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The dizzying pace of world events since the fall of 1989
has surpassed the powers of comprehension of most decision-
makers (and analysts) . The world order in place since the end
of the Second World War faded with the revolutions of Eastern
Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union relegated it to
the annals of history. The East-West paradigm which shaped
most American foreign policy decision-making for over forty
years has disappeared, and with it the foundations of many of
the institutions dependent upon the Cold War.
A. HYPOTHESIS AND PURPOSE
This thesis examines several of the key issues affecting
the future of the American security relationship with Europe.
Specifically, it attempts to answer the_ question, "Will the
United States be reduced to a marginal role in European
security affairs owing to the emergence of a more autonomous
West European defense identity?" In order to prepare for this
analysis, it is necessary first to review key elements of the
recent history of European security affairs. This
introduction then considers various issues concerning alliance
affairs, especially those dealing with the formation and
cohesion of alliances.
B. RECENT WORLD CHANGES
Shortly after the end of World War II, the political and
military scene in Europe developed into a distinct bipolar
order. Soviet troops of occupation remained in Eastern
Europe, and these nations were denied the opportunity to
implement promised democratic reforms. The beginning of the
Cold War and the development of alliance systems based on this
bipolarity were to shape strategic planning worldwide for the
next forty years. Nearly every political event throughout the
world was analyzed in terms of its significance for the East-
West struggle, whether it be in East Asia, South America, or
West Africa. The Soviets and the Americans engaged in a
contest for the loyalties of both established and newly
independent governments across the globe. Proxy wars were
common; as important as were the Arab-Israeli Wars to the
combatants, the results were often portrayed as victories and
defeats for the superpowers. In addition, fear of the "domino
effect" came to influence much strategic planning.
The international system resulting from bipolarity was
characterized by the formation of numerous security alliances.
Though the most important was the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) , other "Western" alliances included the
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) . Each was tasked with carrying
out President Truman's containment policy, designed to resist
the spread of Communism. The containment of Communism was a
major rationale for the Korean War and for the effort to
prevent the fall of South Vietnam. Much of President Reagan's
foreign policy involved contesting Communist regimes and
insurgents all over the globe. Political events were
considered peripheral if not directly involved in the Cold War
struggle; the fight to contain Communism was one of the
supreme political goals of the West.
The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of
the Soviet Union, and that empire's subsequent decline and
collapse, have led to a paradigm shift among Western strategic
planners. No longer simply able to base their defense needs
on the requirement to meet the Soviet threat, Western
countries must reexamine the missions of their military forces
and the reasons for maintaining the alliances in which they
have participated. While most believe that the newly
introduced uncertainty is preferable to the possibility of a
catastrophic superpower nuclear exchange that was inherent in
the Cold War, some analysts, such as John J. Mearsheimer,
believe that the stability and predictability of the Cold War
will be missed. 1 The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 has
opened the door for the entrance of new players into the
central forum of international politics. Germany's 1990
reunification has introduced a powerful economic entity that
is beginning to assert political power commensurate with its
aJohn J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold
War," The Atlantic Monthly , August 1990.
economic strength. The directions Germany chooses in the
future will be crucial to the future of Western security.
As the bipolar order has crumbled, its replacement is as
yet uncertain. The quick fall of the USSR conferred on the
United States the position of the world's sole superpower, a
role the U.S. played during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis
and war. Still, this does not mean that a unipolar system is
inevitable, especially as the relative importance of military,
political, and economic sources of influence is in flux. Some
have recommended German and Japanese permanent membership on
the United Nations Security Council, while others have
expressed interest in the European Community (EC) assuming
such status. As Russia recovers from the pain of Communism,
its future political status will be uncertain. China may also
play a larger role in international politics in the 1990s.
American strategic planners must take all these possible
scenarios into account as they examine the international
environment in which the U.S. will carry out foreign and
security policy in the coming years.
C. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
An important change in post-Cold War politics is the
acceleration of the process of European integration. Stemming
from the 1948 Brussels Pact and the 1950 European Coal and
Steel Community, the union process has progressed toward a
common market, monetary union, some components of social and
political union, and certain aspects of united foreign and
security policies. European integration is important because
it shows how Western Europe changed as a result of World War
II, after which the world's leading powers became the United
States and the Soviet Union. Europe's historical powers,
unable to defend themselves or rebuild individually, were
forced to seek strength through unity, ultimately backed up by
the U.S. As one British scholar has stated,
[The North Atlantic] pact ... revealed the inability of
[Britain and France] not only to shape the postwar world,
but to defend themselves. In 1939 Britain and France were
seen to be the world's leading powers; ten years later
they needed American support to survive. 2
In the years since, the integration process has both
deepened and widened, culminating in the planned 1992 economic
integration agreed to in Luxembourg in 1987 and confirmed in
Maastricht in 1991. While there are limits to the degree of
actual and projected integration, such as Britain's ability to
"opt out" of monetary union, the EC has established itself as
an economic bloc and as a political force. Efforts are also
underway to transform economic union into political union, a
more difficult undertaking. As an outgrowth, and partly as a
result of efforts to satisfy American demands for more
balanced burden-sharing and the need for insurance in the
event the U.S. ever failed to honor its security commitment,
2John W. Young, Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe,
1945-1951 (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1984),
107.
the Europeans have embarked on attempts to define and conduct
common security policies.
The process of redesigning European security, involving
the attribution of roles to NATO, the Western European Union
(WEU) , CSCE, the EC, and possibly other institutions, is far
from showing a clear direction, however. Each of the major
players (France, Germany, Britain, to a lesser extent Italy,
and of course the United States) has its own goals for the
process; their goals sometimes mesh but often do not.
Moreover, there are serious divergences within the domestic
political entities of the key nations which increase the
complexity of the security picture. In one sense, moves
toward a common security policy and in time a common defense
reflect the view of many that such policies will complete the
process of West European integration, and as such are
essential. At the same time, however, the December 1991
Maastricht Summit highlighted the differences among the EC
members that make the challenge of forging common policies
particularly difficult. One important driver for those
favoring and opposing common defense policies is the future
course of the United States, which remains unclear yet sure to
wield considerable influence.
D. CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES
The post-Cold War United States finds itself in a much
different condition than the country which emerged from the
Second World War as one of the most powerful nations history-
has ever known. The consensus that formed to permit and
support institutionalized American involvement in European
political and military affairs has been shaken as a result of
a number of domestic pressures. The chronic U.S. budget and
trade deficits of the 1980s have led to calls for large cuts
in defense spending, including in Europe, as well as for
various types of protectionism. The issue of burden-sharing
has gained political momentum as the Soviet threat has
evaporated. The stalemate of the Uruguay Round of GATT talks
to progress has hinted at the link between transatlantic trade
relations and security ties.
The American public has shown, in a number of recent
opinion surveys, that it would like the government to shift
much of its attention from international and military affairs
to domestic issues. 3 At the same time, pressure on Congress
to adopt protectionist measures has increased with the growth
of anti-foreigner sentiments around the country, notably
"Japan-bashing" protests about Japanese trade practices.
Prominent individuals, such as Pat Buchanan with his "America
First" campaign, add to the pressure for the U.S. to withdraw
from many of its overseas commitments, including those in
Europe
.
3See for example R.W. Apple, Jr., "Majority in Poll Fault
Focus by Bush on Global Policy but Back New Order, " New York
Times, October 11, 1991, A8
.
Much of what is transpiring on both sides of the Atlantic
stems from what is perceived as a loss of American power and
influence. Though the purpose here is not to attempt a
thorough survey of power and its measurement, American
influence in Europe has changed in several ways since the
early postwar period. Clearly, the relative economic weight
of the United States has changed considerably from the late
1940 's and early 1950 's, when its undamaged wartime economy
was dominant. Economic growth has made Japan the world's
largest creditor and has shifted much economic power away from
the U.S. In addition, the recent steps toward amalgamation of
most West European nations into one prospering and growing
entity (the combination of European Community and European
Free Trade Association countries) with a larger market than
the U.S. further changes the balance of economic power.
Perhaps the most important factor is that the significance
of the various types of power has changed with the passing of
the Cold War. As significant as economic and political power
have been, the very nature of the perceived threat from the
Soviets ensured that military power, of which the U.S. held a
preponderant share in the West, would be the most important
type. Without the Soviet threat, and with the perception that
the American economy has weakened relative to Europe and
Japan, Europe's economic power may serve to diminish American
influence in Europe. Joseph Nye has noted the diffusion of
power through economic interdependence, transnational actors,
8
nationalism in weaker states, the spread of technologies, and
the rise to importance of new political issues. 4 At the same
time, however, it should be recalled that, as the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf War indicated, decisive political and diplomatic
power continues to reside in the United States. According to
Nye, "The natural decline [of American power] after 1945 is
often exaggerated by comparison with a mythical past, when
America allegedly 'bestrode the world. '
"
s Shifts in both the
amount and type of power will significantly affect the future
of U. S . -European security relations.
E. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE
The American public's desire that the federal government
devote greater attention to domestic issues than to foreign
affairs has been adopted by a Congress that has increasingly
asserted its role in the making of foreign policy. With the
end of the clear Soviet threat, Congress as a whole will be
able to take advantage of its Constitutional powers of the
purse, while the Senate will have added clout in the advising
and consenting over much policy-making. This is significant
because of the added pressure on the President to take policy
initiatives, knowing the Congress is poised to do so in the
4Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature
of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 182.
5Ibid., 21.
absence of executive leadership. These developments confer
much more power on the Congress than previously existed.
Regional aspects of American planning will also play an
important role in the future. Considerable U.S. attention has
shifted toward the Pacific Rim. Already providing the largest
American trade market as well as a growing segment of the
American population, Asia is gaining importance in U.S.
strategic planning. 6 As a result, and coupled with additional
attention focusing on the Western Hemisphere and the Middle
East/Persian Gulf region, Europe is losing some of its
predominance in American concentration.
Still, there is no denying the importance of U.S. ties to
Europe. Historical ties and cultural heritage are
significant, as is the economic relationship between the U.S.
and the EC, especially after 1992. Concern about potential
instability in Europe in the near future will also help to
perpetuate the American desire to retain influence in European
security affairs. In order to keep this influence, NATO will
have to survive the Cold War. As one of many members with
nominally equal votes in the CSCE, and no voice in the EC or
WEU, the United States will have to rely on NATO to keep that
influence in the future. The future of not only American
6For purposes of comparison, the "Asian" trading bloc
consists of Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast
Asian states. The data used to rank the various trading blocs
were drawn from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of
Trade Statistics , Washington, D.C., March 1992, 141.
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forces but also American influence in Europe is highly fluid.
European integration will have an impact, as will executive-
legislative wrangling in Washington. U.S. strategic planning
is entering into a new period with few givens, yet is has the
responsibility to plan a viable, cost-effective military
posture
.
F. A EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY AND ALLIANCE THEORY
Alliance cohesion depends on commonly perceived needs and
interests. Stephen M. Walt, in The Origins of Alliances
,
theorizes that alliances are formed in order to balance a
threat. Walt compares his theory to a greatly simplified view
of balance of power theory, in which potential alliance
members choose sides so as to create an overall power balance.
In this way states prevent others from achieving a dominant
position. 7 Walt considers this theory to be mistaken, in
that too many historical examples exist of nations joining
with much stronger powers in contrast to power balancing
7Walt's analysis, primarily drawn from his article
"Alliances in Theory and Practice: What Lies Ahead," Journal
of International Affairs , Summer/Fall 1989, streamlines at
least twenty theories of the "balance of power" into one which
he uses for purposes of comparison. He notes in his article
that he has drawn upon the work of Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126-7
and passim, but Waltz acknowledges the presence of numerous
theories, especially several identified by Ernst Haas, Martin
Wight, and Hans Morgenthau. It is important to note that Walt
has not thoroughly defined the theory to which he is comparing
his own; however, Walt's generalized description of the
"balance of power" is sufficient for differentiating it from
his own theory.
11
behavior. In its place, the "balance of threat" theory holds
that nations facing a common threat join forces in
opposition. 8 In addition, geographic proximity, offensive
capability, and perceived intentions of the potential
aggressor help cement the alliance. The balance of threat
theory is especially effective in explaining the creation of
the Atlantic Alliance in the post-1945 period. Even though
the United States was the predominant world power after the
Second World War, the Western European countries quickly
allied themselves with it because of the commonly perceived
Soviet threat.
The rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 brought
about a significant change from the Soviet Union on the
international political scene. Recognizing the perception
held by others of his country which led to the counteractions
Walt's system describes, Gorbachev acted to overcome its
reputation
.
Since Gorbachev's emergence as general secretary, Soviet
diplomacy has focused on the single overriding goal of
reducing the threat that other nations perceive from the
USSR. 9
8Walt's book, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987), primarily analyzes postwar
alliance behavior in the Middle East. He uses this region to
show that his theory applies outside the bipolar superpower
relationship. Much of the subsequent description in this
section is drawn from Walt's article, "Alliances in theory and
practice: What lies ahead," which analyzes NATO at that time
using his book's framework.
9Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 4.
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Just as for years Soviet leaders had attempted to undermine
NATO's cohesion, one of Gorbachev's motives may well have been
the same. Where all before him had failed, however,
Gorbachev's attempt had the greatest prospect for success
because it weakened the strongest base for the alliance - the
unifying threat. Without the threat the alliance would lose
much of its traditional military purpose; cohesion would
become vulnerable.
The Soviet military nevertheless remained quite powerful.
The NATO countries were able to recognize the difference
between capabilities and intentions and demanded more
definitive action by the Soviets. Much has changed since
Walt's 1989 analysis, however. Given the changes in Eastern
Europe since 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, it is necessary to reexamine Walt's theory and to
consider other theories.
Threat-based planning is essential in producing a national
military strategy. Without threats to consider, it would be
especially difficult to convince a skeptical Congress to spend
huge sums on the defense establishment. Representative Les
Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has
articulated the need for threat-based planning because
. . .no other approach to force planning tells you how much
is enough. . . [and] . . .what citizens look for from their
national security establishment is protection of their
13
vital interests against things they perceive as
threatening them. 10
It is also incumbent upon the members of alliances to hold
common views on what threatens them in order for their
alliances to thrive.
NATO 11 has gained considerable strength since its
founding in 1949. Balancing the continuing threat posed by
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc as a whole contributed
greatly to alliance maintenance. Other factors augmented
NATO's cohesion. First, David Mitrany describes how the
ability of an alliance's members to handle the growing
complexity and importance of technical issues is enhanced by
institutional cooperation, which in turn reinforces the
alliance itself. 12 NATO has been a central forum for
discussion and policy-making in areas ranging from arms
control and aid to Eastern Europe to world security issues.
Second, Karl Deutsch postulates that the continued
cohesion of an alliance depends on three factors: compatible
10Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional
Forces for the Post-Soviet Era, " House Armed Services
Committee, January 24, 1992, 3.
nNATO will be employed as the example for the alliance
theories examined here because of its familiarity and ease of
use. Nevertheless, these theories have general applications
and should be considered applicable to actual and potential
alliances discussed throughout this thesis.
12Mitrany's theory as well as the subsequent ones in this
section are discussed in James E. Dougherty & Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International
Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 419.
14
values, predictability of behavior, and the responsiveness of
allies to each other's needs. 13 Though many political
conflicts have arisen throughout NATO's history, such as those
over France's withdrawal from the integrated military
structure as well as INF issues, Deutsch's factors reflect the
alliance's strengths and have prevailed over the long term.
A third factor is the "sense of community" that develops over
the lifetime of an alliance, which may prevent its dissolution
when its objective is met. 14 This sense of community serves
to institutionalize the alliance in the domestic politics of
the members, further reinforcing it. 15
With the passing of the Soviet Union, the major factor
underlying NATO's formation has seemingly ceased to exist.
Robert Osgood has described alliances as "latent war
communities," 16 and if that is all NATO is, then it has no
chance for survival, regardless of any new political missions
it can assume. Additionally, it will be exceedingly difficult
for any other European alliance to establish itself, unless
the EC becomes a truly supra-national state. On the other
hand, significant threats in the post-Cold War world remain
that, while less deadly than a superpower conflict, would best
13Ibid., 426
14George F. Liska and William R. Riker, in Dougherty &
Pfaltzgraff, 449.
15Walt, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," 11.
16Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 448.
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be handled multilaterally . It is apparent, then, that many-
motivating factors exist which could promote NATO's cohesion
or contribute to its disintegration.
Since the threat is so fundamental to the formation and
cohesion of an alliance, chapter two of the thesis examines
the threats facing Europe. European and American perspectives
are considered to determine whether any basis for an alliance
exists. Next, considering the impact that greater West
European security autonomy might have on U. S . -European
security relations, this eventuality is analyzed from European
and American perspectives. Implications of potential West
European security autonomy for the United States are
highlighted. The next chapter of the thesis focuses on the
two West European nuclear powers, Britain and France, and
their potential nuclear cooperation, again with due attention
to implications for the United States. As nuclear weapons
have been considered both a status symbol and instruments of
national sovereignty, they illustrate well the changing nature
of European security.
The role of Germany in European security structures is
treated separately, primarily analyzing the domestic and
international forces acting on German politics. This chapter
is particularly important because of Germany's role as a
pillar in both NATO and the EC/WEU structures. Next, the
future of NATO is examined, in view of the previously analyzed
topics and domestic political trends in the United States.
16
Finally, an attempt is made to draw together recurrent themes
and to identify the critical factors in the interrelationships
among the key nations. This analysis illustrates the
implications for the United States of actions the Europeans
are taking as well as of those in progress in the U.S.
17
II. THREATS AND DEFENSE ALLIANCES
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to determine what security
risks and threats might justify the maintenance of a European
military alliance, whether it be NATO or any other pact.
Richard Hart Sinnreich's 1975 observation is still
appropriate: "The danger [of NATO's unravelling] is greater
when the threat against which the alliance is principally
directed declines, or is perceived to do so." 17 Though this
comment referred to the Soviet threat, it applies equally to
any threat (s) around which an alliance is formed. This
analysis draws its theoretical basis largely from Walt's
balance of threat theory, in order to consider the threats
described by leading officials from Western Europe and the
United States. It then offers judgments as to whether as a
whole these risks and threats are likely to sustain an
alliance. The chapter begins with a review of some
traditional views of the postwar threats to Europe. It
proceeds to an analysis of the threats within Europe from
European and American perspectives, and then does the same
with threats originating outside Europe. It concludes with an
17Richard Hart Sinnreich, "NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma,"
Orbis , Summer 1975, 461.
18
explanation of why the post-Cold War risks and threats will
probably be sufficient to justify a continued Atlantic
Alliance and a Western European security alliance.
B. TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF THE THREAT
The paramount security concern for the United States and
its European allies after World War II was the threat posed by
the Soviet Union. This threat was perceived as being manifest
in different ways by different countries. Greatly simplified,
Konrad Adenauer saw a direct military threat to West Germany;
the British and French envisioned threats to their empires;
and the United States saw the threat through the operation of
the domino theory. A clear picture of how the threat was
considered in the past is important in understanding how it
has changed in the post-Cold War period, especially across
national perspectives.
The British and the French emerged from World War II on
the second tier of world powers, displaced from the top tier
by the United States and the Soviet Union. The psychological
reaction to this change was as significant as the real
implications of this shift in international security.
Initially, the French in particular feared the threat of a
revived Germany, while the British, though less fearful, were
19
still cautious. 18 In time, however, the concerns of the two
nations shifted. Both the British and French were left with
declining empires, the dissolution of which accelerated in the
late 1950s, but which both were determined to keep in some
form. Though both were concerned with the Soviet threat on
the central front, each had to deal with threats to its
empire, whether inspired by the Soviets or not. 19 The
possession of worldwide colonial interests, as opposed to the
overarching anti-Soviet global scope of the United States,
forced British and French attention to be split. The prime
concern remained in Central Europe, but forces and planning
were devoted to threats of national concern elsewhere.
In West Germany's case, the concern focused exclusively on
the Soviet military threat in Central Europe. Konrad Adenauer
cast his lot firmly with the United States and the West, and
in so doing had the support of the overwhelming majority of
the West German people. 20 Even into the 1980 's public
opinion largely reflected this opinion. Germany has shown
18For a detailed description of the postwar German
question see John W. Young, Britain, France, and the Unity of
Europe 1945-1951 (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press,
1984) .
19Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the
1990
' s , Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), 14.
20Mary Fitzgerald, et al . , Challenges to NATO Stratecrv -
Implications for the 1990 's . National Security Research, 1990,
184.
20
little interest in threats outside the NATO area. Only
reluctantly did Germany participate in Operation Desert Storm
by sending frigates and mine countermeasures ships to the
eastern Mediterranean and protecting aircraft to NATO ally
Turkey. 21 As the Soviet threat has declined, a majority of
Germans has come to view the Soviets and their successors
favorably, 22 a product of closer bilateral relations begun by
the policy of Ostpolitik. 23 During the Cold War, alliance
membership was imperative as the threat was unquestioned; the
Cold War's end has raised new uncertainties.
For the United States the threat has been broad but
simple: halting the spread of Communism. Beginning with
George Kennan's "X" article of 1947, the United States has
pursued a policy of containment for this purpose. 24 For
21Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis, " Survival ,
May/June 1991, 250-5.
22A recent German poll showed almost three-quarters of
those surveyed (ranging across political party lines) viewed
the Soviets very favorably or somewhat favorably. Taken
before the August 1991 coup and subsequent breakup of the
Soviet Union, it is clear that such an attitude toward the
Soviets and their successors remains strong. See Ralf Zoll,
"Public Opinion on Security Policy and Armed Forces: The
German Case, " paper presented at the International Meeting on
the Future of Security in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of
European Public Opinion, Brussels, December 16-17, 1991, 18.
23Peter Meroth, "Germany 2000: The State We Want for
Ourselves," Suddeutsche Zeitunq , January 4, 1991, 8-15
( Foreign Broadcast Information Service - West Europe Daily
Report [hereafter designated FBIS-WE] , January 15, 1991, 22).
24X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs ,
July 1947 (reprinted in Foreign Affairs , Spring 1987)
.
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years the Americans viewed nearly any threat or crisis as
Communist -inspired, and military planners reacted accordingly
.
Though recent analyses have speculated that the threat from
the Warsaw Pact may have been overestimated, it is
nevertheless clear that this threat thoroughly dominated U.S.
planning. 25 The domino theory of the 1960 's and 1970 's was
popularly used to explain simply the American view of the
Soviet threat. This U.S. view differed from that of some of
America's key allies, in that while the U.S. view concentrated
on the central front in Europe-, it demonstrated worldwide
concern. This differentiation might, under less threatening
circumstances, reduce alliance cohesion, because of the
importance of common perceptions of the threat. A survey of
current threat perspectives is, therefore, essential in
determining whether significant European-American divergences
exist
.
C. RISKS ORIGINATING WITHIN EUROPE
1. European Perspectives
In order for the threat or security risk to be
sufficient to warrant the continuation either of NATO or
another security alliance in Western Europe, it must be viewed
25Report of the Defense Policy Council of the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, "The Fading
Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline," 101st
Cong., 2nd sess., July 9, 1990, 3.
22
to be sufficiently serious by each of the main participants.
As already described, these main actors are the UK, France,
Germany, and in some cases Italy, though the views of other
nations should be taken into account in a comprehensive
analysis. Without the threat, there would be no reason for
nations to take part in organizations other than those
promoting political or economic cooperation. As a result,
this examination considers threat assessments as seen by each
of the primary actors. In discussing threats involving the
former Soviet Union, the word "risk" often replaces the word
"threat," as in NATO documents, not only to reflect the
warming of relations between East and West, but also to
emphasize the level of uncertainty which now exists in Europe.
The Western Europeans consider that several risks or
threats to security remain in Europe, including instability in
the newly independent former Soviet republics and Eastern
Europe, the spillover of refugees and/or fighting from the
East, and the possibility of a resurgent Russia. In addition,
some have expressed concern about the possibility of
instability in Western Europe itself, fearing the revival of
the nationalism that was subdued in the wake of two world
wars. 26 Prominent Germans have spoken of the need to form as
26The terms stability and instability have often been used
rather loosely both in the literature and in official
government statements. Webster's New World Dictionary (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1980) defines stability as "the
state or quality of being stable, or fixed; steadiness," or
"the capacity of an object to return to equilibrium or to its
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quickly as possible a new security structure in Europe while
the Germans maintain their pro-European stance, in order to
dissipate any concerns over post-reunification German
nationalism. As Chancellor Kohl has stated, "I advise anyone
afraid of the Germans to join in building a firm roof over
Germany. Then these fears will be completely overcome." 27
NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has spoken of the need
for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe to prevent
the return of the nationalistic rivalries for power that
plagued Europe for so many years. 28 Nationalism could also
manifest a threat by encouraging separatist movements in
Spain, in France, and elsewhere. Results from Yugoslavia and
the former Soviet Union will be especially instructive in this
regard.
original position after having been displaced." In
international security terms, instability implies a lack of
enduring political, social, and economic institutions or
consistent relations with neighbors. Eastern Europe has long
had a history of failing to meet these definitions, and fear
of new upheavals in this region and further to the east raises
concerns throughout Western Europe, especially because the
Soviet successor states are likely to be at least as
vulnerable to instability as the Eastern Europeans. Questions
about the results of nationalism have been a recurrent theme
articulated by many experts, including Josef Joffe. Joffe's
arguments will be presented in later chapters.
27Marc Fisher, "'German Question' Bedevils European
Unification Talks," from the Washington Post
,
printed in the
San Jose Mercury News , December 8, 1991, 12A.
28Manfred Woerner, "NATO's Major Political Tasks," speech
at Detroit June 26, 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day , August
15, 1991, 643.
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Risks posed by instability throughout the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) are potentially the most dangerous
of all. The large stockpile of nuclear weapons within the
borders of these republics, the political leanings of which
remain unpredictable, raises the potential for catastrophe in
Europe. Former German Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg,
a staunch advocate of NATO and the American role in European
security, has declared that, "We have a vested interest in
having stability in [the former Soviet Union] increase hand in
hand with internal progress." 29 This opinion has been echoed
by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, who considers the
American role in post-Cold War Europe to be as important as
that following World War II, because of the risks posed by the
new ex-Soviet republics - especially the nuclear ones. He
calls the Americans "the biggest security trump that Europe
has ever had." 30 The French, in reiterating their desire for
an American military presence to remain in Europe, have also
cited dangers from the former Soviet Union as motivating the
desire for a continuing American role. As the French
ambassador to the United States has stated,
...there is a feeling that [NATO] must be kept for reasons
of military protection in case the situation changes and
29Interview with Gerhard Stoltenberg, "The Bundeswehr Must
not Economize Itself to Death," Die Welt , September 9, 1991,
6 (FBIS-WE, September 10, 1991, 11)
.
30Interview with Douglas Hurd, "Do not Isolate Europe,
"
Per Spiegel , October 28, 1991, 203-7 (FBIS-WE, October 29,
1991, 6) .
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a threat reappears. [W]hile making [changes to NATO's
military structure] , we must maintain a military doctrine
which makes sense, we must make sure that, if a threat
materializes again, there will be deterrence. [This]
involves keeping some American nuclear arms in Europe, and
protecting the French and British forces of
deterrence . . . . 31
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) has accurately described the threat posed by potential
disorders in Eastern Europe, noting that in the Balkans,
" [the] breakdown of authoritarian order freed people with
long-frustrated separatist and irredentist impulses to pursue
their national ambitions .. .a threat of disintegration
looms." 32 Yugoslavia exemplifies both the separatist and
irredentist impulses. Irrendentist sentiment is common
throughout much of Eastern Europe - and part of Western Europe
- as recent European public opinion has shown considerable
support for this principle in a number of countries. 33
Stoltenberg has also expressed concern over the implications
of a possible reignition of historic Balkan instability, as
"this potential for conflict, given a critical development,
31Jacques Andreani , "France and European Challenges,"
speech before the World Affairs Council of Boston, October 8,
1991, 14-15.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic
Survey 1990-1991 (London: Pergammon-Brassey ' s , 1991), 13.
33
"What Europeans Think, " Los Angeles Times , September 17,
1991, HB/C. This extensive public opinion survey, conducted
by the Times Mirror Service, showed that territorial disputes
remained important in the minds of many in Europe.
Dissatisfaction with current borders ran at 39% in Germany,
48% in Spain, 52% in Bulgaria, and as high as 68% in Hungary.
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can destabilize the international order in Europe and thus
also endanger the bases for our existence." 34 German Foreign
Minister Genscher, who has echoed his colleague's concerns,
stated before the United Nations, "We want the Western
Alliance (NATO) to continue its efforts to ensure stability
throughout Europe in a changing political environment." 35
Britain's NATO representative has enumerated essentially the
same threats to Europe from Eastern European uncertainties,
including nationalism in an environment in which the




The potential spillover of refugees and conflict is of
particular concern in Western Europe. Germany and Italy are
already facing an accelerating influx of immigrants from
Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) . The numbers will increase if
fighting in Yugoslavia continues and as economic hardships
cause others to leave the former Eastern Bloc countries. It
is therefore of great interest to the Western Europeans that
they prevent the escalation of crises in Eastern Europe. The
conflict over what course of action to take in Yugoslavia
34
" Stoltenberg Warns of Military Risks in Europe, " Hamburg
DPA, January 30, 1992, 1215 GMT (FBIS-WE February 3, 1992,
17) .
35Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The United States of Europe,
"
speech before the United Nations General Assembly, September
25, 1991, in Vital Speeches of the Day , October 1, 1991, 9.
36Sir Michael Alexander, "European Security and the CSCE,
NATO Review , August 1991, 10.
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within the EC and the WEU has reflected deep concern over
becoming directly involved, yet fear of the consequences if
the war continues. While the French and Germans have
supported action by the EC and the UN, the British have been
especially reluctant to enter a situation in which they could
become entangled without hope for an easy exit. 37 This
attitude reflects a general hesitancy by the British to
involve themselves in the violence which has occurred in
Eastern Europe; it appears that the British hope merely that
closer cooperation with allies on'security affairs may be able
to prevent its spread. 38
Though the scenario of the Cold War becoming hot has
been laid to rest, uncertainties resulting from political
volatility and the presence of a vast nuclear arsenal in the
former Soviet Union constitute a serious risk that has been
considered by Western military planners. Some have even
spoken of the dangers of a resurgent (post-Yeltsin) Russia.
Prior to his resignation in January 1991, French Defence
Minister Chevenement reiterated the need for a continued
American presence on the continent, including nuclear weapons,
to counter a possible resurgent Moscow-centered risk because
37
"EC Presidency Sets Terms for Peacekeeping Force, " Paris
AFP, September 17, 1991, 1408 GMT (FBIS-WE, September 18,
1991, 1-2) .
38Philip A.G. Sabin, British Strategic Priorities in the
1990
' s , Adelphi Paper 254 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Winter 1990), 19.
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of the vast arsenal that remains in place - east and west of
the Urals. In addition, the French rejected the London
Declaration as unrealistically diminishing the effectiveness
of Western nuclear deterrence in light of continued
uncertainty about the former Soviet Union. 39 Former British
Defence Secretary Tom King gave much the same assessment after
the attempted coup in August 1991, rejecting more substantial
defense cuts in the UK while the unstable Soviet Union
maintained its large military arsenal, despite statements by
Boris Yeltsin that Russia's nuclear missiles were no longer
targeted on the UK. 40 As long as politics in Russia and the
other former Soviet republics remain so fluid, Western
European military planners will remain cautious. This
uncertainty strengthens their desire to see American forces
keep their active role in Europe, as well as the need for
military alliances.
2. American Perspectives
American perspectives on the indigenous European
threats are in many ways similar to those of the Western
Europeans. Nevertheless, certain differences play important
39Lothar Ruehl , "Eternal Peace in Europe is a Promise, not
a Certainty, " Interview with Jean-Pierre Chevenement in Die
Welt , January 14, 1991, 7 (FBIS-WE, January 15, 1991, 39-40) .
40Simon Tisdall, Jonathan Steele, "Yeltsin Blunts Nuclear
Threat; Russians to Turn Missiles away from all U.S. Cities,"




roles in American alliance strategy and strategic planning.
Some senior American officials have expressed concern about
continuing threats to the security of Western Europe. Defense
Secretary Dick Cheney, stated in a November 1991 interview
that
,
We've got a vital interest in staying involved in European
security questions. Twice in this century we've had to go
to war because we didn't have the capacity to influence
events in Europe. We don't want to have that happen
again , 41
Cheney also indicated that his concerns were not American
inventions, but reflective of similar feelings in Europe.
. . .a prominent European public official a couple of weeks
ago explained to me privately that much as Europe wants to
develop a new security identity, and as much as there's
this desire to knit together the fabric of European
identity in this regard, that the historic animosities are
still just under the surface. 42
Some U.S. academics, including Professor John Mearsheimer of
the University of Chicago, believe that Western Europe left to
its own devices will revert back to the old state system that
created incentives for aggression. Mearsheimer calls
"hypernationalism" the "single greatest democratic threat to
peace" in Europe. 43 Some U.S. experts fear that this
hypernationalism, left unchecked, could create conflicts that
might force the United States to intervene militarily in
4IDick Cheney, interview by the San Diego Union , November
12, 1991, 3.
42 Ibid., 4
43John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold
War," Atlantic Monthly , August 1990, 36-37.
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Europe once again. It is this threat (among others) which
motivates some U.S. observers to favor the United States
remaining institutionally involved in the security affairs of
Europe
.
In addition to this threat, the United States takes
seriously risks posed by the former Soviet Union, both as a
result of instability and in view of the long-term potential
for military resurgence. Prominent Americans - administration
officials and others - have stated that the greatest risk
results from an uncertain future - economically, politically,
and socially. 44 Such uncertainty has led writers and
officials to refer to the former Soviet Union as a "Weimar
republic." 45 Military forces of the ex-USSR could use the
resulting turmoil to their advantage; the uncertainty and
unpredictability of the European security environment
necessitates the continued adherence to the four foundations
of the national security strategy, especially forward
presence. 45 Defense Secretary Cheney shares these concerns
and also believes that the failure of democratic reforms could
44This opinion is held by, among others, former President
Nixon, who articulated his position at a recent Washington,
D.C. speech. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush Cites Limits on
Aid to Russia," New York Times , March 12, 1992, Al .
45See for example Dick Cheney, "Annual Report to the
President and the Congress of the Secretary of Defense,
"
Washington, DC, February 19 92, 5.
46John R. Galvin, statement before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 3,
1992, 1-2.
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create instability that could spread beyond the borders of the
new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and augment the
unrest that already exists in Eastern Europe. 47
While most attention recently has been devoted to
political aspects of instability in the former Soviet Union,
the large CIS military arsenal remains a concern in the United
States as well. Though the possibility has become
increasingly remote, the reversibility of ex-Soviet troop
withdrawals from Eastern Europe will be a topic of
consideration as Eastern Europe faces an uncertain political
future for as long as some of these forces remain. The
question of capabilities vs. intentions cannot be ignored,
and attention to CIS military capabilities has been
responsible for much of the Pentagon's continuing efforts to
modernize American forces. 48
Instability in Eastern Europe is of great importance
to the United States because of the risk of its spreading into
Western Europe. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment named
instability as one of the key trends in the transitional
47Dick Cheney, statement before the U.S. House Committee
on the Budget, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., February 5, 1992, 11-
14.
48See for example, Colin Powell, The National Military
Strategy , 1992, as well as the New York Times article
regarding future military scenarios reportedly considered by
Pentagon planners, in Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New
Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold War Era, " New York Times
,
February 17, 1992, Al
.
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environment in Europe. 49 Secretary of State Baker in June
1991 concurred, stating,
In Central and Eastern Europe, . .
.
, devolution [of power
from the national governments] is certainly the more
prominent phenomenon. With the collapse of Communism,
ethnicity has reemerged as a powerful political force,
threatening to erect new divisions between countries and,
even more acutely, within multinational states. 50
The President's National Security Strategy also reflects
concern over the threats from regional conflicts, especially
those in Eastern Europe. 51
It is significant that not only do the Western
Europeans and the Americans both continue to see serious
security risks or threats in the future of Europe, but also
that their assessments are essentially similar. Without such
consistent assessments, re-nationalized military policies
could develop, an outcome that most would find highly
undesirable. 52 Though nearly all acknowledge that the
unifying Soviet threat of the Cold War era no longer exists in
its old form, there remain many concerns in Europe that tend
to point in the direction of a continued need for collective
49Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net
Assessment , Washington, DC, March 1991, 12-1.
50James Baker, "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture from West
to East," speech at Berlin, June 18, 1991, 4.
51George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States , Washington, DC, August 1991, 7.
52 Ian Gambles, Prospects for West European Security
Cooperation , Adelphi Paper 244 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1989), 19.
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defense. The next section examines security threats and
challenges beyond Europe.
D. THREATS ORIGINATING OUTSIDE EUROPE
1. European Perspectives
Threats coming from outside Europe take a number of
forms and are significant enough that some have referred to
NATO's protective boundary as having shifted from facing the
East to facing the South. As David Greenwood has observed,
...the collapse of the Eastern Bloc has been so
precipitous and the instabilities across NATO's southern
boundary - from the Maghreb to the Middle East - are so
pervasive that the next several years could well be
punctuated by periodic crises on Western Europe's
perimeter. 53
In general these threats consist of terrorism, regional
rivalries and instabilities, demographic pressures, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems - an issue potentially compounded by the
existence of unemployed Russian scientists.
France, located geographically close to North Africa,
and retaining important economic, cultural, and security ties
with its former colonies, considers it important that any
European security organization address its concerns to the
south. The French are particularly concerned about threats
from the Maghreb, especially Libya and Algeria, as reflected
53David Greenwood, "Refashioning NATO's Defences," NATO
Review, December 1990, 3.
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in recent public opinion poll information. 54 The historical
animosity of many Algerians toward France in the post-colonial
phase, coupled with improving Algerian weapons technology
(primarily imported)
,
gives France concern over the relatively
short distance separating the two countries. According to
Diego Ruiz Palmer, France has developed
. . .an unusual sense of vulnerability to events outside its
control. At the same time, the Gulf War has called
attention to neglected emerging extra-European security
risks, while feeding apprehensions that the conflict with
Iraq could, in the long-term, develop into a wider scale
confrontation between the West and the Muslim world. 55
France is placing more emphasis on preparedness for out-of-
area contingencies such as the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. 5 '
Potential threats from North Africa cause considerable concern
in Italy as well.
For Germany, the out-of-area threats are not as
imminent as they are for France. In addition Germany faces
the constitutional debate over its Basic Law, which some have
cited as prohibiting German military involvement in activities
outside the NATO area. Former defense Minister Stoltenberg
54Recent French polling data reflected in FBIS shows that
the French public believes strongly that the threat has
shifted from the East to the South by a 58-8% margin. Of
those believing in a threat from the South, 22% consider the
threat coming from Algeria (up from 6% in 1990) . 52% consider
Iraq the main threat. "Poll: Military Threat Perceived from





has nevertheless declared German interest in many of the same
threats that preoccupy Germany's allies, such as demographic
pressures and weapons proliferation. 5 Foreign Minister
Genscher, while hesitant about the use of the Bundeswehr in
alliance activities out-of-area, has suggested German
participation in UN-sanctioned efforts as a first step,
recognizing that Germany is affected by these threats and that
German participation is essential as Germany's international
role grows. 58
In the British case, geographical separation may
account for a lower level of interest in some of the threats
that concern the French and Germans. Though former Defence
Secretary Tom King has acknowledged the potential emergence of
North African demographic threats to Southern Europe, he says
that " [t]he risk [posed by the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction in the Third World] has never been
greater." 59 He has also mentioned the spread of ballistic
missile technology, highlighted by Saddam Hussein in the
Persian Gulf War. The British have closely followed threats
to regional stability by leaders like Hussein.
"Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European Security
Policy and Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of Change in
Europe," speech in Bonn, April 10, 1991, 3-4.
58
"Right of Intervention Demanded, " Frankfurter
Allqemeine , May 24, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, May 28, 1991, 7)
.
59Peter Mulligan and John Winder, "King Wields Nuclear
Shield," London Times , January 15, 1992, 5.
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Various Europeans agree with these threat assessments.
Though NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner has stated that,
"We do not need a threat... We have become nothing but an
insurance company against risks," he quickly adds that NATO
must provide insurance against dangers coming from the region
spanning the Maghreb and the Middle East. 60 Additionally,
the Rome NATO Summit enumerated risks for which the new
strategic concept plans: the "proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources
and actions of terrorism and sabotage." 61 In addition to the
threats described above, France and the United Kingdom face
threats to their ex-colonies, unlike most of their allies.
Long a domestic problem, such threats may become more of an
alliance issue, as allies help each other in combatting
crises. Should this trend continue, no assessment of threats
or risks to Europe will be complete without including colonial
and post-colonial matters. In the British case, the 1982
Falklands War provides an excellent example. In that war, the
British relied on the United States for intelligence
information and on NATO navies to fill gaps left by Royal Navy
ships involved in the war. France has been involved in
disturbances or wars around the globe for many years,
60Dietmar Seher and Ingo Preissler, "We Do Not Need a
Threat," interview with Manfred Woerner, Berliner Zeitunq ,
October 5-6, 1991, 5 (FBIS-WE, October 9, 1991, 1)
.
61North Atlantic Council, "Rome Declaration on Peace and
Cooperation," Rome, November 8, 1991, paragraph 19.
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including most recently Zaire, where it cooperated with
Belgium in an attempt to restore order and protect foreign
nationals in the former Belgian colony. In this effort the
United States aided the Europeans with transport aircraft.
French interests stretch from sub-Saharan Africa to the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, and to North Africa and the Middle
East . 62
2. American Perspectives
Though the details of the threat assessments in the
United States generally agree with those in Europe, the U.S.
tends to have a different outlook on them. The opinion that
every threat must be examined in terms of the U.S. -Soviet
strategic rivalry has been replaced by the selectivity
described in President Bush's Aspen Speech of August 1990. 63
Even in the new security environment, however, the United
States is careful to analyze every potential threat for its
possible implications for world stability. For this reason
the scope of American threat assessment is broader than that
of most of the West European allies; the French and the
British take a more global perspective than do most other West
European nations.
62Ruiz Palmer, 25.
"See George Bush, speech to the Aspen Institute
Symposium, Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990.
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American strategic planning and threat assessments
have generally accepted that the U.S. will be unable to fight
major wars alone and that coalition strategies will be
required. The Iraqi case demonstrates that the U.S. must
expend considerable effort to ensure that its allies perceive
the threat as the U.S. does in order to form the coalition.
Defense Secretary Cheney summarizes the American situation:
We have already seen that regional tensions, such as the
conflict in the Gulf, can pose serious threats to our
national interests. [Additionally, w] ithout democratic
traditions for the peaceful resolution of political
conflict, some new democracies have been threatened with
civil violence, unrest, and war. Other threats, including
terrorism, illegal drugs, and low-intensity conflict, can
weaken the fabric of democratic societies. 64
To combat these threats, the United States would likely
require coalition support, because the scope of operations
might well exceed the limits of American power. The U.S.
European commander, General John Galvin, added Africa to the
list of regions where growing instability had the potential
for escalation, and noted that operations such as the




Two other major areas of concern to the United States
in the European as well as worldwide sense are proliferation
64Dick Cheney, "Annual Report to the President and the
Congress of the Secretary of Defense," vi
.
65John R. Galvin, "Statement before the United States
Senate Committee on Armed Services," 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
March 7, 1991, 5.
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and terrorism. Despite the efforts of supporters of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control
Regime, numerous Third World countries could have a small,
usable nuclear force by the year 2000. Coupled with
developments in delivery systems, certain governments in North
Africa and the Middle East might pose a profound threat to
Southern Europe. Secretary of the Navy Garrett has listed
terrorists and "modern-armed Third World regional bullies" as
the major threats in the European and Middle Eastern
theater 66
, while House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les
Aspin has enumerated opposition to regional aggressors,
prevention of the spread of mass terror weapons, and fighting
terrorism as challenges requiring military responses. 67
A wide range of potential risks and threats face the
United States and its West European allies from outside
Europe. The U.S., Britain, France, and Germany generally
assess them similarly. It is increasingly clear that none
would welcome the prospect of facing these challenges alone,
even if any one country, including the United States, were
capable of doing so.
66H. Lawrence Garrett, III, "Secretary of the Navy's
Posture Statement FY 1992-93," February 1991, 4.
67See Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American
Conventional Forces for the Post-Soviet Era, " House Armed
Services Committee, January 24, 1992. This paper is devoted
to current and future threats facing the U.S. military.
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E. CONCLUSION
In order to validate Walt's hypothesis, the threat would
have to be assessed by the potential or actual allies as
sufficient to warrant formation or continuation of an
alliance. Though the single, unifying threat from the former
Soviet Union no longer exists in its original form, there
remain many threats and risks commonly accepted as serious by
the Western allies, including the United States. Though some
of the NATO members, particularly the United States, may not
believe themselves directly threatened by certain specific
dangers, long-standing political, economic, and cultural ties
reinforce the institutional framework that has bound NATO's
members since 1949-50. For the United States a unique
consideration is the desire to avoid having to "rescue" Europe
from itself for a third time. In the eyes of some American
observers, the way to do so is through the perpetuation of
NATO and its American leadership.
West European assessments generally accept that the
potential threats are more in toto than they can handle
without American assistance. Though the French most strongly
wish to see a European security organization under their
influence, they consider a continued military American
presence in Europe necessary. Stoltenberg has asserted the
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need for a sound structure to preserve Europe's stability and
security, 68 and according to Tom King:
. . .the rapid and positive outcome of the military campaign
[in the Persian Gulf War] proved that the principle of
collective defence - on which the defence of Europe has
been based for the last 4 decades - works. 69
American planners may anticipate that a Western security
structure with U.S. participation will continue to be valued
and supported by the West Europeans. Sustaining this
structure, however, will require considerable domestic
political effort, not only in the United States but also in
the West European countries. The U.S. can continue to provide
leadership to an alliance still faced with numerous threats
and risks, but it must be more attentive to West European
needs and sensitivities. Whether NATO will endure in its
current form is discussed in a later chapter; the application
of Walt's theory indicates that some security alliance
involving Western Europe will survive.
68Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change, " 10
69King, 3.
42
III. PROSPECTS FOR WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE AUTONOMY
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter showed that significant threats
remain that warrant the continuation of a defense alliance.
As the world enters the post-Cold War era, however, serious
questions are being asked about the need for collective
defense, about who should provide it, and in what form it
should be provided. The tight U. S . -European relationship has
weakened now that the passing of the Soviet threat has let
other issues come to the forefront. David Yost recognized in
1982 that
...even more serious for the long-term future of the
[Atlantic Alliance] are the growing cleavages between the
United States and West Europe as a whole on such basic
issues as 'out of area' questions, detente, arms control,
and East-West relations. 70
To this list can be added agricultural and other trade issues,
dealing with the Third World, and immigration issues. Coupled
with the shifting American attention toward other regions of
the world among other factors, these considerations are
leading Western Europe toward some type of security autonomy.
The nations involved, primarily those comprising the European
Community (EC) , are attempting to devise a common defense
70David S. Yost, "NATO's Political-Military Challenges,"
Current History , December 1982, 435.
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structure. The December 1991 Maastricht Summit was the
culmination of a lengthy period of negotiations aimed at
creating monetary and political union among the EC's members.
While declared a success by all participants, the Summit
illustrated some of the difficulties involved in forging
common policies among such a disparate membership. In the
end, the EC announced that its members would work to
strengthen the Western European Union (WEU) by "authorizing it
to 'elaborate and implement' community decisions on defense
issues." Those decisions, however, had to be compatible with
existing commitments to NATO. 71 This declaration shows that
the Europeans have yet to determine how all sides can be
satisfied with one structure, and how hard such an achievement
will be to attain.
The question to be examined in this chapter concerns the
prospects for the successful creation of an autonomous West
European security organization. (Autonomous in this thesis
means without the leadership of the United States, but it does
not necessarily mean that a West European defense structure
would not consult with the U.S. before undertaking military
action - for example, in an "out-of -area" contingency beyond
Europe.) European history reveals strands of nationalism,
balance of power politics, and conceptions of the glorified
71Alan Riding, "Measured Steps Toward One Europe: What
was Decided," New York Times, December 12, 1991, A8
.
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nation-state. 72 As described in the previous chapter, the
reemergence of these tendencies remains of concern both in the
United States and in Europe. This possibility is one of the
challenges that efforts toward European unity must overcome,
especially in the security arena.
The three key organizations in the move toward defense
autonomy are the EC, WEU, and NATO. While NATO has cemented
the transatlantic partnership since 1950, the development of
the EC and/or WEU could alter it. Such a result seems
difficult to avoid entirely. This chapter examines the
possibility that the West Europeans in the next several years
will develop an autonomous defense organization under EC
auspices. While its scope may be uncertain and limited as
long as NATO endures, it will be important as a symbol of West
European political unity.
This chapter is organized as follows. Its theoretical
foundation is based on Josef Joffe's idea of "Europe's
American pacifier, " which concludes that the United States has
been absolutely essential in overcoming the nationalistic
disputes that would otherwise plague Western Europe.
Consideration of European perspectives on defense autonomy
follows, including subjects such as the need for a European
defense identity, the role of the WEU, ties to NATO, and
treatment of the U.S. by the West Europeans in the process.
72Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 2.
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A review and analysis of U.S. perspectives is next, covering
historical support for European unity yet concern over
weakening NATO and the American role. The chapter concludes
with some findings and assessments.
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
West European history is full of examples of wars between
the states on the continent, shifting borders, and ethnic
rivalries. Since 1945, however, this cycle has been muted
(with the current exception of Yugoslavia) . Josef Jof fe has
concluded that the reason for this stability in Western Europe
has been the active presence of the United States. As Joffe
writes, "...by extending its guarantee, the United States
removed the prime structural cause of conflict among states -
the search for an autonomous defense policy." 73 By looking
at the history of the two world wars, one can clearly see the
effects of this search for security in a series of shifting
alliances which resulted in war. As Joffe observes, the
United States removed the need for West European states to
provide for their own security so that they could concentrate
their energies on rebuilding after the Second World War. 74
The participation of the U.S. in European security ensured
that the French and Germans could coexist peacefully,
73Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign
Policy , Spring 1984, 68.
74 Ibid., 72.
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providing West European defense with a much sounder foundation
as latent German capabilities were added to the picture and as
French strengths could be directed at the Soviet Union rather
than at West Germany. The threat from the East provided the
motivating force for West European unity and gave the United
States a sufficient reason for entangling itself in European
security affairs. Without specific American participation,
European squabbling could possibly have led to another chain
of events resulting in further conflict. 75
According to Joffe, the participation of the United States
has remained of vital interest. Even after years of peaceful
association in NATO and the European Community, the departure
of the United States could lead to a reversion to the old ways
of European politics. Joffe quotes former West German defense
minister Georg Leber, who in 1973 stated, "There is neither a
political nor a military nor a psychological substitute for
the American commitment in [Western Europe] . Il7b The American
commitment to Western Europe has allowed the Europeans to
produce common political, economic, and social goods for
themselves that they could not have otherwise produced because
the costs of security would have been excessive. As Western
Europe approaches some degree of security autonomy, the




relationships have changed, and the countries of Western
Europe have declared that there can never be war among them
again. Still, as bickering over unification treaties has
occurred, some room for doubt remains over the long term. It
is important, if one accepts Joffe's thesis, that the
Europeans not entirely exclude the United States from Europe's
security affairs. The questions and issues raised by Joffe
are of particular importance at a time when the European
Community considers its own defense.
C. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON DEFENSE AUTONOMY
1. The Need for a European Defense Identity
Various officials and observers have given
justifications for the formation of an autonomous European
defense pillar. These motivations range from those wishing to
deepen the unity of the EC to those believing the U.S.
commitment is losing its reliability. French President
Francois Mitterrand has on a number of occasions expressed the
feeling that the United States will not always be available to
solve Europe's problems, meaning that the progress toward
developing the WEU as West Europe's security pillar must
continue. 77 In an effort to aid the union process, Italy has
attempted to overcome British resistance to more closely
77See for example Alain Chastagnol, "Mitterrand Ready to
Share the Deterrent," Le Quotidien de Paris , January 11-12,
1992, 1 (FBIS-WE, February 6, 1992, 2).
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integrated European security structures in a way that would be
much more difficult for France or even Germany to accomplish.
Historically more a follower than a leader, Italy can more
objectively influence Britain toward European defense
integration than can France or Germany. As a result, the
Italians have been able to bring the British more closely in
line with the "Europeanist " proposals. As Italian Foreign
Minister De Michelis has stated, "The real aim of the Anglo-
Italian [defense initiative of October 1991]... would enable
Britain to accept the concept of a common defense policy." 7 *
This also shows Italy's sincere interest in the concept of an
autonomous European security policy, and shows Italy's ability
to fill a needed gap between Atlanticist and Europeanist
positions
.
Clearly there would be benefits to a strong European
defense identity, some of which would include a more highly
motivated participation in the common defense, the ability to
act where the NATO Treaty has been interpreted to limit
operations, and reducing the defense burden through more
effective specialization. 7 ' In addition, the Europeans have
to be prepared for the possibility of the United States
78,, De Michelis on Franco-German EC Initiative, " interview
in Le Figaro , October 17, 1991, 5 (FBIS-WE, October 21, 1991,
37) .
79Catherine Guicherd, A European Defense Identity:
Challenge and Opportunity for NATO , CRS Report for Congress,
June 12, 1991, 62.
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pulling out of Europe militarily as the Europeans progress in
building their own defense identity, eventually forcing the
Europeans to take full responsibility. Though strong American
support remains for NATO, budget constraints, the burden-
sharing issue, and world changes could ultimately result in
the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.
An autonomous European defense identity would further
deepen the integration process of the European Community. An
economic heavyweight, it has been roundly criticized for
failing to participate on the political scene with military-
power proportionate to its economic strength. Simply put, to
be taken seriously by all interested parties as more than an
economic power, the EC must close the gap between its economic
and political-military significance. 80 As a full-fledged
economic, political, and military power, German Foreign
Minister Genscher feels that "the EC will increasingly become
a bedrock of stability for the whole of Europe and a source of
hope for Europe's nations." 81 As Ian Gambles has observed,
As after the Second World War, there is much talk of a
supranational structure of European security, a
transcendence of national and international defence
through the eventual evolution of the EC into an armed
federation. The Europeanist impetus to cooperation and
self-reliance, therefore, is not focused narrowly on
defence integration within the Alliance, but more broadly
80Guicherd, 11.
81Hans-Dietrich Genscher, speech at the meeting of the
Western European Union at Luxembourg, March 23, 1990, in
Statements & Speeches , March 30, 1990, 2.
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on the re-examination of security in all its aspects right
across the continent and beyond. 82
The Western European Union has been the focal point of
the European defense pillar, whether as an autonomous
organization, as one tied to the EC, or as a component of
NATO. Long operationally dormant, the WEU was resurrected in
1984 with its first ministerial meetings, finally acting in
the Red Sea in 1985 and in the Persian Gulf in 1987. In 1987,
the WEU issued a platform on security interests which stated,
It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make
a stronger contribution to the Alliance (NATO) , to the
benefit of Western security as a whole. This will enhance
the European role in the Alliance and ensure a basis for
a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are
resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the
Alliance. 83
While it was clear in 1987 that Western Europeans were not
contemplating the notion of a fully autonomous security
identity, in 1990 French President Mitterrand and German
Chancellor Kohl proposed that the WEU become the security arm
of the EC's projected political union. Though too radical a
proposal for some at first, the idea germinated to the point
that it eventually gained considerable stature. 84
82Ian Gambles, "European Security Integration in the
1990s," Chaillot Paper 3 (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies, Western European Union, 1991), 7.
"Western European Union, "Platform on European Security
Interests," The Hague, October 27, 1987, 5.
84Guicherd, 12-15.
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Foreign Ministers Dumas and Genscher further developed
the concept of the WEU as a European security identity,
through a letter of 4 February 1991 in which the two foresaw
WEU in that mission, though still with ties to NATO.
Questions such as the out-of-area role and Germany's role
remained unanswered. 85 By the following March Dumas and
Genscher pledged to strengthen EC-WEU ties, and by June, Dumas
had expressed dissatisfaction with NATO's proposed Rapid
Reaction Corps, saying that a WEU-based Rapid Reaction Force
would better serve the needs of. Europe. 86 In December 1991
the WEU issued a summarizing statement of one of the
organization's goals:
The common foreign and security policy shall include all
questions related to the security of the European Union,
including the eventual framing of a common defence policy,
which might in time lead to a common defence. 87
The need to create a single voice with which the
Europeans can speak is a very important step toward political
union. European opinions have historically come out as a
cacophony of disparate voices in the absence of the American
stabilizer, but for the EC and/or WEU to act effectively in
85Steven Philip Kramer, "The French Question, The
Washington Quarterly , Autumn 1991, 91-92.
86Paris AFP, June 4, 1991, 1425 GMT (FBIS-WE, June 5,
1991, 2) .
87Western European Union, "Declaration of the Member
States of Western European Union which are also members of the
European Union of the role of WEU and its relations with the
European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance," December 10,
1991, 3.
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the international arena it will be necessary to speak as one
entity. This issue has already been addressed by European
leaders, who recognize the need to overcome history, including
Chancellor Kohl who stated that, "Europe must finally speak
with one voice on foreign and security policy.
"
8& The EC and
WEU have also addressed the issue. WEU Secretary General
Willem van Eekelen has noted the importance of the WEU members
following through on the pledges of the Brussels Treaty to
show the United States that the Europeans are serious about
their own defense, 89 and EC Foreign Ministers have expressed
the necessity of a joint defense policy complementing a common
foreign policy. 90
Chancellor Kohl and Italian Foreign Minister De
Michelis have echoed persistent calls by French President
Mitterrand for a common European defense. Though Kohl has
tried to straddle the fence between Europeanism and
Atlanticism, he has said that, "A united Europe is not
possible in the long term without a common European
88Berlin ADN, October 12, 1991, 1116 GMT (FBIS-WE, October
15, 1991, 13) .
89Willem F. van Eekelen, "The Changing Transatlantic
Relationship in a New Security Environment," Speech at
Monterey, California, April 28, 1992.
90Conference Des Representants des Gouvernements Des Etats
Membres Union Politique, "Provisions on a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (Article J) , " Projet De Traite Sur L'Union
Europeenne , Brussels, December 18, 1991, Articles J.1-J.4.
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defense." 91 In Kohl's eyes, this formula would be compatible
with membership in the Atlantic Alliance. De Michelis, who
has also been known to shift his position on defense
integration issues, has made a call for a completely
independent military bloc, with an eventual EC/WEU merger as
over the long term NATO fades away. 92 This illustrates
Italy's Europeanist interpretation of the October 1991 Anglo-
Italian defense proposal.
Another key motivation for European defense autonomy
has already been briefly mentioned - the uncertainty over the
future of the American military commitment to Europe's
security. There are many causes for this doubt: the
reduction of the threat, U.S. defense budget tightening, signs
of U.S. neo-isolationism. An older - though now arguably
obsolete - reason is the vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear
attack. While there had been no previous reason to doubt that
the United States would respond to a Soviet attack on Western
Europe, the realization that the Soviets would eventually
match the assured destruction capability of the U.S. shook the
alliance. 93 The uncertainty aroused by this fundamental
alteration of the balance has never been overcome, and coupled
91 Paris AFP, November 14, 1991, 0829 GMT (FBIS-WE,
November 14, 1991, 12).
92Ferdinand Hennerbichler, "There Will Be an EC Military
Alliance, interview with Gianni De Michelis, Wiener Zeitunq ,
August 6, 1991, 3 (FBIS-WE, August 7, 1991, 25)
.
93Kaplan, NATO and the United States , 169.
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with other recent changes in the security environment,
Mitterrand has pointed out that it is "inconceivable" that the
U.S. will always stand on the front line for Europe; this
necessitates a European ability for self -protection
,
94 This
recognition has important repercussions in the search for an
autonomous defense policy and structure.
2 . Plans for a European Force
The June 1991 meeting of WEU ministers resulted in a
compromise over the future capabilities of a permanent WEU
military force focusing, typically, on the opposing British
and French poles. Though the French were pleased and the
British uncertain about developing a WEU intervention force,
the issue was far from settled, as events in the fall would
soon demonstrate.^ 1 In early October 1991 the British and
Italians announced a proposal that would form a WEU force that
would complement NATO. This force, which would coordinate
with NATO's political structures, would be used in scenarios
occurring outside NATO's area of responsibility. On October
14, 1991, the French and Germans revealed a long-awaited
proposal for the WEU, calling for a "European corps" to be
formed around the Franco-German brigade, which could be
94Craig R. Whitney, "NATO, Victim of Success, Searches for
New Strategy," New York Times , October 24, 1990, 5.
95John Palmer, "WEU Treads Path of Independence, " The
Guardian
,
June 28, 1991, 8 (FBIS-WE, July 3, 1991, 1 (annex) )
.
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supplemented with units from other WEU member states. 96 As
French Foreign Minister Dumas stated,
...the goal is an authentic military instrument common to
the member countries. France, with Germany, has shown
that its actions match its words. The formation of a
Franco-German army corps for European missions is the
first concrete step towards a European defense. 9
Though the French and the Germans went to great lengths to
assure NATO that this effort was intended as a complement to
the Alliance, the British immediately called it a challenge to
and duplication of NATO's functions. De Michelis, however,
found no contradiction between the two proposals. 98
While the Italians, as well as the French and Germans,
were satisfied with the course of events, it was clear that
the stage was set for a confrontation with the British over
the bridging of the gap between the two ideas. This debate
has highlighted the ongoing disputes in Europe over the
development of the European security identity. While the
Franco-German proposal was pathbreaking, a great deal of work
remains toward functioning compromises. Though the British
and French have both announced their satisfaction with the
security policy compromise reached at Maastricht, it remains
96
"The Franco-German Initiative on the European Foreign
and Security Policy," Le Monde , October 17, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE,
October 18, 1991, 22) .
97Roland Dumas, address to the Institute of Higher Defense
Studies, Paris, February 4, 1992, 6.
98Alan Riding, "Mitterrand Joins Kohl in Proposing a
European Army," New York Times
, October 17, 1991, Al
.
56
to be seen whether the product was a workable structure or
merely words that can be interpreted at the whim of the
interested party.
3 . The Importance of Retaining Ties to NATO
Understanding the importance of a continuing U.S. role
in European security (whether to pacify Europe or to balance
German power, among other reasons) , and desiring to make WEU
autonomous development as palatable for the UK (and the U.S.)
as possible, the French and the Germans have endeavored to
emphasize the WEU's continuing links with NATO. Though not
yet structurally clear, these links serve a political purpose.
The Genscher-Dumas March 1991 statement pledges an organic
EC/WEU link without weakening NATO ties. 9 ' One proposed
method of linking NATO with the WEU has been through the
"double hatting" of national forces (a concept used by van
Eekelen and the British) , with the forces serving under the
command of the organization appropriate for the crisis in
question. Though NATO Secretary General Woerner believes the
WEU's role is out-of-area, the French wing of the WEU wishes
to be responsible for reacting within any part of Europe
itself. 100 NATO has also tried to emphasize the importance
""Joint Statement by Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich
Genscher and Roland Dumas," Berlin ADN, March 22, 1991, 1546
GMT (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1991, 1)
.
100Ruediger Moniac, "A Two-Hat Concept for Europe's




of the endurance of ties between the two security
organizations in an attempt to prevent its own marginalization
as European autonomy develops. 101
The proponents of greater defense autonomy have
asserted that the ongoing developments will present no threat
to NATO's existence. Recent WEU communiques have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of compatibility and strong
relations with NATO. 102 Germany views the Franco-German
proposal as making the WEU a component of the EC and a pillar
of NATO, in which a coordinated European position created by
the EC would be the position held by the Europeans in the
North Atlantic Council. 103 Woerner has accepted the concept
of a European army so long as it is "an army that can be used
only if NATO does not act." He would recommend the assignment
of NATO forces to the WEU in such an event. 104 Finally,
considerable opposition has been raised by the British and
others to the suggestion that the EC political union would
ultimately assume the security guarantees of the Brussels
101Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,
Final Communique, Copenhagen, June 6-7, 1991, paragraph 3.
102See the WEU Communiques of Vianden (June 27, 1991),
Bonn (November 18, 1991), and Paris (December 10, 1991).
103Hamburg DPA, October 17, 1991, 1339 GMT (FBIS-WE,
October 18, 1991, 6) .
104Manfred Woerner, interview with Madrid ABC, November 7,
1991, 38 (FBIS-WE, November 14, 1991, 4) .
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Treaty (through a merger with the WEU) , because in their view
this might eliminate NATO's raison d'etre. 105
Another reason for maintaining ties to NATO lies in
the continuing belief in the stabilizing role the U.S. plays
in Europe. In apparent agreement with Joffe's hypothesis,
Genscher has opposed a total American withdrawal because of
the negative effects this would have on European
stability. 106 The long-standing American security guarantee
has preempted a considerable amount of discussion on
autonomous European security efforts. As David Yost points
out, "Discussions about West European nuclear deterrent
cooperation may remain abstract and deferred to an uncertain
future as long as U.S. commitments appear reasonably credible
and reliable." 107 Nearly all in Europe remain convinced of
the necessity of a continued American involvement in European
security affairs. Though some wish for this presence to be
more substantial than others, the notion of its significance
cannot help but weaken European efforts to build an autonomous
security identity.
105Guicherd, 35.
106Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The United States of Europe,
"
speech at the United Nations, September 25, 1991, in Vital
Speeches of the Day , October 1, 1991, 9.
107David S. Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," in
Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security , ed.
Beatrice Heuser (London: Brassey's for the Centre for Defence
Studies, King's College, University of London, 1991), 43.
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4. Avoiding the Marginalization of the United States
Even more than considering American participation in
European security vital, Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly
labelled North American forces in Europe as "indispensable"
for this purpose. 108 Former British Defence Secretary King
opposes European drives for autonomy because "only U.S.
capabilities can provide the ultimate guarantee of European
security." 109 Should the Franco-German proposal lead to a
strongly autonomous organization, the American role in
European security affairs might be reduced. Not only would
this cause British opposition, but it would compound Kohl's
difficulties in attempting to straddle the two sides of the
argument
.
Not only the British - with their special relationship
with the U.S. - but also the French and Germans have devoted
considerable attention to avoiding marginalizing the U.S.
while impressing the Americans with their own potential for
action. As French security policy has developed, it has been
careful to avoid forcing Germany to choose between Paris and
Washington when conflicts arose, especially since 1983. no
108This term has been used frequently by Kohl, as well as
by French officials. See for example Berlin ADN, January 30,
1991, 1133 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 30, 1991, 7).
109Tom King, "European Defence in a Changing World, "
Speech at Chatham House, June 19, 1991, 9.
110John G. Mason, "Mitterrand, the Socialists, and French
Nuclear Policy," in Philippe G. LePrestre, ed., French
Security Policy in a Disarming World: Domestic Challenges and
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Though the motivations for this behavior may have altered with
world events, Germany has still hesitated or attempted to
moderate the impact of initiatives that could antagonize the
U.S., and as Le Prestre has observed,
. . .the erosion of U.S. power makes France more susceptible
to external constraints. To achieve greater European
cooperation on European and defense matters, [and] to fend
off U.S. protectionism, to define and pursue security
interests that may contradict U.S. ones will require




French strategic planning for the 1990s continues to take
great care to avoid sending strong signals that would indicate
the marginalization of the United States. 112
Finally, because they are aware of the impact of the
issue of burden-sharing on the U.S. Congress, West Europeans
have made efforts to color European security autonomy as
reducing the load on the U.S. WEU Secretary General van
Eekelen has intimated that greater European exertions will
lessen the burden on the United States through greater multi-
national efforts as well as through arms control. 113
Attention devoted to burden-sharing will strike a responsive
International Constraints (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 73.
niLe Prestre, "The Lessons of Cohabitation, " in Le
Prestre, 42.
112Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the
1990
' s , Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), 24-5.
113Van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security Order:
WEU's Contribution," NATO Review , August 1990, 21.
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chord in a Congress which has long been dissatisfied with its
assessment of European responsibility, using these
determinations to call for a reduced U.S. commitment. At
present, however, it is uncertain whether a greater European
role will reduce or strengthen the U.S. commitment. It may,
nevertheless, make the U.S. more amenable to the process of
seeking greater West European security autonomy.
5. The WEU and the Out-of-Area Mission
As the threat has shifted away from the inter-German
border and toward regional contingencies outside central
Europe, the question of out-of-area roles and missions has
grown in importance. Though not specifically barring out-of-
area operations, the North Atlantic Treaty has been
interpreted to do so. According to Article 6,
For the purpose of Article 5 [which provides the security
guarantee to the members] an armed attack on one or more
of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North
America, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe,
on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on
the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the
Parties . 114
Treaty members remain hesitant to reinterpret or legislate
changes to the treaty. One obvious solution to the out-of-
area question has been the use of the WEU, either coordinated
with, or directed by, NATO (perhaps also through an ad-hoc
114The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., April 4,
1949, Article 6, in Kaplan, 220.
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coalition as was used in Desert Storm) . As part of a European
autonomous security identity, however, the WEU would be under
the direction of the EC, with only a limited coordinating role
with NATO. Though van Eekelen has stated that the WEU was
created to deal with problems internal to Europe 115 , the
October 1991 Anglo-Italian proposal contemplates an out-of-
area responsibility for the organization.
The Franco-German initiative, however, does not
restrict the potential roles of the WEU, thereby allowing it
the intra-European role that van Eekelen describes. Such
missions, however, could raise strongly negative reactions
from the Soviet Union's successors, especially Russia. 116
Though it is unstated, it seems also to assume responsibility
for coordinating European out-of-area contingency responses,
such as occurred in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991 in the Persian
Gulf. It is in this capacity that the Franco-German proposal
would be acceptable to the UK, the Netherlands, and Portugal
(and the U.S.), as usurping NATO's role would be
unsatisfactory to these countries. 117 Considering the
constitutional issues in Germany, if other European countries
were to agree on a European defense identity, linked to but
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not subsumed in political union, German parties might agree to
a limited Bundeswehr out-of-area participation. 118 While the
sensitivity in Germany about any out-of-area role for the
Bundeswehr seemingly undercuts Kohl's joint initiative with
France, it also brings into question the extent of the
proposal's intentions and shows the uncertain domestic
political situation with which Kohl must contend as he stands
with France. The out-of-area question deserves a great deal
of study by the proponents of European defense autonomy.
While the concept could serve as an additional aspect of
European cooperation, it could also be the preserver of NATO
and the U.S. role in European security. Uncertainty currently
reigns
.
6. Other Issue Areas
Several other areas are important in a survey of
European perspectives toward defense autonomy. First, any
structure must provide for a satisfactory degree of national
sovereignty. One of the points of conflict for the British
throughout the process of European integration has been
avoiding a loss of decision-making power over their own
resources to a bureaucracy in Brussels. The French, too, have
insisted on national prerogatives in a number of issue areas,
118
"NATO Comes to Terms with New Europe, " London Times , 7
November 19 91, p. 14.
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especially nuclear weapons. 119 This aspect appears to have
been the subject of a compromise with the process of security
integration leaving individual countries the masters of their
own security policies when issues of European-wide interest
are not at stake. 120 While this point will somewhat weaken
European defense integration, the alternative could be the
collapse of the project.
Second, Europe's ability to carry out military tasks
independently has been the subject of much criticism. Kaplan
is uncertain whether the WEU has the will to follow its
rhetoric, or whether it will be an organization with any
teeth. 121 British NATO Ambassador Sir Michael Alexander has
called attention to
...one major negative lesson to be learnt from the Gulf -
the relative military impotence of Europe in dealing with
the Gulf crisis ... [0] ur effort was equivalent to just
eight per cent of the American effort. Europe, though not
a spectator, was not a full player either, and had to rely
on the US effort in the Gulf to deal with a threat to
world security. 122
Some soul-searching will have to take place throughout Europe,
along with a reassessment of the will and desire of Europeans
to lead. In the meantime, until a new opportunity arises for
n9The prospects for West European nuclear cooperation
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
120Guicherd, 29
121Kaplan, 179.
122Sir Michael Alexander, "European Security and the
CSCE, " NATO Review , August 1991, 13.
65
the Europeans to coordinate a significant military action,
doubts will remain on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere
as to whether an autonomous European defense organization is
to be taken seriously. Gambles summarizes a widespread
opinion
:
As the European Community's experience in the Gulf War
showed, world respect for Europe as a power in its own
right is fatally undermined by its known inability to
muster either the will to determine a common security
policy or the capability to carry out a common military
effort. 123
This consideration could affect the feasibility of the
structure
.
Third, as the driver of the initiative toward a
European corps, France has had to utilize expert diplomatic
skills to prevent its project from collapsing in the European
political morass. The same characteristics that have made
France a leader have also aroused opposition and irritation
from other countries about French arrogance and apparent
attempts to usurp the American position. France has
deliberately taken a unique path toward West European
security, and as Kaplan observes: "There was hardly an issue
in the first decade [of NATO] that did not offend French
sensibilities, if not disturb their sense of national interest
or security." 124 This situation has essentially remained




office has attempted to come to more favorable terms with the
U.S. and other European nations in security policy.
It is important to consider French behavior because of
its importance in the development of a new defense structure.
Mitterrand has often expressed anger over NATO attempts to
strengthen itself at the expense of French efforts, and France
has been in danger of losing the leadership role it has so
assiduously strived to build. Still, France has attempted to
soften its stance to the point that it is trying to improve
relations with NATO, though still refusing to rejoin the
military structure. These efforts are important for the
development of an autonomous European security organization
because of the reassurance they provide to the Atlanticist
members of the EC about the link with North America. In their
absence, the French would continue to be unable to reach
accommodations with the British and Dutch, and the Germans
would be much less willing partners.
A fourth issue which has yet to be resolved adequately
regards the varying memberships in the European organizations.
German writer Hans Ruhle has outlined some of the structural
problems in the WEU's idea of a Rapid Reaction Force,
beginning with questions about command, composition, and
relative position compared to other structures already in
place. Additionally, he points out that
A clear outline of European defence within a WEU framework
is made more difficult by the different organisations to
which European countries belong. Twelve are members of
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the European Community, 14 are members of Nato and nine
are members of the WEU. 125
Several of the countries are unsatisfied with their
present situations. Britain and Germany have called for
widening the EC to make it more inclusive of Europe, and
Turkey, in particular, has revealed its interest in
membership. Ireland, as an officially neutral state, has been
hesitant about the EC's assumption of a military role, and has
rejected participation in the WEU. France has strongly
expressed its desire to deepen the EC union prior to widening,
for fear of the dilution of its influence before solid
progress toward integration has been achieved on its terms.
Finally, as Ruhle points out,
As none of the interested countries, with the exception of
France, is prepared to set up extra units for the WEU over
and above troops already assigned to Nato, a military
option for the WEU can only mean using Nato forces. 126
France and Germany have attempted to resolve these issues,
realizing the requirement to satisfy NATO's needs and the
confusion over membership. Unless these issues are adequately
resolved, progress toward European defense union may be
stifled in the relatively near future.
A final problem for resolution before European
security autonomy can become a reality is Germany's Basic Law
125Hans Ruhle, "European Alternative to NATO Force is
still "a Hare-Brained Strategic Notion, " Die Zeit , September
26, 1991, in The German Tribune , October 6, 1991, 5.
126Ibid.
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dispute over out-of-area military activity. Numerous German
politicians, including Chancellor Kohl, have tried to gain
support among Germany's parties for a political formula for
out-of-area activity, 127 and Foreign Minister Genscher has
called for the participation of German forces in UN
peacekeeping activities. Progress does appear to have been
made, even while the Bundesrat majority party, the SPD, has
announced its opposition to the EC/WEU merger and out-of-area
operations. 128 Without a move toward participation, the
leading German role in the initiative may be seen as hollow
and lose support from other Europeans. The German ability to
participate as a full partner will be of particular importance
to France.
D. BRITISH RESERVATIONS ABOUT EUROPEAN DEFENSE AUTONOMY
Britain, often somewhat separated from continental
politics, has faced considerable internal debates about the
role it should play in the economic and political aspects of
European integration. Satisfied with its special relationship
with the U.S. and not entirely trusting the motives and plans
of the French and other Europeanists
,
yet wishing to be a part
of the new Europe, the British have attempted to participate
127 Ian Murray, "NATO Corps Clash with Germans," London
Times , May 16, 1991, 13.
128Chapter Five will more fully explore German roles and
attitudes to out-of-area issues, as well as toward future
European security structures.
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at arm's length in some key aspects of the process of European
unification. In the defense realm, the British have expressed
alarm at the prospects of the weakening of NATO and its
Atlantic link, not wishing to entrust European stability and
security to their continental allies. The 1991 Defence White
Paper rejected the concept of a new identity and reaffirmed
Britain's commitment to collective defense based on the
Atlantic Alliance.
Building totally distinct Western European defence
entities, involving the eventual absorption of the WEU by
the Twelve, would be disruptive of NATO. It would erode
the concept of NATO as a full partnership in which
European and North American countries participated on the
same basis. To follow this route would be to invite
confusion and a less reliable defence than we have enjoyed
over the last 40 years. 129
The British have been especially explicit in calling
attention to the vagueness of the proposed interrelationships
of the evolving European security structures. According to
one unnamed Conservative Member of Parliament who opposes
integration,
...it is essential that we make certain that we do not
allow ourselves to be drawn into a European defence policy
that will not work... Our entire future military and
defence policy must not be subordinated and hijacked by
people like Mr. Delors. 130
129Secretary of State for Defence, "Statement on the
Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence for the 90s," July 1991,
39.
130House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates on Defence
(Hansard), October 14, 1991, 92.
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French and German proposals have not pleased the British;
Prime Minister Major has called for the WEU to be entirely
autonomous, not only from NATO but also from the EC. 131
Former Defence Secretary King has indicated that the WEU could
take roles where NATO cannot or will not operate 132 , and that
"...the WEU can serve as a bridge between the transatlantic
security and defence structures of NATO and the developing
common political and security policies of the Twelve." 133
The British have made clear their displeasure at not only the
possibility that the WEU will duplicate NATO roles, but also
that it has been so difficult to define its roles in the first
place
.
British opposition to a European system that would
antagonize the United States and potentially lead to an
American withdrawal has been discussed already. Above all
else, failure to resolve this point could prevent any British
agreement on an autonomous defense identity. As the London
Times has editorialized,
Above all, Nato has no answer to France's continued and
infuriating unilateralism. . .The Americans have good reason
after the Gulf not to hasten the day when Europe speaks
with "one voice" on defence. This voice would at present
have to reflect Germany's anti-militarism and France's
131Hella Pick, "Major Draws Line on Defence Links," The
Guardian , November 8, 1991, 11 (FBIS-WE, November 15, 1991,
3) .
132Carol Reed, Marc Rogers, and JAC Lewis, "Waking the
Sleeping Beauty," Jane's Defence Weekly , January 4, 1992, 21.
133,1 Statement on the Defence Estimates," 39.
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anti-Americanism. Policies matter more than structures
and Europe has a long way to go before resolving the
argument over where to centre a chimerical "European
defence strategy." 134
Progress has been made that shows British willingness to move
toward integration, however. They recognized some of the
negative aspects of American leadership during INF
negotiations, as "[fjailure to deal adequately with European
concerns would confirm the impression of diminishing US
interest in Europe." 135 While not ready to abandon the
Americans, the British at that point did implicitly
acknowledge some advantage in European-oriented structures.
With the October 1991 British-Italian proposal, Britain seems
to have accepted "a stronger European defence identity with
the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy." 136
The French air-sol longue portee (ASLP) program has provided
a great opportunity to unite symbolically with France in the
defense field. As Yost observes, "The political arguments for
cooperating with France on some version of the ASLP are
essentially to promote West European defense cooperation and
134
"Now for the Hard Part," London Times , May 30, 1991,
135Gerald Frost, "British Foreign Policy: Dangers and
Opportunities in an Era of Uncertainty, " in British Security
Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990'
s
(Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1987), 27.
136Quoted from the British-Italian defense proposal in
George Brock and Michael Binyon, "Britain Accepts EC Goal of
a United Policy on Defence," London Times , October 5, 1991, 7.
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to diversify Britain's options." 137 The September 1991 U.S.
cancellation of the SRAM-T program may further lead the
British into the arms of the French, increasing the
opportunity for the British to take the symbolic act of closer
defense cooperation with France.
E. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
Developments in Western Europe toward defense autonomy
hold great implications for the United States. Having based
its own security policy on containment since the end of World
War II, the American defense establishment is completely
reassessing its priorities under severe fiscal constraints.
Americans remember having saved Europe from itself twice in
the 20th Century, and the prospect of having to do so again is
not particularly attractive. John Mearsheimer fears the
reemergence of the old "hypernationalist " European state
system that created the incentives for aggression much as does
Joffe. 138 An interest in promoting European stability, along
with deep economic and cultural ties that exist across the
Atlantic, motivate the Bush Administration's desire to retain
a substantial role in European security affairs. European
efforts to displace U.S. leadership are thus viewed as short-
137Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," 27.
138This recurring Mearsheimer theme is thoroughly
described in John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the
Cold War," Atlantic Monthly , August 1990, 36-7.
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sighted and ungrateful in some circles in the United States.
Nevertheless, the changes in Europe may reinforce a shift in
American attention toward other areas of the globe, primarily
the Middle East/Persian Gulf region, Latin America, and the
Far East. Much American trade and a growing percentage of
America's ethnic mix have their backgrounds in these regions.
Developments in Europe, therefore, are necessitating drastic
changes in American strategic planning toward contingencies
unrelated to the old Soviet threat
.
Mindful of these changes, the Europeans cannot fail to
devote attention to American interests. The United States has
consistently proved itself to be the only nation that
possesses the ability to operationalize all types of national
power, most recently in the Persian Gulf War. Many in Europe,
including Eastern Europe, believe that only a U.S. presence on
the continent will prevent Europe from reverting to its old
divisive ways. Finally, the special relationship the British
have with the Americans makes it imperative that American
interests be accommodated before the British will agree to the
security integration which some see as completing the process
of European unification. These factors give the United States
some degree of leverage over events in Europe, though that
influence level has decreased relative to that during the Cold
War. As a result it is important to examine American views
and concerns as Western Europe moves toward a more independent
security structure.
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1 . Historical and Current Support for European Unity
The development of a "United States of Europe" was a
great hope of some American Senators who voted to ratify the
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and confirmed the decision to
send American forces to Europe in 1950. For some this was an
ideal which was important to fulfill; for others it reflected
an isolationist desire that the Europeans become responsible
for their own defense. Throughout the Cold War period, there
was never much of a chance that the Europeans would attain
this responsibility entirely. The U.S. has expressed support
for European unity for many years, exemplified by a 1963
statement by President Kennedy.
Ever since the war the reconstruction and knitting
together of Europe have been objectives of United States
policy, for we have recognized with you that in unity lies
strength. And we have also recognized with you that a
strong Europe would be good not only for Europeans but for
the world. America and Europe, working in full and
effective partnership can find solutions to the urgent
problems that confront all mankind in this crucial
time. 139
President Bush has declared that, "A more united Europe offers
the United States a more effective partner, prepared for
larger responsibilities," 140 and Secretary of State Baker has
pledged U.S. support for European integration as long as it
139Reprinted by the Eurogroup in "Western Defense: The
European Role in NATO," Brussels, May 1988, 4.
140Bush, cited in Reed, et al, 21.
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strengthens the Atlantic Alliance. 141 It is important to
observe that U.S. support has only been extended to those
efforts designed to solidify the European pillar of NATO.
According to Catherine Guicherd, a French analyst,
While the United States kept calling for a stronger
European contribution to NATO, it has been reluctant to
grant the Europeans larger responsibilities for fear that




Fortunately for U. S . -European relations President Bush has
emphasized the need for good ties between the U.S. and the EC.
American officials have spoken often about the
President's support for initiatives toward European defense
autonomy, always ensuring that consideration is paid to NATO
in the effort. U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney tried to
back the Europeans as much as he could while protecting NATO
by saying,
The United States believes that the emergence of a
distinct European security identity within the context of
transatlantic relations is compatible with NATO. For this
reason, the United States is prepared to support
arrangements needed for the expression of a common
European security and defense policy. 143
Cheney has recognized the steady chain of events in Europe
toward greater unity, yet sees the opportunity to ensure
141James A. Baker, "New Directions for the Atlantic
Alliance," Speech at Copenhagen, June 6, 1991, in US
Department of State Dispatch , June 10, 1991, 403.
142Guicherd, 5.
143Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the
Congress , February 1992, 16.
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NATO's survival. Josef Joffe, on the other hand, has
expressed concern over the lack of recent American
participation in major European events such as the Maastricht
Summit and the Yugoslav Civil War, fearing that "the United
States will not be Number One in the world if it becomes
irrelevant in Europe." 144
The United States has continued to press for the
development of a strong European pillar in NATO. It sees the
WEU fulfilling that role, bridging the gap between the EC and
NATO. The WEU could also be responsible for out-of-area
actions if it were subordinate to NATO. As Cheney has
indicated,
I don't see anything within the NATO framework or the U.S.
commitment to NATO that should be taken as an effort to
discourage the Europeans developing their own out-of-area
capabilities .. .There ' s no reason in the world they can't
be dual-hatted and have dual assignments. 145
The U.S. voice in European security would remain influential,
and the Atlantic link would stay strong under this structure.
The United States has been forced periodically to mute its
voice, however, because of the inherent opposition its
opinions would engender, often a French reaction to what
France considers American domineering. However, the Dutch,
the Germans, the Portuguese, the British and others often
144Josef Joffe, "America's in the Balcony as Europe Takes
Center Stage," New York Times , December 22, 1991, E5
.
145Dick Cheney, interview with the San Diego Union
,
November 12, 1991, 5.
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assert the Atlantic viewpoint. The United States has had to
play the diplomatic game very carefully to ensure that its
viewpoint is heard while not isolating itself from events. In
February 1991, the State Department reportedly sent a
memorandum to Europe that had counterproductive effects. 146
The U.S. will need more skill in the future if it is to avoid
marginalization from European security affairs.
The burden-sharing issue, long a sore point among
members of the U.S. Congress, remains an important factor in
the U.S. analysis of European security progress.
Dissatisfaction with European burden-sharing in the 1960s and
1970s led to a series of legislative attempts to force
changes, culminating in the Mansfield Amendment and Resolution
which, if passed, would have legislated the reduction of U.S.
troops in Europe. 147 The Europeans have claimed that their
recent efforts are designed to ease the U.S. burden, and many
in the United States agree, saying the U.S. should pass the
146According to John Newhouse and other journalists, some
U.S. officials, concerned over a late 1990 British proposal
that would have established the WEU as the European pillar in
NATO, reacted by emphasizing their position that a "European
security identity .. .would duplicate NATO's functions ... [and]
could lead to NATO's marginalization." The reportedly heavy-
handed memorandum sent to convey this idea caused irritation
and anger in Europe, leading to disavowal of the note by many
American officials. See Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round: A
Collective Nervous Breakdown," The New Yorker , September 2,
1991, 92.
147See an extensive discussion of burden-sharing and the
U.S. Senate in Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in
Europe (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985).
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burden entirely. Continued European and American addressing
of the burden-sharing issue will aid the process of the




2. The Range of U.S. Capabilities
Even if the Europeans are able to agree among
themselves on the structure of an independent defense
organization, U.S. experts generally do not believe that such
an organization will have the necessary capabilities to
express Europe's will and protect the continent against all
threats, at least in the immediately forseeable future. This
opinion, shared by many Europeans, serves to hamper European
initiatives toward autonomy. As Guicherd notes, the Gulf War
showed that Europe cannot handle the distant threat alone, as
"only the United States has both the political will and the
military means to confront an aggressor." 149 The National
Security Strategy agrees, noting from the outset that the U.S.
remains the only state with truly global strength - political,
military, and economic. 150 The Europeans have attempted to
remedy their deficiencies, especially through French bids to
improve their space surveillance capabilities. Technological
148The burden-sharing issue will be treated in more depth
in Chapter 6.
149Guicherd, 17.
1B0George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States , Washington, DC, August 1991, 2.
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weaknesses will also encourage more cooperative ventures,
which have political benefits for European countries. As
Guicherd concludes, however, "The limitations of European
capabilities may be one of the most powerful arguments for a
close coordination of WEU operations with those of other NATO
allies. " 151
F. FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENTS
The United States must recognize and accept the fact that
Western Europe is proceeding along the path toward a greater
degree of defense autonomy. With' many pitfalls along the way,
the Europeans have made considerable progress in overcoming
their historic nationalism and inability to deal
diplomatically with each other to advance toward the
surrendering of a significant amount of sovereignty. Though
the Maastricht defense compromise was incomplete and somewhat
ambiguous, it is important that all sides praised the progress
made toward European unity. Far from what the French,
desiring the leadership role in Europe, and the British, who
favored little or no change in Alliance structure, originally
wanted, the result so far has been the necessary compromise to
promote wider and deeper cooperation.
Joffe's thesis that the Europeans cannot behave peacefully
without the United States keeping them in order reflects a
151Guicherd, 50.
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past vision of Europe. While disagreeing on a great many
issues, the Europeans have shown themselves able to conduct a
dialogue as long as necessary to produce an agreement while
maintaining a professional, diplomatic atmosphere. They have
also shown themselves more capable than in the early post-1945
era by taking the initiative on issues dealing with their own
security. Still, the relative loss of power the United States
has experienced in Europe may add to a somewhat anarchic
situation on the continent. Agreements will not be easy, yet
they will emerge eventually.
The development of an autonomous European defense identity
has been characterized by several key conditions. First,
French leadership coupled with German support has been crucial
in producing a workable structure. The French ability to
learn from past mistakes with regard to the role of the U.S.
has allowed them to gain German support and forge compromises
with the British. Second, Prime Minister Major's Europeanist
leanings (in comparison with his predecessor's views) have
allowed the British to become more a part of the integration
process, and their participation has ensured that it will have
more of an Atlanticist flavor than had they abstained.
Third, the actual future abilities of an EC-based WEU
remain uncertain. Though Chancellor Kohl has stated his
support for the French proposal, he has been careful to
express his continued support for NATO. While these positions
have allowed the French and British to enter into a
compromise, the German position seems to be one of trying to
please everyone by adopting all sides as their own. This
position cannot endure, as the French, the British, and the
Americans will not accept it when it comes time to decide on
the path to follow. It has been convenient to invoke German
support for one's position when necessary; eventually this
will not be possible. In addition, the Germans will have to
resolve the out-of-area issue if they are to be true
participants in an integrated European security structure.
Fourth, questions remain regarding the real military
capabilities of the EC or the WEU. Events in the Persian Gulf
did not reflect favorably on either, and the Yugoslavian Civil
War has pointed to political impotence in the Community.
Though he overstated the situation, there is some truth in
Gambles 's observation that, "each of the three major European
powers acted exactly [in the Persian Gulf war] as one might
have expected if the idea of European security integration had
never been suggested at all." 152 Issues to be resolved
include force structure, command relationships, basing,
missions, and political will. The generally unpopular
question of the duplication of the tasks of NATO must be
resolved as well. 153
152Gambles, 41.
153William Drozdiak, "NATO States, Ex-East Bloc Meet for
Talks," Washington Post , March 11, 1992, All.
82
Importantly, all the members of the EC, as well as other
European states that wish to become members, accept the need
to integrate more fully on a wide spectrum of issues. Public
opinion and speeches by officials across the continent show
that the drive toward unity is accelerating. Though the
Maastricht Summit settled less than might have been hoped, the
geographical, cultural, historical, political, and economic
ties that bind the nations of Western Europe have ensured a
process that will probably not reverse itself. Development of
a fully capable and autonomous European security identity is
still some years in the future, yet it will most likely come
through the EC and WEU. The Atlantic link will probably not
be broken, but it doubtless will be considerably altered.
For the United States, the implications could include
marginalization from European security affairs. Forty-five
years of pronounced support for European unity and billions of
dollars in military aid will have helped to foster the process
which costs the U.S. much of its influence. For many
Americans, the loss of influence in Europe will not be a
problem, as support grows for disengagement from Europe as
part of an isolationist revival. For others, emphasis is
shifting from the old European paradigm to areas of growing
interest for the U.S. - the Middle East/Persian Gulf region,
Latin America, and the Far East. For either group, events in
Europe are not unfavorable. For some in the Bush
Administration and others, however, the loss of U.S. influence
in Europe means a Europe bound to repeat the instability of
its past, necessitating the eventual reintroduction of
American troops onto the continent, or at least Europeans
pursuing security policies at variance with worldwide U.S.
interests
.
European and American defense interests do not have to
clash; compelled European support of U.S. positions is not the
answer if they differ. Western Europe may well progress
toward unity regardless of the United States, though the
process and end results would be different depending on the
character of U.S. -EC relations. Cultural, political, and
economic relationships will perpetuate transatlantic ties; as
both pillars of Atlantic defense generally hold similar views
on security topics, there is no reason why some degree of
European autonomy cannot have positive ramifications for the
United States, such as easing the American burden. While U.S.
strategic planning should continue to plan for NATO
contingencies, it should also recognize that NATO's tasks are
changing in conjunction with the decline of the traditional




IV. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR COOPERATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The last chapter showed the difficulties of the process of
integrating the defense structures of Western Europe, yet also
highlighted the importance of this action to the overall goal
of European Political Union. One of the primary stumbling
blocks toward a closer continental union is the loss of
sovereignty that the participants must accept, and in that
light the question of West European nuclear cooperation serves
as a fine example of the costs and benefits of more thorough
integration. This chapter examines the prospects for the
British and French bringing their nuclear arsenals together in
a West European defense entity.
Attempts at close European nuclear cooperation are not
without precedent. The Multilateral Force talks of the early
1960s tried to bring together American, British, and French
nuclear forces and to give each nation, along with Germany, a
share of responsibility for their coordination and deployment.
In the end, however, the plan failed because the system of
control was considered unworkable and because the United
States opposed losing control over its forces. 154 The French
1MLawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 328.
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plan to deploy Pluton missiles in West Germany in 1974-75 was
changed after the Germans informally tried to gain some
control over them and obtain a potential veto over their
use. 155 French President Giscard d'Estaing attempted to
soothe this blow to German-French relations as well as move
France closer to NATO militarily with efforts implying French
nuclear cooperation in 1975-76, but backed down in the face of
strong domestic opposition. 156 In the 1980s there were
numerous efforts at talks between the French and the Germans
over some degree of consultation on nuclear use. In October
1987, President Mitterrand reaffirmed France's 1986 agreement
to consult with the West Germans over the use of French pre-
strategic nuclear weapons on German soil. 157
With the legacy of limited success in previous attempts at
nuclear cooperation and an international environment in which
the U.S. nuclear deterrent may not be as reliable (or as
necessary) as it once was, West European nuclear cooperation
is once again an issue of great interest. Indeed, EC
155David S. Yost, "Franco-German Defence Cooperation," in
The Bundeswehr and Western Security , ed. Stephen F. Szabo
(London: MacMillan, 1990), 235.
156Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in
Europe , Part I, Adelphi Paper 194 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1984/85), 8.
157Edward Kolodziej, "British-French Nuclearization and
European Denuclearization: Implications for U.S. Policy," in
French Security Policy in a Disarming World: Domestic
Challenges and International Constraints , ed. Philippe G. Le
Prestre (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 136.
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Commission President Jacques Delors has already addressed the
need for a nuclear arm of political union:
...if we really reach a political entity made up of a
certain number of nations which agree to have a common
external policy on the main issues, then, in my mind,
French nuclear weapons should be at the service of
this common policy. 158
Though numerous factors tend to favor such cooperation, this
chapter shows that it is unlikely that Western European
nuclear cooperation will occur in the foreseeable future.
Cooperation in this case means close British-French nuclear
planning with conceptual, financial, and/or operational
contributions from other West European allies, with the goal
of ensuring nuclear deterrence for Western Europe.
Such nuclear cooperation will probably not occur for three
primary reasons. First, too many national interests must be
overcome, ranging from questions of national sovereignty to
differing strategies. Second, various political and
operational factors will constrain attempts to design and
operate the force, such as the mechanism for control as well
as the international relations implications pertaining
primarily to the United States. Third, the role of Germany in
a unified security structure remains uncertain. Domestic
politics and attitudes toward nuclear weapons are highly
polarized, and decisions taken toward cooperation by the
158Jacques Delors, Paris Antenne-2 Television Network
interview, January 5, 1992, 1100 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 6,
1992, 8-11)
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nuclear powers may create political controversy in Germany.
There is also the question of participation by Germany and the
implications of this effort.
The basic plan for this chapter is as follows. It
examines each of the three primary reasons hindering the
development of a unified West European nuclear force, as well
as mitigating factors and overall prospects. It then
addresses the implications for the future U.S. role in
European security as new structures are developed.
B. PROBLEMS IN COOPERATION
1. National Interests
Any attempt to integrate policies among nations must
first overcome or at least placate the national interests of
the nations involved. Five areas in particular are of
interest in the area of nuclear integration: national
sovereignty, Great Power status, strategic cultures, domestic
politics, and relationships with the United States.
Though the United States has provided, and according
to West European leaders should continue to provide, the
deterrent to protect Western Europe from attack, a national
arsenal provides additional protection. For the British and
the French, the concept of an ultimate deterrent, the
insurance policy that provides a nation with the ability to
strike and cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor, helps
to ensure the security of the homeland. Sabin calls British
nuclear weapons the "ultimate national deterrent against
attack upon the United Kingdom." 159 This force is necessary,
according to the concept, because no nation can rely on a
force not under national command for its protection. The
force de frappe serves as the protection of the French
sanctuary, as a guarantor of French vital interests. As
President Mitterrand has stated, "France, in any case, will
not use its nuclear capability other than for its own strategy
of deterrence, and Europe as a whole will not take the risk of
finding itself unprotected." 160 The question of national
sovereignty affects the French and British willingness to
accept a degree of non-national control or influence over
their nuclear weapons, as both generally oppose this incursion
into their national sovereignty. 161
Closely related to the idea of national sovereignty is
the status provided by the possession of nuclear weapons.
France believes that its nuclear arsenal has conferred on it
the status of being the third leading military power of the




, Adelphi Paper 254 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Winter 1990), 8.
160Francois Mitterrand, speech at The Hague, February 7,
1984, quoted in David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and
Security Policy," French Politics & Society , Summer/Fall 1991,
151.
161John G. Mason, "Mitterrand, the Socialists, and French
Nuclear Policy," in Le Prestre, 53.
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world. 162 Public and official support for the French nuclear
force remains strong, as
France stands out as the Western country with the
strongest public consensus in support of nuclear
deterrence .. .French officials have been consistent in
upholding the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence as a means
of preventing war and assuring France's independence and
international status. 163
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan described the importance to
Britain of nuclear weapons in the 1950s:
The independent contribution .. .gives us a better position
in the world, it gives us a better position with respect
to the United States. It puts us where we ought to be, in
the position of a Great Power. 164
The possession of nuclear weapons gives both the British and
the French somewhat more political leverage vis-a-vis the
United States, adding to their perceived status as Great
Powers
.
Another national obstacle to the integration of
British and French nuclear forces resides in the differences
u' 2This attitude has been expressed by numerous French
leaders, including Francois Mitterrand, in "Interview with
President Francois Mitterrand, " Bulletin d' Information ,
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, May 22, 1989, 6, in
Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, French Strategic Options in the 1990s ,
Adelphi Paper 260 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Summer 1991), 15.
163Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?"
Armed Forces and Society , Summer 1990, 493.
164Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British
Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 84, in John Roper,
"Nuclear Policies: Different Approaches to Similar
Objectives," in Franco-British Defence Cooperation: A New
Entente Cordiale? eds . Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche, and John
Roper (London: Routledge, 1989), 8.
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in the strategies and strategic cultures of the countries. A
joint West European nuclear force would have to fall under one
strategic plan that resulted at least from a consensus between
the nuclear participants, not to mention from all the other
voices within the security organization as a whole. This
would only be brought about with great difficulty, however,
owing to the vastly different allegiances and meanings the
British and the French hold for their forces. British
strategy begins with NATO, and it is within this fundamental
setting that British policies must be understood. The United
Kingdom has devoted its forces to NATO - with ultimate
authority remaining in London - and it participates completely
in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Joint Strategic
Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) . Additionally, the British
readily accept (and have historically contributed to the
formulation of) American strategic concepts for the use of
nuclear weapons.
The French, on the other hand, have been fiercely
independent about the use of their nuclear forces. They have
constructed notably different scenarios for their use of
forces, including an earlier and larger use of pre-strategic,
and then strategic, weapons. France has also refused to
participate in the NPG in order to retain its complete freedom
in nuclear planning. 165 At the same time, the differing
165Roper, 13.
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strategic cultures between the British and French could
compound the challenge of closer cooperation, though the NATO
allies have managed to overcome this problem in many areas.
Domestic politics will play a large role in hampering
the coordination and merging of the French and British nuclear
arsenals. While the force de frappe retains its support
across most of the French political spectrum, anti-nuclear
strains are strong in the UK's Labour opposition. 166 Should
Labour come to power, it is unlikely that any accommodation
will be reached with France that fails to address nuclear
disarmament. In addition to differences over the possession
of nuclear weapons, Labour has also expressed opposition to
the possibility of "first use" and supported requirements to
consult with Germany before any nuclear use. 167 Such
166Debates over nuclear policies are more frequent in
Britain's House of Commons than in France's National Assembly.
Though there is a great deal of interest in cooperating with
France on a variety of issues, it is often difficult to forge
common positions from which to negotiate with France because
of the internal debates. Uncertainty remains regarding the
outcomes of questions dealing with Britain's nuclear role,
including the Trident program, TASM, and disarmament. See
House of Commons (Hansard) , Parliamentary Debates on Nuclear
Defence, Vol. 201, No. 39, January 14, 1992. In addition, the
development of Labour's position toward nuclear weapons is a
key factor in cooperation. Though Labour, as a whole, has
retreated from the unilateral nuclear disarmament stance of
much of the 1980s, many in the party still support the notion.
For a review of Labour's security policies, see Bruce George,
The British Labour Party and Defense , Washington Paper 153
(New York: Praeger, 1991) .
167Freedman, "Britain's Nuclear Commitment to Germany, " in
British-German Defence Cooperation: Partners within the
Alliance , eds . Karl Kaiser and John Roper (London: Jane's,
1988), 198.
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policies, depending on their precise formulation, could
compound the conflicts in strategy discussed above and further
complicate British nuclear cooperation with France. Domestic
political constraints in the United Kingdom will exacerbate
the British government's difficulties in reaching agreement
with a French government in which nearly all players favor a
strong nuclear force. Debating the utility of nuclear weapons
may result in no accord at all.
One final component of national interests that
separates the British and the French involves the relationship
of each with the U.S. Though the French and the Americans
have enjoyed relatively close security relations over the
years, some on each side still consider the other too self-
important or somehow pursuing policies harmful to European
interests. France has repeatedly attempted to reduce American
influence in Europe and replace it with its own in the
security arena. While the French have relied on the American
nuclear umbrella to deter the Soviets from attacking Europe,
they still feel that their own forces are more reliable
because they are protecting European territory (their own)
.
France has tried to spread this attitude throughout Western
Europe in efforts to enhance the "European Pillar, " with
France as its center. 168
168Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity,"
Survival , July/August 1991, 333-4.
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The United Kingdom, in contrast, considers a close
relationship with the United States of the utmost national
interest and strongly opposes any association with France that
would threaten this relationship.
For 40 years, the UK has tried to have the best of both
world, by maintaining this privileged bilateral security
relationship stemming from the close Anglo-American
cooperation which developed during World War II, while at
the same time becoming part of the integration process in
Europe. If NATO is superseded by a new security
arrangement involving bilateral links between the United
States and an integrated European force organized under
the EC or WEU, then this special relationship may come
under even greater pressure. 169
This is an essential feature of any military integration plan
involving the UK. A West European defense identity, including
a nuclear cooperative effort, must account for the importance
of the Atlantic link. Nuclear integration has been hindered
in part because the French have not addressed this concern
sufficiently
.
2. Political and Operational Considerations
A second group of reasons why Western European nuclear
cooperation is unlikely (or, at least, likely to be difficult)
for the foreseeable future concerns the political and
operational points that would be involved in cooperating. In
this context five main ideas are covered: the second decision
center, control problems, cooperative motivations, initiative,
169Sabin, 37-38.
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and the reactions of other nations to a British-French nuclear
relationship
.
The notion of a second decision center means that an
aggressor will have to consider the reactions of more than one
opponent when planning aggression. In this case, not only are
possible American responses to an attack important, but the
British and French responses may also be both severe and
different from those of the U.S., complicating the aggressor's
decision-making process and (it is hoped) deterring him more
effectively. This rationale has been utilized for the
creation of both the British and French arsenals, and
continues to be valid in the eyes of their creators. The
French rely on "proportionate deterrence, " a term also adopted
by the British, to show how they add to Western deterrence.
According to one French scholar, "French retaliation ... relies
on the enemy's inability to predict whether French
conventional and especially nuclear forces will actually be
used." 170 As the United States pulls a large portion of its
forces and equipment out of Europe, some French and British
officials believe that their nuclear arsenals must assume
Europe's nuclear guarantee. 171 If American weapons were
170Andre Brigot, "A Neighbor's Fears: Enduring Issues in
Franco-German Relations," in Le Prestre, 96.
171The January 14, 1992 House of Commons Debate also
specifically addressed the importance of the British second
decision center because of the potential loss of the U.S.
nuclear umbrella. Parliamentary Debates, 887.
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removed from the equation, however, the second decision center
notion could serve to help perpetuate the wedge between French
and British cooperation.
In addition to the strategic reasons why nuclear
integration is unlikely, there are practical reasons as well.
Under any realistic cooperative regime, the national
governments providing the weapons would consult before any
were used. It is here that time considerations come into
play, for in the event of war, especially if a nuclear attack
had already been launched by an aggressor, there would little
(or no) time for extensive consultations before responding.
Even if cooperative agreements were in place, the time might
not be available to implement them. 172
Similarly, questions remain regarding the mechanisms
through which multilateral or central West European control
would be exercised. According to Brigot, nuclear cooperation
is unlikely because "nuclear logic limits considerably sharing
sovereignty, whoever the partners may be." 173 The logic to
which he refers includes the placement of forces, their
control, and the guarantees and use of the deterrent.
Additionally, once hostilities had begun, operational
coordination with France might be difficult because of years
:72Yost, "French Nuclear Targeting," in Strategic Nuclear
Targeting , eds . Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 147.
173Brigot, 102.
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of weakened communications ties between the French and NATO,
complicating attempts at coordination (though numerous
bilateral arrangements are in place) . Finally, while there
are similarities between a number of British and American
systems, this is often not the case with the French, which
could require extensive modifications to the command, control,
and communications equipment if integration were sufficiently
deep
.
One must consider the motives for deciding whether to
cooperate or not . Though they sternly oppose weakening the
Atlantic link, the British also deem it necessary to
participate to a reasonable extent in the process of Western
European integration. One aspect of this entails
participation in military procurement projects, an aspect of
policy that may be applicable to nuclear forces at some point.
In deciding whether to cooperate, however, the British must
determine whether cooperative ventures represent good military
judgment or political expedience. British decision-making
toward the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) program was
affected by these considerations. The challenge of keeping a
fine line in which military and political needs are both
satisfied would always affect nuclear cooperation; an
integrated force depending on national inputs would remain
subject to the military vs. political debates of the national
leadership, resulting in choices based on domestic politics as
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well as the national interest. The ASLP is especially
interesting in this regard. 174
Deficiencies in leadership and initiative, crucial to
effective world organizations but present in West European
countries in uncertain quantities, could play an important
role in hindering Western European nuclear integration.
Though the French have long attempted to lead the Western
Europeans toward political and military union on their terms,
French leadership initiatives have sometimes antagonized
potential followers. On the other hand, the British have
generally been content to follow the American lead. The 1990-
1991 Persian Gulf War once again showed American initiative,
as the U.S. was the only nation able to build the necessary
political and military coalitions to perform the task. 175
Initiative and leadership are essential, or attempts at West
European military integration in general, and nuclear force
integration in particular, are doomed to fail.
174
"Anglo/French Defence Cooperation, " report of the
Defence Committee of the House of Commons, Session 1991-92,
November 27, 1991, shows a wide range of areas of bilateral
cooperation, including some in the nuclear field (exercises,
procurement, planning) and considers cooperation with France
"undervalued." In addition, British and French officials have
recently discussed potential cooperation on SSBN operations,
procurement, and the ASLP, though some reservations have been
noted. See Charles Miller, "UK, France Discuss Nuclear
Defense Cooperation," Press Association , January 16, 1992,
1137 GMT (FBIS-WE, January 16, 1992, 2) .
175Freedman, "The Gulf War and the New World Order, "
Survival , May/June 1991, 199.
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The final political concern that makes West European
nuclear integration difficult (or unlikely) is the reaction of
other interested nations. For other European nations,
especially those who might be happier with lessened U.S.
influence, a coordinated French-British nuclear relationship
might seem like the creation of a new hegemony in Europe, a
"second tier" of a NATO-like oligarchy. 176 For smaller
nations which had come to count on the stabilizing and leading
influence of the United States for the past forty-five years,
such an occurrence would be less than favorable. Hoping for
more influence themselves, these nations might not only be
disappointed but also wish for a return to American
leadership, as many feel that only the American extended
deterrent can truly protect them. 177
Mitterrand's January 1992 statement about a European
nuclear doctrine may well have been motivated out of concern
that other Western Europeans were beginning to feel left out
of the integration process by France, with a corresponding
reduction in their input to form a West European defense
176Stefano Silvestri, "Search for a European Pillar," in
NATO in the 5th Decade , eds . Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990),
89.
1770ne example of this viewpoint can be found in Thomas
Enders, Holger H. Mey, and Michael Ruhle, "Germany, Extended
Deterrence, and the Nuclear Debate," draft of March 1991, 9.
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identity. 178 The appearance of a new hegemonic relationship
would cast a dark shadow on the new defense union right from
the start and dim prospects for long term success. American
support or opposition toward West European nuclear cooperation
is also very important to the prospects for its success, as
questions about the U.S. role in European security affairs
affect nuclear cooperation just as they do the West European
security identity in general. Concern for the potential
marginalization of the U.S. will continue to influence this
debate
.
3 . The Role of Germany
Though Chapter Five of this thesis is devoted to
Germany's role in the development of new West European
security structures, it is necessary here to emphasize those
factors which specifically affect the possibility of a
European nuclear deterrent. This section discusses four
areas: anti-nuclear sentiment, neutralism, German attitudes
toward the nuclear deterrent, and attitudes of others toward
German participation in nuclear policy.
178Mitterrand said, " [France and Britain] have a clear
doctrine for their national defense. Is it possible to
imagine a European doctrine? That question will very quickly
become one of the major issues in the construction of a common
European defence." Allocution Prononcee par Monsieur Francois
Mitterrand, lors de l'ouverture des rencontres nationales pour
l'Europe, au Palais des Congres, Paris, January 10, 1992, 9 of
text furnished by the Service de Presse, Presidence de la
Republique. This unexpected statement could be one of a
series of steps taken to regain French leadership in the
process of designing the new West European defense structure.
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The anti-nuclear movement in Germany is well-developed
and powerful. Though successive Bonn governments have
accepted and desired U.S. nuclear protection, they have done
so representing a public that has increasingly held ambivalent
or opposing views. Since U.S. theater nuclear weapons have
been deployed primarily in Germany and have been planned for
the defense of Germany, a loss of German support for them will
largely undermine the nuclear policies in place in Western
Europe. As a result, the German voice at defense union
meetings might oppose the policies of the British and the
French regarding nuclear forces. President Bush's September
1991 initiative reducing nuclear forces and the subsequent NPG
meeting in Taormina in October satisfied certain domestic
political needs of the Kohl government, but public support for
the continued maintenance of the remaining air-launched
nuclear weapons in Germany is uncertain. 179
The French decision to deploy the Hades missile system
strained France's relations with some German experts,
officials, and politicians, and weakened the coherence of
European defense efforts. The SPD quickly announced strong
opposition to a system which could hypothetically be used on
German territory. 180 As public opposition grew, France, not
179Helga Haftendorn, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in
Allied Strategy," in Dunn and Flanagan, 129.
180Berlin ADN, July 27, 1991, 1450 GMT (FBIS-WE, July 31,
1991, 9) .
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normally hesitant about taking national security decisions
despite foreign criticism181
, eventually deferred the
deployment and reduced total numbers. 182 The effects of this
reversal remain to seen.
Opposition to nuclear weapons is related to another
possible path for German foreign policy - neutralism. Though
the Kohl government remains firmly committed to the Atlantic
Alliance, there has been a great deal of support (especially
from certain circles within the SPD, though it still professes
loyalty to NATO) for a neutralist German policy, with Germany
playing a major international political role without true
allies. 183 Germany's current pro-Western stance could change
if some of the pressures affecting other parts of Europe
should cross its borders, such as religious problems, regional
differences, or nationalism. 184 Such pressures (and
181Yost, "France," in The Allies and Arms Control , eds
.
Fen Osier Hampson, Harald Von Riekhoff, and John Roper
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 185.
182
"French Try to Clear Nuclear Uncertainties," San Jose
Mercury News , September 12, 1991, 8C . The Hades program,
originally calling for 120 missiles for 60 launchers, has been
cut to a total of 30 missiles. See Yost, "Western Nuclear
Force Structures," in Nuclear Weapons and the Future of
European Security , ed. Beatrice Heuser (London: Brassey's for
the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of
London, 19 91), 30.
183Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher, "West German Arms
Control Policy, " in West European Arms Control Policy , ed.
Robbin Laird (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 110.
184William Odom, "Challenges to NATO Strategy:
Implications for the 1990s - Task 2" (Fairfax, VA: National
Security Research, 1990), 6.
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disagreements with EC partners about how to deal with them)
could force Germany away from Western European organizations
and weaken efforts at defense integration, thus weakening
prospects for any integration of European nuclear forces.
Other German attitudes toward nuclear deterrence will
compound the difficulty of creating an integrated force. The
first problem concerns German participation, because if
nuclear planning is to reflect German political interests to
any significant degree, Germany must ensure that its voice is
heard. 185 Though Germany as a whole is losing interest in
nuclear weapons, it remains important that its interests not
be ignored; yet voicing its concerns may complicate integrated
European planning. Joffe makes it clear that the previous
German role has become unsustainable when he says that the
"Federal Republic will no longer act as a willing 'aircraft
carrier' of American nuclear weapons in Europe." 18 ' Any
central West European nuclear force will have to take German
interests into account and treat the Germans as more equal
partners than before Germany's reunification.
185Enders, Mey, and Ruhle, 21. In addition, Foreign
Minister Genscher has signalled his support for Delors's
statement that eventually French nuclear weapons should become
part of a European arsenal, which would give Germany some
influence over their disposition and potential use. See
"Genscher Supports Delors's Statements, Die Welt , January 8,
1992, 8 (FBIS-WE, January 8, 1992, 10).
186Josef Joffe, "The Revisionists: Moscow, Bonn, and the
European Balance," The National Interest , Fall 1989, 53.
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Another point weakening European nuclear forces in
general and hampering effective integration in particular is
the German perception of the effectiveness of the British and
French deterrents. As Enders, Mey, and Ruhle note, neither
force is credible in an extended deterrence role, being
satisfactory only for the protection of their own
sanctuaries. 187 Such opinions damage the credibility of a
French arsenal which, some Frenchmen have vaguely implied,
might provide protection for Germany as a vital French
interest. This also strengthens the hand of Americans who
wish to retain a nuclear deterrent role in Europe, especially
because some Germans remain interested in a counterweight to
the large nuclear arsenal of the Commonwealth of Independent
States
.
As important as German participation in an integrated
European defense organization is, true partnership involving
Germany and nuclear weapons evokes considerable opposition
from other Europeans, especially the French. There has been
strong and repeated opposition to any conception of Germany
having nuclear weapons or any control over nuclear weapons
from Alliance partners, the Russians, and the Germans
themselves 188 , even though the lack of this participation
weakens integrated security structures. France also fears the
187Enders, Mey, and Ruhle, 9.
188Yost, "The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?"
503.
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possibility of foreign policy marginalization as German
political influence in Europe and globally increases. 189
Clearly the most powerful conventional military as well as
economic force west of Russia, however, Germany must play a
large role in ensuring the West European structure's
legitimacy and effectiveness. Otherwise, Germany could turn
against the integration process, and the U.S. could oppose
such a process that prevented full German participation.
C. PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION
Viewed from the perspective already discussed, prospects
for nuclear cooperation in Western Europe seem exceedingly
bleak. However, a number of factors tend to work in favor of
increased, rather than decreased, integration. The first is
economics. It is highly, if not prohibitively, expensive to
maintain an independent nuclear arsenal in addition to
effective conventional forces. Economic pressures have added
to the difficulty of France maintaining the nuclear and
conventional forces that it has in the past. The easing of
the financial burden that cooperation would provide may force
France in that direction. 190 Even the vaunted French IRBM
force has been affected, with the S-45 mobile missile system
189Yost, "France in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs ,
Winter 1990-1991, 115.
190A.W. DePorte, "French Security Policy, " in Le Prestre,
10.
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being scrapped in July 1991 for budgetary reasons. 191 This
is especially significant as a step beyond the cutbacks in the
Hades as well as other programs.
The United Kingdom has been even more severely affected by
tight budgets. British conventional forces are already being
reduced and strong opposition has been raised to SLBM
modernization as well as to air-launched missile systems. The
British, however, have experience in using cooperative efforts
to reduce the financial burden to themselves, as the Trident
program shows. At the same time as participation further
cemented British-American relations, the program brought the
economic advantages of cooperation in procurement to the
British. 192 Cooperation in the ASLP program may offer
additional opportunities for economic benefits. It is clear
that economic considerations point strongly toward cooperation
and integration for the British as well as the French.
Other factors favor integration. Increased specialization
would benefit NATO. Such efforts could be complemented by an
integrated West European nuclear force. The advantages of
specialization are clear from an economic point of view, but
191 Perhaps significantly, the French Senate Defense
Committee has said that the missile could become the backbone
of a European deterrent, which could justify its cost. See
JAC Lewis, "French Bid to Give S-45 a Euro Role, " Jane'
s
Defence Weekly , November 30, 1991, 1025.
192Ministry of Defence, The Future United Kingdom
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force (London: Ministry of
Defence Open Government Document 80/23, July 1980), 19.
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the benefits of cooperation in the political arena have been
many as well. It is after years of coordinated policy efforts
that NATO stands after the Warsaw Pact has fallen. The
Western Europeans share so many common interests that
cooperation should be possible, especially as efforts are
underway in earnest to create an integrated West European
defense structure. Cooperation produces synergy, but until
now national interests have prevented taking advantage of this
benefit. Finally, results from the Gulf conflict show the
benefits of cooperation, when nations of similar outlook
worked together to meld their abilities against common
opposition. The lessons of the EC's disunity in the Gulf War
should help instruct the Europeans in the benefits of unity as
they progress toward economic and political integration.
Though logic suggests that nuclear integration would
benefit Western Europe in some ways, it would be unrealistic
to say that the evidence based on these factors carries more
weight than the factors discouraging integration. National
sovereignty and related national interests will not be
supplanted by the "European good" unless sufficient national
sovereignty can be retained and the integration process serves
other national interests. Though it would by no means be a
rapid process, the political and operational problems
precluding integration could be overcome by more careful
analysis and diplomatic expertise. There may be ways to shape
a European security organization to include substantial German
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influence while maintaining a robust deterrent force, given
sufficient time and effort. National interests are another
question, however. Considering the importance nuclear weapons
hold for their possessors, cooperation in the nuclear arena
would imply that great political, psychological, and military
gulfs had been overcome so that the participants could
integrate something of the highest value to them. 193
According to Yost,
[France's] preoccupations with autonomy and. .. France'
s
interest in maximizing uncertainties in the interests of
deterrent credibility [have hampered its ability to
consult with Germany] . France's refusal to engage in
consultations on nuclear employment questions with Germany
and other allies lessens the credibility of French
professions of interest in building a West European
defence identity and placing French nuclear forces at the
service of this entity. 194
It is clear that until political integration takes place, it
is premature even to consider the integration of European
nuclear forces. Considering the multitude of problems
involved in political integration, and the fact that plans for
defense integration are only at the earliest stages, it is
apparent that for the foreseeable future there will be no
close cooperation of West European nuclear forces.
193Peter Nailor, "The Difficulties of Nuclear
Cooperation," in Boyer, 32.
194Yost, "Western Nuclear Force Structures," 42.
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Any fundamental shift in the structure of European
security carries great significance for the foreign and
military policy of the United States. Though this chapter has
argued that Western European nuclear integration will not
happen for the foreseeable future, the reasons behind the
efforts being made toward integration in this area as well as
European economic and political integration in general will
necessitate basic reassessments of U.S. relations with Europe.
This section of the chapter briefly analyzes some important
issue areas affected by European integration with an eye
toward future nuclear strategic planning for the United
States. Many of these issue areas are related to more general
topics concerning the development of a West European security
identity and its implications for U.S. planning, which are
discussed in other chapters. This section concentrates on two
specifically nuclear considerations: the reshaping of the
nuclear roles of NATO and/or the WEU, and the challenge of
controlling potential nuclear escalation in a conflict.
1. Nuclear Roles in the Reshaping of NATO and/or the WEU
The alliance structures are in a period of major
transition. NATO has already begun to transform itself toward
the post-Cold War era, attempting to define new roles in
European security. The concept of existential deterrence has
many more followers. The Western European Union is on the
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fringes of power, as Europeanists and Atlanticists attempt to
find its place in West European integration as well as its
relationship to NATO. Efforts toward integrating European
nuclear forces could fit nicely into a strengthened WEU, but
this would institutionalize nuclear forces in an organization
over which the United States has little influence. Whereas
under current structures the U.S. can count on coordination
with the British through the NPG and JSTPS, a combined
British-French arsenal under WEU auspices might present
American nuclear planning with the need to consider scenarios
in which the European arsenal played an autonomous role.
Should the EC gain a nuclear arsenal in this way, it is
possible that NATO's nuclear role would lose some of its
centrality in allied planning, perhaps reducing its deterrent
effect, especially as the U.S. reduces its European forces.
As the United States withdraws large portions of its
forces from Europe, its whole European posture changes. The
U.S. role may become one of ensuring the stability of Europe
by a token presence and political relationships, in order to
keep Eastern Europe under some form of control as well as
providing a counterweight to a Germany which could choose an
independent path. 195 The role of American nuclear forces,
then, becomes one of a very distant threat. Should the U.S.
choose or be forced to remove its nuclear forces from Europe
1950dom, 3 .
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in their entirety, nuclear deterrence may become what some
have called "declaratory extended deterrence, " less credible
than extended deterrence based in part on an in-theater
nuclear presence. 196 The entire face of nuclear deterrence
and of the Atlantic Alliance will be shaped by efforts to
integrate and reconfigure West European security structures.
2. Control over Nuclear Escalation
The concept of nuclear weapons under the control of
allies other than the U.S. itself has always been of great
concern to the United States because of the uncertainties
involved regarding their control and possible use. 19 ' The
smaller nuclear powers do not share the thoroughly debated and
modelled deterrence strategies that the U.S. has created.
French strategies that diverge widely from Anglo-American
strategies by emphasizing threats of earlier and less limited
use than are envisaged by Britain and the U.S. cause concern
that in the event of war SACEUR might lose escalation control
because France might usurp the initiative and begin a large
scale nuclear war. 198
While nuclear force integration in Europe could
moderate the French strategies more toward American views,
196Yost, "U.S. Military Power and Alliance Relations,"
Annals, AAPSS , September 1991, 87.
197Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy , 306.
198Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in
Europe , Part II, 20.
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having another large institutionalized control point for
nuclear weapons would force a reassessment of American nuclear
strategy. The delicate nuclear balances that have existed
could be upset by an assertive EC or WEU armed with nuclear
weapons should tensions arise again there, and uncertainty
would exist over nuclear use in contingencies outside Europe.
The United States would likely be forced to negotiate strategy
with the European organization to try to coordinate planning
and control, and this would give the Europeans additional
leverage over the U.S. In sum, efforts to unite British and
French nuclear forces, however far they may progress, will
have substantial implications for American strategic planning.
E. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that any potential nuclear force
integration in Western Europe is a far-reaching proposition
for both European integration and American strategic planning.
It would certainly be the apex of West European integration,
completing the final act of establishing an autonomous defense
identity. Still, the many advantages of integrating West
European nuclear forces will likely be outweighed by the
disadvantages and obstacles into the foreseeable future.
National interests and questions over national sovereignty
will prevent accord on more technical and political issues
from catalyzing integration. The role of Germany, the
strongest economic power in Western Europe, will remain
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uncertain for some time to come, further clouding true
European integration in the security field.
Regardless of the end result, the United States faces
great challenges in its strategic planning. It will play some
role in the reshaping of European security structures, but
this role will depend greatly on the extent of cooperation
among the Europeans, as well as the fear of general
instability. The U.S. must continue to address these issues
because the stakes are very high. Careful attention to
nuclear weapons has kept the peace for forty-five years;
further close attention will (it is hoped) perpetuate it.
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V. GERMANY AND WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY
A. INTRODUCTION
November 9, 1989 represented the true end of the postwar
period for many of the world's nations. For Germany, which
would have been the central front battlefield had war
occurred, the collapse of the Berlin Wall ultimately led to
the restoration of full national sovereignty and all the
resulting privileges and responsibilities. The Federal
Republic of Germany, which had defined much of its security
policy in close collaboration with the United States in NATO,
suddenly found itself with a much more influential voice, at
the same time as domestic opposition in the U.S. to a large
military effort in the post-Cold War era increased. Quickly
developing, however, was a German political debacle over not
only the proper role of German military power but also over
what type of West European security structure Germany should
back
.
While for many years the Federal Republic had been obliged
to accede to the leadership of the U.S. (and certain European
powers) in formulating its security policy, the reunified
Germany in short order became the pivotal actor in any
European multinational structure. A leader in the EC,
Germany's role has been critical to the endurance of NATO, the
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WEU, and CSCE as well. While the Paris-Bonn axis has been the
driving force for greater European integration (the European
identity) , the Bonn-Washington axis has become the cornerstone
of the transatlantic link. Germany's recognition of its
multiple roles has required complicated political maneuvering,
which has often led to questions about Germany's true motives
and reliability.
While France has led the way toward a more significant
European identity, and while Britain has underscored the
importance of close ties with the U.S., Germany will play the
key role in the development of future West European security
structures. A position provided by population and economic
might, Germany's status also depends on the actions of the
leading political parties as well as trends in public opinion.
Since Germany's role is so important, this chapter
specifically addresses the principal factors that will
possibly influence its positions in the near future on these
security issues. Specifically, it begins by examining briefly
German "assertiveness " in foreign policy, as this idea not
only colors much of Germany's security policy, but also
affects relations with allies. Next, the chapter considers
the attitudes of Germany's leading political parties on two
essential questions: the development and interrelationships
of West European security structures, and the out-of-area
question. Next is an analysis of public opinion trends with
respect to the use of military force, alliances, and the
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future of U.S. forces in Germany. The chapter concludes with
an overall look at the direction German security policy is
taking
.
B. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY "ASSERTIVENESS"
Germany has taken a much more active role in European
affairs in the time since the fall of the Berlin Wall and
reunification. Partly a result of the strength of the unified
nation, this role also results from what Germany has perceived
as a lack of leadership from its European partners. The
Yugoslav crisis has been the most obvious example of what has
been called by some German "assertiveness " in foreign policy -
that is, bucking the mainstream opinion and forging its own
course, in this case with recognition of the independence of
Croatia and Slovenia. 199 At the same time, Germany has
exercised much of the initiative in the development of
integrated European structures, taking over from France in
devising the compromises necessary to keep Britain involved in
the process. The Germans have played an essential role not
only in monetary union compromises but also in the development
of a West European security identity. 200 While Chancellor
Kohl has attempted to dispel concerns that Germany is creating
199David Binder, "As Bonn Talks Louder, Some in the U.S.
Wince," New York Times , January 7, 1992, A2
.
200Stephen Kinzer, "Germany Now Leading Campaign to
Strengthen the European Community, " New York Times , December
2, 1991.
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a "Fourth Reich, " Free Democratic Party (FDP) Chairman Otto
Lambsdorff has stated that Germans "are being involved in
solving problems they would not have dared to address
before. " 201
Germany has also become the leading U.S. ally in Europe.
The "special relationship" with the U.K. has not weakened, but
Germany is the dominant economic and political power on the
continent, and the United States has chosen to work with it
most closely in the security field. It is significant that
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was launched as
a U.S. -German initiative. 202 Not only does Germany fear the
creation of a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe,
but as one unnamed official also said, "We have greater
responsibilities and a duty now to take a lead on
occasion." 20 ' The United States and Germany recognize the
need each has for the other in European security affairs.
While the U.S. needs Germany to legitimize the American role
and the continuation of NATO, Germany feels that there is no
substitute for the American military guarantee, neither in
201Otto Lambsdorff, "Germany Needs U.S. Political
Leadership, " speech at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation,
Washington, DC, February 25, 1992, in The Week in Germany
,
German Information Center, New York, February 28, 1992, 1.
202James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "US-German
Joint Statement on the Transatlantic Community, " statement in
Washington, DC, October 2, 1991, in US Department of State
Dispatch , October 7, 1991, 736.
203 Ian Murray, "Genscher Offers Vision of Future to EC and
NATO," London Times , January 9, 19 92, 7.
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French forces nor in a potential Franco-British nuclear
umbrella. 204 This growing partnership will significantly
affect the development of European security structures and the
future U.S. role in European security affairs.
The more active German role in foreign and security
politics has aroused concern in some areas, particularly in
France. France's fear of a new German powerhouse was evident
in 1990, when the French attempted to slow German
reunification. French anxiety appeared again in October 1991
during the discussion of the British-Italian and French-German
defense proposals, when the French worried about the
reliability of German support. 205 President Mitterrand
expressed annoyance and concern about the German role in
Yugoslavia when he stated,
[the] scenario [of the redrawing of internal Yugoslav
borders] did not occur because the desire for western
unity between the Community countries in the end
prevailed, but not without temporary hitches over
individual countries ' desires to assert their own
interests there. 206
French concerns have been echoed by others, including the
British, who in some ways might also be attempting to "tie
204L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Germany: Key to a
Continent (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1992), 26.
205
"A la Recherche de l'Europe Perdue," The Economist ,
October 12, 1991, 56.
206Francois Mitterrand, "Europe's Future," speech at the
Conference on "The Tribes of Europe," Paris, February 29,
1992, 5.
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down Germany." 207 It is likely to be some time before other
countries have confidence in Germany's desire to work with its
European partners for common goals, adding to the complexity
of international relations in the interim.
C . GERMAN PARTY ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES
1. CSCE
A strengthened CSCE would be the embodiment of the
"common European house" called for by former Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev and taken up by German Foreign Minister
Genscher. Genscher has reiterated his support for the goal of
bringing "the whole of Europe ever closer together on the
basis of the Charter of Paris" on a number of occasions. In
his view, Europe's military alliances would become part of
that process, effectively transforming them into components of
a pan-European collective security arrangement.^ 01 While
Chancellor Kohl and the CDU/CSU union have also lent their
support to the CSCE process, it has not occupied their
attention to the extent that it has that of Genscher and the
FDP and the Social Democrats (SPD)
.
207Spoken by an unnamed British ambassador in Europe,
quoted in Marc Fisher, "'German Question' Bedevils European
Unification Talks," Washington Post , December 8, 1991, in the
San Jose Mercury News , December 8, 1991, 12A.
208Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Speech at the Meeting of the
Western European Union, Luxembourg, March 23, 1990, in
Statements & Speeches , March 30, 1990, 3.
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The SPD's recent Congresses have expressed the party's
desire to replace the previously established European security
structures with a new European system not based on military
power. 209 The 1991 Congress called for the CSCE to be the
base for a European peace order, with which existing
institutions could be dovetailed. 210 SPD official Karsten
Voigt has said that the party favors NATO being at the CSCE's
disposal, as well as the NACC. 211 These proposals for the
CSCE would not only fundamentally alter Europe's military
alliances, but could also effectively diminish American
influence in European security affairs.
2 . NATO
The CDU/CSU has remained a steadfast supporter of the
Atlantic Alliance since the Federal Republic of Germany joined
in 1955. Chancellor Kohl has often repeated that "the
security alliance between Europe and North America remains
indispensable," 212 and has recently stated that,
209See for example the SPD position paper, "From the
Confrontation of the Blocs to a European Security System,
"
April 25, 1990, 1.
210,1 SPD European Policy Perspectives and European Policy, "
Resolutions adopted by the Congress of the SPD, May 29, 1991,
1,5.
211Berlin ADN, February 25, 1992, 1027 GMT (FBIS-WE,
February 25, 1992, 17) .
212Helmut Kohl, "Europe - Every German's Future," speech
at Davos, February 3, 1990, in Statements & Speeches , February
6, 1990, 2.
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In [the] future, . .
.
[the] freedom and security of Europe
and also, therefore, of Germany can be safeguarded by this
transatlantic alliance, which is why I would like to
underline ... that for us, it is a matter of course that
this includes also a substantial presence of American
troops in Europe." 213
NATO has been, and remains, the cornerstone of the CDU/CSU's
security policy, even while it has lent support to a West
European defense identity. Germany has also recently stated
its desire to subordinate the "European" corps proposed by
France and Germany to NATO. 214
Genscher and the FDP have also expressed the need for
NATO as not only the cement of transatlantic solidarity that
will ensure North American participation in the European
house, but also as the organization that will ensure European
stability during the transitions occurring in Eastern
Europe. 215 NATO, through the NACC, would also provide the
institutional framework for cooperation with the Central and
Eastern European nations. While the SPD as a whole favors
NATO becoming an arm of the CSCE, former Chancellor candidate
Oskar Lafontaine called for NATO to extend its security
213Helmut Kohl, "US-German Friendship Strengthens Atlantic
Partnership, " joint news conference with U.S. President George
Bush, Washington, DC, March 22, 1992, in US Department of
State Dispatch , March 23, 1992, 218.
214Karl Lamers (CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman) , "Of
German Dodgery," Per Spiegel , March 16, 1992, 22-3 (FBIS-WE,
March 17, 1992, 5)
.
215Genscher, "The United States of Europe," 9.
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guarantee to the Commonwealth of Independent States. 216
Quickly disavowed by other party officials, this proposal
illustrates the internal split of the party, weakening its
ability to influence national policy formation. It also shows
the fluidity of efforts to redesign the architecture of
European security - and raises questions about what role NATO
will play in the foreseeable future.
3. The EC, The WEU, and the Franco-German Proposal for a
European Corps
While continuing to support both NATO and the U.S.
role, the Kohl government has also acknowledged the importance
of addressing the security interests of the backers of the EC,
the WEU, and the Franco-German proposal for a European corps.
An important driver of the European identity, Kohl has tried
to frame it in terms acceptable to the United States. It
appears that Kohl "intends strengthening the European pillar
without rendering the Atlantic Alliance superfluous." 217
This pillar would have its uses, including assuming some of
the military burden from the U.S. and allowing Europe (either
the EC or the WEU) to participate in a cohesive fashion in
some future military eventuality, following the example of WEU
naval coordination in the Persian Gulf in two recent
216Martin Winter, Lafontaine Wants to Extend NATO Area,
"
Frankfurter Rundschau , January 15, 1992, 1-2 (FBIS-WE, January
15, 1992, 8-9) .
217Jurgen Koar, "Agreement in Washington, " The German
Tribune , June 2, 1991, 3.
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conflicts. 218 Additionally, a common European position could
be developed in the WEU and then presented at North Atlantic
Council sessions. It is significant that 65% of those
identifying themselves as CDU/CSU supporters favored the idea
of a European intervention force in a recent survey (as did
51% of SPD supporters) . 219 This could cause a split within
the CDU/CSU that could ultimately threaten its support for
NATO.
The FDP has not expressed a great deal of interest in
European security structures other than the CSCE. This is
probably the result of two factors. First, the party's goal
is a security system based on much more than military power,
a system that a strengthened CSCE might provide, not the WEU
as a component of the EC or as an autonomous entity. The
Maastricht security articles agreed to by Germany can be seen
as an expedient toward the ultimate CSCE-based security goal.
Second, NATO remains the primary military organization in
Europe, as the Alliance is the established organization with
critical American participation. While the FDP has supported
the concept of a European identity, it has done so as part of
an overall campaign to bring Europe together within the CSCE
218Jean-Paul Picaper, interview with Helmut Kohl, Le
Figaro , November 14, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, November 18, 1991, 13).
219Ralf Zoll, "Public Opinion on Security Policy and Armed
Forces: The German Case," presented at the International
Meeting on the Future of Security in Europe: A Comparative
Analysis of European Public Opinion, Brussels, December 16-17,
1991, 17.
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framework. Additionally it has devoted considerable attention
to the need for continued American participation, which would
occur not through the EC or WEU, but through NATO and the
CSCE.
The SPD has called for the WEU to move gradually
toward the process of European political union. It would then
be subject to the common security policy of the EC members,
though each member would be able to debate policy in its own
domestic format. 220 Because it favors the ultimate goal of
dovetailing defense organizations into the CSCE, however, the
SPD is not likely to support strongly the strengthening of the
WEU. Indeed, the party has expressed its opposition to the
interventionary role for the organization envisioned in some
quarters . 22:
As a result of the SPD's stance, the FDP's lesser
interest, and the CDU/CSU's ambivalence, support for the
concept of a truly autonomous European defense identity seems
weakened. While Kohl backs the idea of a European pillar for
NATO, he has remained distant from French concepts of European
activism, preferring that the Franco-German proposal for a
European corps follow NATO guidance. Without clear German
220 M SPD European Policy Perspectives and European Policy,
221Rainer Nahrendorf and Peter Henacher, "Engholm: We Can
Not Return to Nationalism. SPD Demands changes in Maastricht
Treaty," interview in Handelsbatt , March 5, 1992, 9 (FBIS-WE,
March 16, 1992, 10) .
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support or even plausible definitions of the roles and
missions of the WEU or the "European corps, " it seems unlikely
that either will gain strength without other changes in the
European security environment - from either side of the
Atlantic. This clearly demonstrates the political weight
Germany now carries in Europe.
4 . The Role of the United States
The role of the United States in European security
affairs is uncertain as the post-Cold War world develops.
Though European officials across the continent have emphasized
the need for a continued American military presence for a
variety of reasons, it is unclear how large that presence
should be, where it should be located, or whether domestic
American interests will permit it to remain in Europe. In
general, the German point of view is that American forces are
necessary to ensure the stability of a dangerous continent.
As former Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg noted, only the
link with North America can ensure security and stability in
Europe
.
For this purpose, a continued substantial presence of
American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe will be
required. At the same time it stands out clearly that
security in Europe must never be defined as an exclusively
European concern. 222
222Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European
Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of
Change in Europe," speech in Bonn, April 10, 1991, 11.
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Three-quarters of CDU/CSU supporters still believe in
a strong U.S. role in Europe. 223 The opinion is common that
only the U.S. can provide a viable security guarantee, even
while Western Europe strives to build its own defense
identity. Regardless of the claims of some Frenchmen that
France's nuclear arsenal could provide a sufficient deterrent,
"there seems to be an abiding consensus that no realistic
substitute is available for the deterrent role of U.S. nuclear
weapons." 224 This reinforces the attitude that the United
States is the only consistent friend Germany has. 225
As previously discussed, Foreign Minister Genscher has
indicated his desire for the continuation of NATO and the U.S.
role in Europe to stabilize the region. The presence of
American forces in Germany remains an open question, however.
The FDP position on nuclear weapons is much less uncertain.
Genscher has remarked that, "Land-based nuclear weapons can no
longer be deployed on German soil." 226 It is not entirely
clear whether this position opposes the CDU/CSU line on
223 Zoll, 17. Significantly, new Defense Minister Volker
Ruehe is a strong supporter of the United States role in
Germany, even more so than his predecessor.
224
"German Perspectives on NATO and European Security,
"
(Fairfax, VA: National Security Research, August 1991), 34-5.
225Frederick Kempe, "Germany is Seeking to Ease Concerns
in U.S. over Its Reliability as an Ally, " Wall Street Journal ,
February 4, 1992, 2
.
226
"Right of Intervention Demanded, " Frankfurter
Allqemeine , May 24, 1991, 4 (FBIS-WE, May 28, 1991, 7) .
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nuclear weapons for dual-capable aircraft, it could add to the
pressure on Kohl to modify his party's stance on the issue.
It also reinforces the impression that Genscher ultimately
wants U.S. forces and weapons to leave Germany. With the
CDU/CSU showing electoral weakness and German public opinion
strengthening against its position on U.S. nuclear weapons in
Germany, Genscher is gaining increasing power over the
development of German security policy, decreasing the
likelihood of a long-term American military and nuclear
presence in Germany.
SPD positions would seem to deny the need for U.S. forces
in Germany. The party has made its position on nuclear
weapons clear: it favors their total withdrawal from Europe.
As Lafontaine stated early in 1990, "Unity .. .means liberation
from chemical and atomic weapons and renunciation of low-level
military flights." 227 He followed this statement with a
pledge to order the withdrawal of all chemical weapons (which
the U.S. removed in 1990) and nuclear weapons from German
territory if he became Chancellor. Lafontaine' s position was
formalized into party policy shortly thereafter when the SPD
position paper repeated 1988 resolutions to rid Germany and
Europe of nuclear weapons through a ban on short-range nuclear
227
"Lafontaine: Kohl Policy Detrimental to Unity," This
Week in Germany , March 2, 1990, 2.
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forces and all land- and air-based nuclear weapons. 228 In
addition the party continued its call for the transformation
of European military forces into units incapable of
aggression, through logistics, armaments, and operational
changes. 229 Such alterations would substantially transform
and reduce the U.S. military presence.
The future of the U.S. military presence in Germany is
considered later in this chapter. Political circles in
Germany clearly believe that the U.S. role has fundamentally
changed. It will be difficult for Kohl to maintain support
for a large American military presence in Germany, even if he
can produce a consensus on the U.S. role in Europe in general.
One factor that may moderate mass public and elite opinion
against U.S. forces in Germany, however, is the economic
impact of their leaving. Already there have been calls for
their retention to prevent the collapse of certain local
economies. It remains to be seen how important such calls
will be compared to those desiring an end to U.S.
"occupation .
"
228„prom t jie confrontation of the Blocs to a European
Security System," 3,6.
229
"Frieden und Abrustung in Europa, " Resolution on Peace
and Disarmament Policy adopted at the SPD Party Congress at
Munster from 30th August to 2nd September 1988, 1.
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D. THE OUT-OF-AREA QUESTION
Dealing with out-of-area issues is fundamental not only to
sorting out the various options for future West European
security, but also to ensuring that Germany's influence is
commensurate with its economic power. Germany has already
faced considerable international criticism regarding its
reluctance to participate to a greater extent in the Persian
Gulf War and for its hesitation in answering the out-of-area
question in general. As a prominent U.S. expert on German
affairs, Ronald Asmus, has noted,
A stable European peace structure and German-American
relationship cannot be built if Germany is inclined toward
pacifism, is reluctant to acknowledge geopolitical
realities, or is unwilling to share the burdens of
international security. 230
The CDU/CSU has favored the involvement of German forces
in out-of-area missions to a greater degree than the other
main parties. Party officials recognize that an "enormous
crisis of credibility" for Germany will result if it fails to
participate at least in UN peacekeeping tasks 231 , and most
wish to allow the Bundeswehr to operate beyond UN
missions. 232 Gerhard Stoltenberg, who had favored German
230Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany and America: Partners in
Leadership?" Survival , November/December 1991, 564.
231
"Do Not Gamble Away the Seat in the Security Council,"
Frankfurter Allqemeine , March 3, 1992, 4 (FBIS-WE, March 3,
1992, 11)
.
232,1 Parties at Odds on Bundeswehr UN Deployment;
Coalition: SPD Should Give up Resistance to German
Participation in Military Operations," Sueddeutsche Zeitunq
,
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participation in military missions called for by the European
Political Union (EPU) , was forced to back down from
formalizing the policy by strong opposition from both the FDP
and SPD. 233 Volker Ruehe, the new defense minister, has
previously expressed his support for a change in the Basic Law
to allow for German participation in all UN activities, and is
likely to maintain the pressure to allow a wider range of out-
of-area operations. Not all in the CDU/CSU favor altering the
Basic Law, however, because of the possibility that
specifically legislating the permissibility of UN missions
could remove all the ambiguity and outlaw other missions. 234
It seems clear that not even the conservative CDU/CSU has
resolved all its own questions.
The FDP, which originally opposed even the use of German
forces in UN peacekeeping (the so-called "blue helmet")
operations, ultimately shifted its position to favor such
missions if the Basic Law were amended to permit them. 235
Genscher has come out in favor of such a solution to this
January 17, 1992, 2 (FBIS-WE, February 5, 1992, 14).
233
"Obsolete Mindset: Serious Defeat for Defense Minister
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235Hans-Georg Atzinger and Thomas -Durrell Young, "Emerging
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Employments" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,
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question, and his pressure forced Stoltenberg to back down
with his proposal to allow even greater German participation
in out-of-area activities. FDP security expert Jurgen
Koppelin also opposes such an initiative, because he feels
that it would imply that all European security tasks would
become Bundeswehr missions. 236 Genscher's personal political
strength and the party's importance to the ruling coalition
make it unlikely that Kohl will soon gain support for out-of-
area missions beyond peacekeeping under UN auspices.
The SPD has been the most adamant in opposing out-of-area
operations. Following from their positions on the European
security alliances, the SPD would support "blue helmet"
missions only if the Basic Law permitted them, and
participants in such operations would only be allowed to
protect themselves. 237 SPD security spokesman Walter Kolbow
has on numerous occasions opposed Stoltenberg on the out-of-
area question, reiterating the party's insistence on carefully
circumscribed "blue helmet" missions only. 23 ' The SPD's
position on out-of-area operations cannot be ignored by the
CDU/CSU. Any attempt to amend the Basic Law must satisfy the
236„ SpD and FDp Re j ect Military Plans," Sueddeutsche
Zeitunq , February 13, 1992, 2 (FBIS-WE, February 13, 1992,
30) .
237The May 1991 Party Congress finally assented to the
concept of German participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
See Atzinger, 29-30.
238See for example, "SPD and FDP Reject Military Plans,"
29.
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SPD, because it currently controls the Bundesrat , making the
possibility of permitting operations of the type favored by
the CDU/CSU virtually nonexistent in the foreseeable future.
The out-of-area question is important because of its
impact on Germany's ability to play a key role in the
designing of the new West European security architecture. Far
from being resolved, the issue raises concerns among Germany's
allies about its reliability. Germany's ability to
participate in out-of-area activities would seem crucial to
any viable mission for the European corps outlined in the
October 1991 Franco-German proposal, as well as to the WEU.
The question has become much more prominent recently. It is
certain to influence considerably the relations between
Germany and its European partners; it could significantly
handicap any autonomous West European defense entity; and it
could weaken the growing U.S. -German partnership.
E. TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION
1. The Use of Military Force
Public opinion is playing an ever-greater role in the
security politics of the Federal Republic. While the public
long felt secure about the government's handling of security
policy and about the protection of Germany by the United
States, defense and arms control are becoming areas of greater
132
public interest. 239 As the threat has receded, Germans have
felt less need for military forces. One poll found a general
delegitimization of security policy in which less than 20% of
Germans considered there to be any threat to Germany at
all. 240 A certain degree of pacifism has entered the German
population's attitude; the trend is to see peace as an
absolute value. This was an important factor in determining
Germany's behavior during the Persian Gulf War. 241 While
there has been support for joint European defense decision-
making, the German population has opposed a European Rapid
Deployment Force 242 , as well as providing only ambivalent
backing to UN military operations outside the NATO area. 243
Indicative of general German attitudes toward the use of
military force, Germans have expressed support for non-
military out-of-area missions (unlike the Gulf
experience) 244
,
and even more importantly, a recent poll
239Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher, "West German Arms
Control Policy, " in West European Arms Control Policy , ed.
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showed that support for military defense was no more than 60%
even in responding to an attack on their own territory . 245
2. Attitudes Toward European Alliances
Since the late 1980s, not only have German attitudes
changed from giving unquestioning support to NATO, but they
have also left decision-makers with very ambiguous impressions
that make the drawing of trends quite difficult. An early
1990 poll showed that support for neutrality had matched that
favoring staying in the Atlantic Alliance, while other surveys
showed similarly ambivalent results. 246 While Germans
favored joint European defense decision-making, only 40% felt
that defense should be a priority of the EC. 247 In addition,
while a majority of Germans continues to believe that NATO is
essential for German security, the trend has been toward
decreasing support for this position, including only 35% in
the former East Germany. 248 Most of these same Germans seem
to have adopted the FDP and SPD position that the CSCE should
January 29, 1992, 15.
245Zoll, 27.
246Wolfgang G. Gibowski and Holli A. Semetko, "Public
Opinion in the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany: A Two
Nation Study," Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, March 1990, 4.
247Asmus, "Germany in Transition," 20.
248 Ibid., 4.
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be the primary organization for shaping the future European
political order. 249
Even though most Germans no longer consider there to
be threats to their security, as time goes on the
international environment will certainly change. One factor
that could help perpetuate support for NATO is recognition of
new threats, such as those from the Third World or possibly
instability. 250 Nevertheless, support for NATO in the
foreseeable future is unlikely to regain the levels it held
for most of the Cold War period, and this has already forced
an American reappraisal of the U.S. security role in Europe.
After all, as Josef Joffe notes,
Dependents do not seek to inflict their will on patron
powers when the threat is high. Conversely, the hold of
protectors over clients will inevitably loosen as their
demand for security dwindles. 251
3. Attitudes Toward U.S. Forces and Nuclear Weapons
German public opinion has shown a steep recent decline
in support for the retention of American forces in Germany.
Far different from a period in which the U.S. was considered
the protector of the Federal Republic of Germany, much of the
backing for the American military presence now comes from
249Zoll, 11.
250Hans-Joachim Veen, "The New Security Architecture for
Europe in the Public Opinion of the United Germany Seen by
Public Opinion Polls," Brussels, November 12, 1990, 15.
251Josef Joffe, "The Revisionists: Moscow, Bonn, and the
European Balance," The National Interest , Fall 1989, 53.
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those who fear the substantial economic consequences of the
withdrawal of U.S. forces. A late 1991 (post-Soviet coup)
poll showed that 57% of Germans favored the total withdrawal
of U.S. forces, while 70% favored a complete withdrawal of
nuclear weapons from Germany. 252 These numbers are
consistent with results from polls in the late 1980s, which
showed increasing support for nuclear disarmament as well as
opposition to what came to be seen as a U.S. occupation of
Germany, especially in light of the reduced threat. 253
Young Germans who cannot easily appreciate American
efforts on Germany's behalf after the Second World War are
likely to form a substantial bloc of opinion opposing the
American presence in Germany in the near future. There is a
strong sentiment that the Germans "want their country back."
After so many years of "occupation" by foreign military forces
and limited sovereignty, the opportunity has finally come for
Germany to control its own destiny. The trends shown not only
in attitudes toward military operations and European
alliances, but also toward the presence of American forces and
nuclear weapons, may accelerate, with serious implications for
efforts develop a new West European defense identity.
252Asmus, "Germany in Transition," 5
253Jenonne Walker, "Keeping America in Europe, " Foreign
Policy , Summer 1991, 133.
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F. CONCLUSIONS
For all the pronouncements of the Kohl government that
Germany intends to support fully the Atlantic Alliance, as
well as European integration, it is clear that he faces
challenges to his policies on many fronts. Not only the
opposition Social Democrats, but also the coalition partner
Free Democrats are much less convinced than the CDU/CSU of the
efficacy of military force in the post-Cold War era,
increasing the difficulty of achieving a consensus on German
participation in out-of-area missions. At the same time,
while Kohl has taken part in, and supported, the efforts of
the CSCE, his adamant support for NATO as well as for the EC
stands out in contrast to the opinions of both the SPD and
FDP. There exists no clear consensus about the future of
security policy for Germany; the opinion polls come the
closest to producing one, but even their results show
considerable ambivalence in many areas. As Joffe has
observed,
Given the [limited] new security consensus, the best
American pleas for strategic stability count for little if
no significant political force in West Germany is willing
to carry them forward as its own. 254
Germany's hesitations about coming to grips with new
security requirements threaten the ability of the projected
European political union to form a cohesive security policy,
because the out-of-area question and Germany's growing
254Joffe, 53.
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opposition to military force could paralyze numerous decision-
making bodies. In addition, ambivalent support for American
security interests and increasing opposition to an American
military presence will add to the challenges facing U.S.
decision-makers in defining a new U.S. role in European
security affairs, strengthening the position of those who
favor a larger withdrawal of American forces from Europe.
Times have changed in Europe, especially in Germany. Joffe's
1989 observation is all the more apt today:
West German society, as all the polls indicate with ever
more dramatic numbers, is no longer willing to carry
yesterday's military burden - be it nuclear weapons
stationed on German soil, long terms of military service,
the traditional peace-time strength of the Bundeswehr of
496,000 men, or the environmental toll of Allied forces in
the Federal Republic. 255
The domestic costs of reunification have diverted public
attention from security issues, and promise to do so for some
time. Still, Germany is such an important driver of European
integration that it cannot afford either to sit on the
sidelines or assume it can participate in the projected
European political union and avoid particular consequences
when it chooses. Clear-cut German policies will be essential





VI. THE FUTURE OF NATO
A. INTRODUCTION
As the result of changes in the global security
environment portrayed in previous chapters, the guardian of
post-War Western security, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) , finds its continued existence in
question. For the United States, the implication could be the
loss of much of the influence it has possessed in Western
Europe throughout the Cold War period. Lawrence Kaplan stated
in 1988 that, "...if the alliance still had meaning for most
of its members, it rested on the importance of maintaining a
balance of power between East and West." 251 With the
transformation of the East-West relationship, this pillar no
longer exists. It is therefore necessary to determine if
Kaplan was (or will be) correct, and if NATO will follow the
Warsaw Pact into oblivion, or if there is more to NATO and its
ability to adapt than Kaplan's statement implies.
American strategic planning has arrived at a significant
crossroad, as the 1992 political campaign shows. Much of the
latitude American decision-makers will have is being shaped in
Western Europe; nevertheless, how the Administration and
256Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The
Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 100.
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Congress proceed is not only crucial but yet to be determined
completely. One thing is clear: "There will be no
encompassing paradigm of thought and action to rival those
that dominated the past 40 years." 257 The result will be a
much more decentralized and disaggregated American strategic
planning approach than has existed for many years.
Progress toward an autonomous defense identity examined in
chapter three will also play an important role in determining
West European influence on the transformation and survival of
NATO. An autonomous West European security structure could
help satisfy those in the U.S. Congress clamoring for greater
burden-sharing" by the European allies, or make the
maintenance of NATO appear less necessary. From the days of
the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution, when the United States decided
permanently to commit itself to the defense of Western Europe,
the U.S. has officially supported the concept of Western
Europe's being able to defend itself, while the idea has
generally left many Europeans feeling somewhat insecure. As
North Atlantic Assembly Deputy Secretary General Simon Lunn
has observed, "Americans saw [NATO] as a means to create a
more viable and independent Europe which would mean a
diminished American involvement; Europeans viewed it as a
"'Robert E. Hunter, "Starting at Zero: U.S. Foreign Policy
for the 1990's," The Washington Quarterly , Winter 1992, 30.
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means of ensuring American involvement." 258 Though George
Kennan saw the post-War Atlantic framework developing into a
cooperative arrangement, 25 - forces were already at work to
turn the idea of West European self-defense into an American
commitment. Since NATO's founding the goal of West European
self-defense has been periodically reiterated, yet the
American backbone of the Alliance has never wavered.
This chapter deals with the future of U.S. influence in
European security affairs after the Cold War. As this role
has historically depended overwhelmingly on the Atlantic
Alliance, the analysis attempts to forecast the likely future
of NATO as a significant actor in European security. This
effort begins by considering the theoretical basis for the
cohesion and endurance of NATO, drawing upon the theories of
Stephen Walt and others that explain the forces that may help
perpetuate NATO or lead to its undoing. Next, attention is
given to the major issues facing NATO. European perspectives
on NATO's endurance follow, with due attention to
"Europeanist " and "Atlanticist " views. Next come American
views, both those of the Administration and of Congress, which
is increasingly gaining strength in security policy decision-
making. Finally, the chapter analyzes the forces driving
NATO's future development, in order to assess NATO's chances
""Simon Lunn, Burden-Sharing in NATO (London: Rout ledge &
Kegan Paul, 1983) , 9.
259Kaplan, 26
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of survival as the leading provider of the security of Western
Europe
.
B. MAJOR ISSUES FACING NATO
Recognizing the severe challenges to the existence of the
North Atlantic Alliance, its leaders and backers have
reiterated their support for its endurance and have moved to
adapt it to the post-Cold War period. At NATO's June 1991
ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, the Alliance's four
fundamental security tasks were reiterated: "to provide one of
the indispensable foundations for a stable security
environment in Europe; to serve as a transatlantic forum for
Allied consultations; to deter and defend against any threat
of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state;
and to preserve the strategic balance within Europe." 260
These efforts highlight several key issues in NATO's attempt
to move forward - the transition toward a greater political
role, new uses for the Alliance, and the question of
expansion
.
Though NATO is officially a political alliance with
military functions, and though the political side of the
Alliance has played an important role, the post-Cold War
period has seen concerted attempts to heighten NATO's
260North Atlantic Council, "NATO's Core Security
Functions," statement issued at the North Atlantic Council
meeting in Copenhagen, June 6-7, 1991, paragraph 6.
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political profile. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher foreshadowed the need for change in 1988 when he
stated,
In guaranteeing our security, we must rely less and less
on a strategy of deterrence alone. The foundations of
security must be widened. This imposes new demands on
both our political thinking and our military
structures , 261
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has signalled American
willingness to participate in the needed redirection of NATO
while accepting and working with a new European security
identity. 262 It is uncertain, however, whether NATO will be
seen as the best organization to handle the political tasks.
New military tasks constitute a second general issue area
for a transformed NATO. Meetings at the ministerial level and
above since the London Summit of July 1990 have attempted to
produce a new security agenda, provisionally revealed in the
new strategic concept at Rome in November 1991. This document
listed "multi-faceted" and "multi-directional" risks to allied
security from Eastern European instability, nuclear
proliferation, and aggressors to Europe's south as more likely
contingencies requiring rapid Alliance responses. 26 - Such
261Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "New Approaches to East-West
Security Cooperation," speech at Potsdam June 11, 1988, in
Statements & Speeches , June 13, 1988, 5.
262James Baker, "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture from West
to East," speech at Berlin, June 18, 1991, 6.
263North Atlantic Council, "The Alliance's New Strategic
Concept," North Atlantic Council meeting communique, Rome,
November 7, 1991, paragraphs 9-13.
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issues raise the question of out-of-area operations, a concept
gingerly treated by the Alliance and one that might require a
reinterpretation of Articles 5 and 6 of its Charter. As NATO
Secretary General Woerner has stated,
Obviously, the hopes of some commentators that the
Alliance will become a global policeman or seek to form an
alternative UN Security Council, a concert of the great
powers to deter and punish aggressors, will be
disappointed. Yet the Alliance cannot afford to remain
passive either. The Gulf crisis demonstrates that the
United Nations can work only if there is the political
will and international solidarity to make it work. The
Alliance's active solidarity is a significant element in
fostering a wider sense of urgency and collective
responsibility . 264
A number of officials have called for the WEU to serve as
NATO's "out-of-area bridge," 265 handling the functions for
NATO that on which an Alliance consensus has been unable to be
achieved. The use of NATO's transportation and coordination
capabilities in delivering aid to Russia is the first post-
Cold War example of humanitarian assistance. 266 The
development and implementation of a new and broadened security
264Manfred Woerner, "The Atlantic Alliance in the New
Era," NATO Review , February 1991, 9.
265See for example the 1991 British defense White Paper,
the Statement on the Defence Estimates , London, July 1991, 39,
which describes one possible arrangement among the various
providers of European security. In this formulation, the WEU
would be a link between the EC and NATO, and forces for WEU-
specific tasks outside NATO areas of responsibility could come
under a "double hatting" style of command.
266
"NATO Deploys to Russia," Defense News , December 23,
1991, 2.
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agenda are essential if NATO is to survive the end of the Cold
War and remain influential in European security affairs.
A third major issue facing NATO concerns expansion. An
important, and as yet unresolved, issue deals with
distinguishing the security functions of NATO, the EC, and the
WEU. While the problem of differences in the membership of
the WEU and the EC may be partially addressed by the accession
of Greece to the WEU and the potential accessions of Norway
and Denmark to the EC, gaps remain. The June 19 91 NATO
communique emphasized the importance of accounting for those
NATO members not part of the EC or WEU. 267 As all the
European security organizations evolve, NATO can serve an
important function by providing the links between the North
American and West European states during the transformation of
European defense organizations and beyond. The interest of
the former Eastern Bloc countries, revealed by (among others)
Vaclav Havel's March 1991 speech to NATO, has certainly been
a boon for NATO, 268 bolstering the argument that NATO can
adapt to the future. As State Department European expert
Stephen Flanagan has observed,
At the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooper ; ation
Council in December 1991, it was clear that liaison states
were anxious to give real content to [security dialogue] .
All of the Eastern foreign ministers attending the
267North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, Copenhagen,
June 7, 1991, paragraph 3.
268Vaclav Havel, statement at NATO headquarters, March 21,
1991, 8.
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meeting. . .made it clear that they believed NATO remained
the most effective security institution in Europe
today. 269
The future relationship of NATO and the former Soviet
republics is a special case. In late December 1991 Boris
Yeltsin expressed interest in Russia's joining NATO, 270
causing dissension in Western Europe. Former German Defense
Minister Stoltenberg quickly announced his opposition to the
prospect, saying CSCE would be a much more logical place for
the new republics to be. 271 A top SPD official, Oskar
Lafontaine, however, raised the possibility of extending
NATO's security guarantee in exchange for the republics'
giving up their nuclear weapons. Such a policy would also
allow for the use of German soldiers outside the old NATO
area. 272 Though this idea was quickly rejected by other SPD
leaders, it highlighted the debate about handling the new
republics and showed how complex the issue of expansion is for
NATO. As with some other issues, expansion might work toward
the maintenance of the Alliance or toward its weakening.
269Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern
Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership, " The Washington
Quarterly , Spring 1992, 148.
270Michael Evans and George Brock, "Yeltsin Wants Russia to
Join NATO," London Times , December 29, 1991, 1.
271Siegmar Schelling, "Great Concern about Passing on of
Nuclear Know-How," Welt am Sonntag , Hamburg, December 29,
1991, 2 (FBIS-WE, December 30, 1991, 7-8) .
272Martin Winter, "Lafontaine Wants to Extend NATO Area,
"
Frankfurter Rundschau , January 15, 1992, 1-2 (FBIS-WE January




Defining Europeans as "Europeanists" and
"Atlanticists " is not always a certain undertaking, often
depending on the issue under consideration. In this thesis,
Europeanists are those who favor a European security identity
which would claim the leading role in European security
affairs from NATO the European Community (EC) and/or the WEU.
It should first be noted that Europeanists do not, in general,
recommend the immediate and complete pullout of U.S. forces
from Europe or the dissolution of NATO. Rather, Europeans
favoring this approach envisage a lessening of NATO's role, a
large part of which would become the responsibility of West
Europeans. The Europeanist perspective generally begins with
a recognition of important problems that NATO faces: NATO is
a product of the Cold War; it requires a new defense posture
to prevent itself from being counterproductive by insisting on
methods used in the old order; the Alliance cannot handle out-
of-area issues; U.S. pre-eminence remains; and the Alliance
cannot easily handle problems dealing with Eastern Europe. 27
In addition, Europeans have recognized a reduction in the
amount of attention the United States is willing or able to
devote to the Alliance. As one allied official has observed,
273Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War
(London: Sage Publications, 1991), 199-200.
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"With all the problems you have in the United States at home,
how much will any American President after George Bush care
about emphasizing the security role of the United States in
Europe?" 274
A commonly held view is that NATO only addressed the
Soviet threat, and as a result has become superfluous. While
EC Commission President Jacques Delors saw the Gulf War as an
"object lesson, " on the limitations of the EC, he has
emphasized the importance of "the Community determining its
own course of action on matters outside the scope of the North
Atlantic Treaty." 275 From a Europeanist viewpoint, the
foundation of the Treaty rested largely on countering the
Soviet threat, and as a result the Europeans should assume the
responsibility for new challenges that were not foreseen when
the Alliance was founded. Though he reasserts the continued
need for NATO, French Ambassador to the U.S. Jacques Andreani
parsimoniously summarizes much of the feeling toward the
Alliance: "NATO protects the allied countries against dangers
which have become non-existent and does not protect them
against the new fears." 276 Italian Foreign Minister De
274Anonymous official cited in Craig R. Whitney, "NATO,
Victim of Success, Searches for New Strategy, " New York Times ,
October 26, 1991, 5.
275Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security,"
Survival , March/April 1991, 99,109.
276Jacques Andreani, "France and European Challenges,"
speech before the World Affairs Council of Boston, October 8,
1991, 13.
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Michelis, an increasingly influential figure in the building
of a new security structure, has called for a new and
independent European force, because he expects NATO to fade
away with the completion of its mission. 277
Without the Soviet threat, the Europeanists claim the
EC should have much of the influence over security affairs in
Europe the U.S. has long held through NATO. This American
influence irritates sensitivities, especially among the
French. David Yost has written that one possible motivation,
among others, for President Mitterrand's 1990 announcement
that France would withdraw most of its forces from Germany is
that "Mitterrand wants to have his hands as free as possible
for new European arrangements and to avoid being drawn into
NATO decision processes that France could not control." 27 '
This assessment was confirmed after both the Rome and
Maastricht Summits by Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Dumas,
who after reacting angrily to NATO's having ensured its
position of primacy in European security, reemphasized that
France would have to continue to assert its position and
277Ferdinand Hennerbichler , "There Will Be No EC Military
Alliance," interview with De Michelis, Wiener Zeitung , August
6, 1991, 3 (FBIS-WE, August 7, 1991, 25).
278David S. Yost, "France and West European Defence
Identity," Survival , July/August 1991, 333.
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stature in Europe by avoiding reintegration into NATO's
military structure. 279
Former State Department official Jenonne Walker has
summarized some of the Europeanist points when she argues that
although most West Europeans want the U.S. to remain in Europe
militarily to guard against the re-emergence of a Moscow-
directed threat or some new European hegemon, "America is not
a European power. [T]he United States has no more right to
participate in European Community decision making than Europe
does in America's." 280 Walker deplores any U.S. -French
leadership contest as likely to backfire for the U.S. and
further reduce both its and NATO's influence. 281 The results
of this struggle, which involves all the major actors of West
European security, will be important in shaping NATO' s future.
The crux of the preceding arguments is the notion that
NATO reflects the old order and has outlived most of its
usefulness. The result has been intensified efforts to forge
new relationships in alternate organizations, primarily the
WEU, while working with NATO. The Dumas -Genscher letter of
February 1991 brought Genscher in line with the concept of the
WEU as the European security identity, though it would still
279Michael Evans, "Outmaneuvered Mitterrand Walks out of
NATO Meeting in a Huff," London Times , November 9, 1991, 1.
280Jenonne Walker, "Keeping America in Europe, " Foreign
Policy , Summer 1991, 129-130."
281Ibid., 140-1.
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be tied to NATO as the Alliance's European pillar. 282 The
October 1991 Franco-German initiative indicated that an
"organic link" should be established between the WEU and the
EC and that the WEU's role should complement that of NATO.
France's problem in gaining widespread acceptance of the plan
has been convincing more Atlanticist EC members to accept a
more Europeanist position. 283 The French were particularly-
angered by NATO's announcement of its new Rapid Reaction
Corps, feeling that not only had the Alliance usurped a
responsibility that should belong to the Europeans alone, but
that such a force had no strategic or political
objectives. 284 France's displeasure with NATO's ability to
retain a prominent role in European security affairs
apparently was a factor in the French decision to boycott the
April 1992 meeting of the defense ministers of North Atlantic
Cooperation Council countries. 285
282Steven Philip Kramer, "The French Question, " The
Washington Quarterly , Autumn 1991, 91-2.
283
"Paris and Bonn Push for EC Superpower Role," London
Times , October 17, 1991, 10.
284Dumas and Mitterrand both expressed outrage at the
creation of the RRF as inappropriate for changing strategic
circumstances. Both, however, reaffirmed the need for
continued NATO links. See Paris AFP, June 4, 1991, 1425 GMT
(FBIS-WE June 5, 1991, 2), and "Mitterrand, at Lille,
Expresses Displeasure with NATO Resolutions: Multilateral
Response Force and Role of UK, " Frankfurter Allqemeine , June
14, 1991, 2 (FBIS-WE June 14, 1991, 2).
285William Drozdiak, "NATO States, Ex-East Bloc Meet for
Talks," Washington Post , March 11, 1992, A16.
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The German SPD has expressed its opinion that
collective defense is now out of place, more appropriately-
replaced by collective security that could in time be provided
by the CSCE. 286 SPD leader Karsten Voigt recently called for
the integration of the European security structures, including
NATO, under the umbrella of the CSCE. 287 The French and
Germans (to a limited extent) have traversed a tricky
diplomatic road in trying to create the new West European
defense identity, having decided upon the need for drastic
change while assuaging the fears of others that their plans
will drive the U.S. out of Europe and leave France and Germany
(or worse, only Germany) with hegemony.
Even those strongly opposing NATO's continued
dominance feel that it would be unwise for the Alliance
suddenly to disband. Several reasons explain this attitude.
First, there is the political necessity of compromise. The
French, unable to persuade their European partners to accept
a structure of their own creation, have had to grant
negotiations concessions to those backing NATO. Second, it is
almost universally recognized that not only has NATO
demonstrated an ability to safeguard the peace and adapt to
change when necessary, but that there is not yet a
286SPD Party Congress, "SPD European Policy Perspectives
and European Policy," Resolutions adopted May 29, 1991, 1.
287Berlin ADN, February 25, 1992, 1027 GMT (FBIS-WE,
February 25, 1992, 17)
.
152
satisfactory alternative. As Jacques Delors has stated, "The
NATO infrastructure has demonstrated its quality and the WEU
must rely on it for a long time yet." 288
Third, it has been strongly emphasized that any new
security structure should have solid links with the Alliance.
Dumas and Genscher, subsequent to their February 1991 letter,
pledged that an organic WEU/EC link would not weaken NATO's
ties. 289 Even former French Prime Minister Edith Cresson,
who made a number of irritating comments both to the British
and Americans, said,
The Americans must not be worried by the fact that we are
thinking about a defense system within Europe. We are
very much in favor of keeping the very friendly and close
links that we have within the Atlantic Alliance. 29 '
Genscher has emphasized the importance of NATO and of American
and Canadian participation for European solidarity, and he has
stated the desire for the Alliance "to continue its efforts to
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One possible interpretation of Genscher's statement
could be that he sees NATO as a stabilizing transitional
vehicle until the CSCE structure has been strengthened. A
similar transitional motivation could reflect the opinions of
many Europeans, including WEU Secretary General van Eekelen,
who has stated that NATO should last until new European
security arrangements can provide sufficient numbers of EC/WEU
troops to replace the Americans, which would be well into the
future. 292 Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis believes
that, "NATO's role is precisely to prevent a climate of
instability and to heal divisions that may arise in the
delicate political and economic transformation inside Central
and East Europe." In the end, however, he feels European
security will depend on the CSCE. 293 This view is echoed by
the German SPD, which has long proclaimed its desire for the
CSCE to assume the primary role in providing European
security , 294
French Foreign Minister Dumas illustrates the
ambiguity that remains among Europeanists toward NATO and its
292Willem van Eekelen, "Building a New European Security
Order: WEU's Contribution," NATO Review , August 1990, 20.
293Alessandro Politi, interview with Gianni De Michelis,
in Defense News , January 13, 1992, 30.
294National Security Research, "German Perspectives on
NATO and European Security," Technical report, August 1991,
43.
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relationship with the EC and other organizations when he
states
,
I want it to be clearly understood: France does not wish
to call into question the provisions of the Washington
treaty which it believes are ideally suited to the trans-
Atlantic defense relationship. 295
Many Europeanists clearly wish for a pan-European organization
to assume the leading role in European security affairs. They
generally feel that NATO and the American role reflect an old
order that no longer exists, and that their transformations
will not reflect a stronger, unified Western Europe. Still,
the Europeanists feel that they are not yet ready for complete
security autonomy, and recognize that there will be good
reasons to maintain strong transatlantic ties.
2. The Atlanticists
Working alongside the Europeanists in European policy-
making bodies are those Atlanticists who feel that NATO must
continue to be the hallmark of West European security. They
feel that while a European defense identity is important, it
can not supersede or duplicate NATO, and should in fact be
subordinate to NATO. Atlanticists, most commonly in the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands but present throughout West
European governments, have worked to develop the European
pillar in NATO, and find many of the actions of Europeanists
detrimental to NATO. These actions, the Atlanticists feel,
295Roland Dumas, address at the Institute of Higher
Defense Studies, Paris, February 4, 1992, 5.
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could result in the United States pulling out of Europe
entirely. As a London Times editorial points out,
If France is not prepared to take cooperation seriously,
Europe will remain a dependent in NATO, not the serious
and reliable ally AMerica has been seeking ever since
President Kennedy first coined the phrase "European
pillar" in 1962. That is no longer tolerable to the US
Congress . 296
Atlanticists favor a synthesis of NATO and the EC/WEU. Ian
Gambles provides the foundation for Atlanticist views on a new
European security identity: "...no European country now has
the independence in security policy necessary to back up a
national foreign policy in the way that the United States
can." 297 Atlanticists feel that even together the West
Europeans will be unsuccessful unless the U.S. participates.
Like the Europeanists , Atlanticists credit NATO with
having kept the peace in Europe since World War II. Former
German Defense Minister Stoltenberg aptly summarizes the past
and future contributions of the Alliance in stating,
Since NATO is the only fully functioning instrument of
collective defence in Europe, the Alliance is the
guarantor of stability, ensuring lasting security in the
dynamic process of change ... [I] t stands out clearly that
security in Europe must never be defined as an exclusively
European concern. . .The Alliance has a stability function
that goes far beyond the NATO territory proper, and this
has long since been realized by the governments of our
neighbours in Central Eastern and South Eastern
Europe... It is in the best interests of the European
296London Times , editorial, May 30, 1991, 18.
297 Ian Gambles, "European Security Integration in the
1990's," Chaillot Paper 3 (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies Western European Union, November 1991), 13.
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partners to let the United States fully participate in
European affairs on an institutional basis. 298
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, one of the pivotal figures in
designing the new security architecture, has often repeated
that, "...the actual presence of North American forces in
western Europe and on German soil will remain an indispensable
guarantee of transatlantic ties." 299 Though Kohl has been
instrumental as a driving force in the October 1991 Franco-
German proposal, he has attempted to satisfy both Europeanists
and Atlanticists , keeping ties with Paris and Washington as
warm as possible. Should Kohl turn away from NATO, it seems
clear that the Alliance could no longer be viable; similarly,
without Kohl, the French plans would stall.
British views have been the most Atlanticist of all
the allies, providing staunch support for NATO and opposing
any attempt to usurp its position. Foreign Secretary Douglas
Hurd has been outspoken on the need for NATO to continue
guaranteeing Europe's security, especially as no other
organization appears viable as yet. Hurd, who has remarked,
"We cannot afford to exchange a suit of armor for a husk," 3C
298Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Managing the Change: European
Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship in a Time of
Change in Europe," speech to the Eurogroup in Rome, April 10,
1991, 10-11.
299Helmut Kohl, "The Agenda of German Politics for the
Nineties," speech in Washington, DC, May 20, 1991, in
Statements & Speeches , June 6, 1991, 3.
300Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO's Difficult Career Change,"
New York Times , June 9, 1991, E3
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has strenuously opposed any move which could cost West Europe
the United States, which he calls "the biggest security trump
that Europe has ever had." 301 Hurd, Prime Minister John
Major, and former Defence Secretary Tom King have all made
statements opposing the duplication of NATO functions.
A large role for the United States and NATO in Europe
is to stand as a bulwark against instability, fulfilling a
task that no other single country can. Josef Joffe's seminal
article, "Europe's American Pacifier," reflects an important
opinion that without the American presence the Europeans might
return to their old prewar ways of conflict. As Joffe
observed, " . . .by extending its guarantee, the United States
removed the prime structural cause of conflict among states -
the search for an autonomous defense policy." 302 British
Conservatives have based much of their defense policy for the
1990s on this view, believing that while European cooperation
is important, the transatlantic tie helps prevent disputes
within Europe. 303 NATO's past and future roles remain
because, "Locking national armed forces into an international
301Douglas Hurd, "Do Not Isolate Europe, " interview by
Olaf Ihlan and Lutz Krusche in Per Spiegel , October 28, 1991,
203-7 (FBIS-WE, October 29, 1991, 6).
302Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign
Policy , Spring 1984, 68.
303Gerald Frost, "British Foreign Policy: Dangers and
Opportunities in an Era of Uncertainty, " in British Security
Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s
(Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1987) , 25.
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military structure both generates habits of cooperation and
severely impedes any regression to a nationalistic military
posture. " 304
NATO has attempted to assume the role of the keeper of
European stability. The Rome Summit sought to work toward a
new European security architecture encompassing NATO, CSCE,
the EC, the WEU, and the Council of Europe, the combination
which could best prevent instability. 305 The German
Christian Social Union's (CSU) defense platform calls NATO
essential: "During the period of upheaval, NATO alone is
capable of safeguarding peace in Europe and the world. The
WEU... is not an alternative to NATO." 306 In addition, some
judge that without a continuing NATO and the U.S. guarantee,
the risks of nuclear proliferation within Europe could
increase. The German revulsion to owning its own nuclear
weapons could change if the American guarantee were lost and
unsatisfyingly replaced by the British and French
arsenals. 307 Others could have similar changes of attitude
in such an event. A great deal of concern currently exists
304Gambles, 36.
305North Atlantic Council, "Rome Declaration on Peace and
Cooperation, " North Atlantic Council Meeting, Rome, November
8, 1991, paragraph 3.
306
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throughout Europe as the post-Cold War period develops.
Concern over separatist movements, ethnic cross-border
tensions, and doubts about potential long-term German foreign
policy choices support the arguments of Atlanticists that the
United States still has a role to play, and bolster NATO's
credentials for the 1990s.
Atlanticists point out that NATO has successfully
adapted to a number of challenges, both political and
military, and is already in the process of doing so again.
One effort is to adapt the WEU to be the Alliance's out-of-
area bridge. This could provide a more plausible military
rationale for the WEU (as well as for NATO) , strengthen the
links among NATO, the EC, and the WEU, and perhaps even
encourage French movement back toward the military organs of
the Alliance. In addition, the WEU link could help Germany
with its out-of-area question, although the debate is
currently centered on UN missions. The use of the WEU as
NATO's out-of-area bridge could serve alliance cohesion in
another way. Those in Europe dissatisfied with the lack of
European security independence could use this mission to
reclaim some. As noted earlier, the 1991 British Defence
White Paper says, "...the WEU can serve as a bridge between
the transatlantic security and defence structures of NATO and
the developing common political and security policies of the
160
Twelve." 308 Foreign Secretary Hurd has called for an
independent European force capability within NATO that could
be used by the WEU for "certain circumstances." 309 In either
case, the Europeans, through either the EC or the WEU or both
would develop some degree of an autonomous capability for use
in issues of direct concern to them. As a result they could
feel less constrained by American pressure, making them feel
more like partners and improving the transatlantic
relationship
.
NATO is to become a more important forum for European
security issues, with the Rome Summit declaring the Alliance
the "essential forum" for consultation. 310 The North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) , a discussion forum
consisting of the North Atlantic Council members plus the
members of the former Warsaw Pact (including the Baltic
republics and the Soviet successor states) , has already become
more active. Genscher has discussed using it to bring the
former Soviet republics into NATO in order to prevent a
security vacuum from developing in Central and Eastern Europe
308Secretary of State for Defence, "Statement on the
Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence for the 90's," London,
July 1991, 39.
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by nations excluded from NATO and the WEU. 311 The NACC could
become the leading actor for the Alliance of the 1990s,
providing it with the political role for which it has called.
In contrast to the CSCE this political grouping would have
established military teeth. The March 1992 meeting of the
NACC broached the idea of using NATO forces for peacekeeping
duties in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan,
perhaps foreshadowing the organization's role in Europe's
future security structure. 312
The Atlanticist version of the future of NATO differs
from that of the Europeanists in its emphasis on the primacy
of NATO and in its belief that the Alliance, which has been so
instrumental in protecting Western Europe, can successfully
adapt to a new world order. Military rationales do remain,
including one scenario dealing with a resurgent post-Yeltsin
Russia 313 (not likely to be a NACC topic) , but more probably
dealing with other intra-European contingencies or Third World
contingencies. Both Atlanticists and Europeanists want NATO
to endure and the Americans to stay, though for differing
311Berlin ADN, January 3, 1992, 1208 GMT (FBIS-WE, January
6, 1992, 1) .
312Drozdiak, All.
313 See Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to
Fight in Post-Cold War Era," New York Times , February 17,
1992, 1. This article outlines the newly released Pentagon
scenarios for future conflicts, one of which deals with "an
aggressive Russian government. . .seen as demanding autonomy for
Russians in the Baltic republics."
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purposes. Recent months have seen especially strident
attempts, such as at the Rome NATO Summit, to reassure the
United States of its importance to Europe.
D. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
The conclusion of the Cold War has left many American
policy-makers unsure of the next steps to take. The Bush
Administration, trained in the East-West order and accustomed
to incremental change, has slowly attempted to produce a
framework for future relations with the new Europe. Though
the Soviet threat is gone and could only return after a long
hiatus, the world is full of new threats, many of which,
lacking the constraints of bipolarity, are more likely to
produce conflicts. Defense Secretary Cheney h attempted to
focus attention on the issues currently facing JATO: force
reductions; increased readiness , mobility, sustainability , and
efficiency; long-term planning; specialization; and burden-
sharing. 314 Each of these issues is playing an important
role in relations between the United States and its European
allies. NATO's survival is no longer a foregone conclusion in
the minds of American policy-makers; many influential
officials (including 1992 Presidential candidates) behave as
314Dick Cheney, "Annual Report to the President and the
Congress," January 1991, 8-9. The Defense Secretary's 1992
report emphasized the continued importance of collective
defense through NATO as well as the Alliance's adaptability,
altering its military forces toward flexibility, mobility, and
mu 1 1 i na t i ona 1 i ty
.
163
if they consider NATO an unnecessary American burden. If the
Alliance is to survive, the U.S. government must decide that
survival is in the American national interest. This will
require a new rationale for NATO, which could be a variation
of the old one, or a totally new one, possibly based on the
out-of-area role. 315 The decisions taken in the next few
years by Americans will greatly influence whether NATO will
survive or collapse.
NATO supporters claim that new tasks will adapt its
mission in the transformed world, including serving as the
central transatlantic security forum. This concept has been
forwarded by Secretary of State Baker on a number of
occasions, and it represents one method by which to preserve
American influence in European security affairs. 316 This
task, however, is unlikely to garner the support necessary to
maintain large numbers of U.S. troops in Europe. A second
possible task for the new NATO could be acting as the
coordinator for out-of-area missions, an idea much like that
of the British. During the Gulf War, the Defense Planning
Committee coordinated out-of-area planning, and the NATO
structure and resources were used for the protection of
315Robert A. Levine, "European Security in the 1990s:
Uncertain Prospects and Prudent Policies, " RAND Note N-3240-RC
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), 30.
316Joint statement of James Baker and Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, May 10, 19 91, US Department of State Dispatch , May
13, 1991, 346.
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Turkey. 317 Logistic support drawn from established NATO
channels was particularly important to the successful
prosecution of the war effort. 318 This concept has been
extrapolated to the planned use of NATO bases as forward
staging areas for the use of American forces elsewhere. 319
This new military rationale may be crucial to NATO's survival.
Opposing instability and any possible Russian resurgence
are third possible future missions for American forces in
NATO. Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger repeated
Joffe's argument to the Eurogroup in 1991 when he stated,
The U.S. presence is the best insurance against the
rivalries inherent to Europe's nation-state system -
rivalries which have the potential of going military as
long as that nation-state system has not been subsumed
once and for all into a truly unitary structure. 320
While this could also ultimately provide the military
rationale which RAND analyst Robert Levine considers necessary
317William H. Taft, IV, "European Security: Lessons
Learned from the Gulf War," NATO Review , June 1991, 8.
318For a discussion of the role of NATO during the Gulf
crisis see Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis,"
Survival , May/June 1991, 246-259.
319Jan S. Breemer, "U.S. Forces in Europe: The Search for
a Mission, " in Reconstituting National Defense: The New U.S.
National Security Strategy , eds . James J. Tritten and Paul N.
Stockton (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1991), 158-9.
320Lawrence S. Eagleburger, presentation at the Eurogroup
Conference on "New Security Challenges and the Future Role of
the Alliance," June 25, 1991, 3-4, quoted in Hahn, 44.
165
for the support of the American people, 32: the threat will
have to be put into terms which more clearly spell out the
danger to the U.S. before public, and hence Congressional,
support, will be forthcoming. Though the concept is gaining
popularity within NACC and administration circles, Jan Breemer
has considered it to be inappropriate for the United States to
pursue military roles in Eastern Europe, as that should be
under the purview of the Europeans themselves. 322 This would
preclude such contingencies coming under the NATO aegis.
Clearly, much policy development remains for the U.S.
government on relations with Eastern Europe.
As an additional task, NATO could be used for focusing
allied cooperation in the 1990s and beyond. Though intra-
alliance relations have periodically been shaky, NATO, with
the Western world's key military and political powers, has
provided a most effective forum to address many world
problems. More than a security forum, NATO has been a
political roundtable in which the U.S. and its European allies
promote cooperation and solve problems. President Bush has
already pledged his support for Western Europe's "historic
march toward greater economic and political unity, " which
321Levine, "Keeping U.S. Troops in Europe: The Real
Reason Why," RAND Note N-3085-AF (Santa Monica: RAND,
September 1990) , 4.
322Breemer, 152.
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includes a pillar in NATO. 323 Such support is important if
the U.S. intends to continue forming coalitions for emerging
non-traditional threat scenarios. As former National Security
Adviser Brzezinski observes, "Though America is today
admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are
too complex and America's domestic health too precarious to
sustain a worldwide Pax Americana." 324
The U.S. government has recognized the need for NATO to
adapt in another way - ensuring more attention is devoted to
allied interests. Without the Soviet threat dominating the
Alliance agenda, the U.S. must devote its attention to other
key political issues in Europe. For example, military
policies must be subordinated to American political support of
Germany, because if Germany should turn on the United States,
NATO will fall. 325 The United States so far appears to have
followed this advice, but it must also recognize the need to
relinquish some of its leadership. As foreign affairs writer
Michael Brenner notes, "The allies' acceptance of larger
responsibilities needs to be matched by an American readiness
to let go of the exceptional powers it has enjoyed as
323George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States , Washington, DC, August 1991, 3.
324Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment,
"
Foreign Affairs , Fall 1991, 20.
325Mary FitzGerald, et al . , Challenges to NATO Strategy -
Implications for the 1990's , National Security Research,
August 1990, 165.
167
paramount leader of the Alliance." 326 One issue discussed
already includes the possibility of SACEUR being a European in
the future, while the substantial nuclear arms cuts announced
by President Bush in September, 1991 were in part an answer to
European public opinion, though other motives existed. 327
These important Alliance maintenance steps may not, however,
satisfy a domestically-minded Congress.
The U.S. Congress has gained a great deal of power over
foreign policy and defense decision-making in recent years.
Since the foreign policy consensus evaporated with the Vietnam
War, the Administration has been unable to count on almost
automatic support for its foreign policy decisions. In the
1990s, with budgetary considerations coming to the forefront
over almost all other areas, the power of the purse has given
Congress almost unprecedented influence over security policy.
As public opinion shifts on Alliance matters, vote-conscious
Congress will shift with it, with a corresponding impact on
NATO's future.
Many of the arguments used to support NATO fall upon deaf
ears in the United States. Walter Hahn pinpoints the public's
attitude
:
326Michael Brenner, "The Alliance: A Gulf Post-Mortem, "
International Affairs , October 1991, 678.
327
"Bush Orders Dramatic Cuts in Nation's Atomic Weapons,
"




The problem, beyond a prevailing Amrican popular
disinterest in history lessons, is that under the best of
circumstances broad 'historic purpose' alone is not likely
to generate a strong and unblinking beacon of strategic
self-interest, especially at a time of relative scarcity
of resources. 328
Though President Bush and others have strained to make a
convincing case for their views, the chances of this gaining
public support for a significant military role in Europe seem
slight. At this year's Wehrkunde conference on security
policy, leading U.S. Senators informed the Europeans of the
American public's waning interest in NATO. According to
Republican William Cohen, "The prevailing and popular view in
the United States is that NATO is no longer relevant,
necessary or affordable," 329 while Indiana's Richard Lugar of
warned of the impact of stalled trade talks as follows:
I don't think the Europeans understand how far they have
to move on trade. If they don't back down, it could
undermine NATO and American participation in the alliance.
We're heading to a precipice that Europeans really don't
understand. 33 °
Vice President Quayle contributed to the furor over the
linking of economic and security policies, and was obliged
later to attempt to show that America's defense commitment
328Walter Hahn, "The U.S. and NATO: Strategic
Readjustments?" Global Affairs , Fall 1991, 60.
329Marc Fisher, "U.S. Officials Take Tough New Line on
Europe," International Herald Tribune , February 10, 1992, 1.
330Ibid.
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remained strong even in the face of GATT difficulties. 331
The entry of the trade issue into NATO could be most
threatening to the Alliance's future, especially as it plays
to American protectionist attitudes.
Historically, the Senate has never been completely
satisfied with the American defense relationship with Europe.
As Simon Lunn has observed, "The assumption that NATO is a
gift that the United States makes to the Europeans is never
far from the surface of any Congressional discussion of the
Alliance." 332 With the price of the gift so high today, the
Senate is seriously questioning the benefits the costs
provide. As a result a series of new strategic concepts has
been issued by Congressmen anxious to redirect American
defense thinking away from a narrow and expensive European
focus
.
Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn in early 1990
presented his vision of future U.S. military strategy, with
consideration for a lesser role in Europe.
American troops in Europe can and should play a
stabilizing role during this period of transition.
Nevertheless, the greatly lengthened warning time of a
credible Soviet conventional attack against NATO allows
the U.S. to reduce the size of our standing armies
defending well forward and to emphasize reinforcement
instead. I agree... that we should start planning on a
33:Craig R. Whitney, "Quayle, Ending European Trip,




residual force in Europe on the order of 75,000 to 100,000
troops within five years. 333
Before the debate is concluded, this figure may be
significantly lower. Republican Senator John McCain, while
emphasizing that the U.S. cannot withdraw from Europe, has
said that "Europe is now capable of assuming primary
responsibility for its own defense, and this allows major cuts
in the U.S. forces deployed in Europe." In addition, he says
that remaining forces in Europe should not be assigned to NATO
on a full-time basis. 3 ' 4 Rep. Aspin's analysis of the threat
largely omits Europe. 3 " Clearly it is the opinion of many
influential members of both parties in the Congress that the
U.S. role in Europe is too large for the changing times, and
that more responsibility should be assumed by the Europeans.
Congress has already acted to limit U.S. forces in Europe,
passing a 100,000 cap with the Fiscal 1992 Defense
Authorization Act and cutting U.S. contributions to the NATO
Infrastructure Fund. i: The end is probably not yet in sight.
333Sam Nunn, "Sen. Nunn on Vision of Military," New York
Times , April 20, 1990, B6
.
334John McCain, "Matching a Peace Dividend with National
Security - A New Strategy for the 1990 's," Congressional
Record , November 26, 1991, S18528-S18536
.
335Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional
Forces for the Post-Soviet Era."
336David C. Morrison, "Bringing Them Home," National
Journal, December 7, 1991, 2956-7.
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This analysis has already alluded to the ever-present
burden-sharing issue, whose lid may now be unreplaceable . The
opening of the debate on the Fiscal Year 1993 defense budget
saw a barrage of anger at the issue from both Houses,
including Senator Riegle's call for an end to the "hemorrhage"
of money out of the United States. 337 James Tritten writes
that it should be apparent that the President could never
convince Congress to fund reconstitution, a fundamental
component of the new national military strategy, if the
Europeans did not do so themselves. 338 Canada's recent
decision to remove its combat forces from Europe is sure to
weaken the argument that the U.S. should leave substantial
forces there. 339 Congressional irritation runs deep, and the
Administration so far has been unable to convince Congress of
the value of maintaining large forces in Europe. Without a
more effective effort, Congressionally-mandated cuts could be
drastic (nearly total), haphazard, and potentially
destabilizing
.
What attempts have been made by the Administration to
convince Congress of NATO's importance have dealt with the
337Philip Finnegan, "Allies' Burden-Sharing Issue Rankles
Congress," Defense News , February 10, 1992, 8.
338James J. Tritten, America Promises to Come Back: Our
New National Strategy (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School),
October 1991, 45.
339Clyde Farnsworth, "Ottawa to Pull Out Combat Force from
Europe by the End of 1994," New York Times , February 27, 1992,
A7.
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need to avoid the marginalization of the U.S. in European
security affairs. Secretary of Defense Cheney's statement
that, "NATO is the mechanism by which the United States has
been involved and will stay involved in the questions of
European security," 340 not only emphasizes both the U.S.
commitment to Europe and its intention that NATO retain its
leading role in European security affairs, but it also informs
Congress about the Administration's desires. Secretary of
State Baker has emphasized, "The strength of the Euro-Atlantic
community depends on cooperation between the community and the
United States keeping pace with European integration and
institutional development." 341
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council may become an
integral part of Europe's post-Cold War development,
contributing to the work of the CSCE while enhancing European
security. As Baker has stated, the NACC can serve the roles
of primary consultative body between NATO and the Eastern
European liaison states, overseer of the liaison program, and
European crisis manager. 342 Congress will have to be
convinced of the worthiness of the NACC, but it should be less
340Alan Riding, "U.S., Wary of European Corps, Seeks
Assurance on NATO Role," New York Times, October 20, 1991, 12.
341 Baker, "The Euro-Atlantic Architecture, " 7
342James Baker, "US Commitment to Strengthening Euro-
Atlantic Cooperation, " intervention before the NACC, Brussels,
December 20, 1991, in US Department of State Dispatch ,
December 23, 1991, 903.
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costly to the U.S. while showing the administration's ability
to adapt to the changing security environment. It may be too
late, however. Such descriptions of the need for a strong
role in Europe may not succeed in swaying a Congressional
movement gaining momentum in Washington and across the
country. Significantly, it remains unclear whether the
difficulty the Administration is having gaining support for
its case is due to its own persuasive weakness arguing a
strong case, whether the case is really too weak to be
supported, or whether no case can be strong enough given the
other forces influencing the decisions.
E. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The Drivers of NATO's Future
The questions posed at the beginning of this chapter
asked if NATO can carry on beyond the end of the Cold War and,
if it can, whether it can function with any effectiveness.
Several factors are at play in determining the answers to
these questions: the progress of European integration,
European public support for NATO, the foreign policy role of
Germany, and American domestic politics. First, the progress
of European integration and its relationship to NATO are of
great importance. Clearly, were the Europeans on a more
united path toward an EC-based security identity, NATO's
position would be even weaker. The communiques of the
November 1991 NATO Summit in Rome and the December 1991 EC
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Summit at Maastricht, while producing important statements of
agreement and cooperation, showed significant gulfs remaining
between the Europeanist and Atlanticist points of view,
primarily between the French and British on the organizational
relationships . 343
Second, unambiguous public support for NATO no longer
seems to exist in Western Europe. A recent poll in the United
Kingdom showed that respondents considered European military-
integration more important than military links with the United
States by almost a 3:1 margin. 344 Though the poll was
unspecific with regard to NATO, it would seem likely that the
British public has taken a more Europeanist turn, which could
ultimately affect the British government's security policies.
The French have long opposed what they often portray as
American "dominance" in Europe, and efforts to assert French
leadership in Europe draw great support from domestic
constituencies. A European defense identity based on the WEU
and the EC would be more popular than French reintegration
into NATO's military structure.
343 Ian Murray, "UK and France Fail to Heal Defence Rift,"
London Times , October 30, 1991, 12.
344Robin Oakley, "Support for Europe Reaches Highest Level
since 1945," London Times , December 7, 1991, 4. In addition,
another poll showed 57% of those surveyed supporting "fully
integrated armed services to defend Europe, " with only 31%
opposed. Nigel Dudley, "British Cautious on Unity," The
European , March 26 - April 1, 1992, 2 (FBIS-WE, March 31,
1992, 7 [annex] )
.
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Germany is the critical European actor in the
formation or maintenance of any security structure. 345
Constituting the swing vote between the U.K. and France, it is
becoming a stronger European link for the U.S. Trends from
recent public opinion polls taken in Germany, however, show
that the disintegration of the Soviet threat has eliminated
much of NATO's rationale and support. A post-Soviet coup RAND
study shows a decline in the belief that NATO is important for
preserving the peace, lessened support for the presence of
U.S. troops in Germany, and little backing for military
missions in alliances to which Germany belongs. Nevertheless,
interest in continued, close ties with the United States
remains strong, as does membership in NATO as opposed to some
other structure. 346 Above all, Germans have a very limited
interest in military tasks now that the Soviet threat is gone.
Still, the domestic political situation with regard to
security policy remains muddled in Germany. According to
Joffe, the Right and Left seem to be drawing together toward
345Much of the following section summarizes some of the
key aspects of Germany's post-reunification and post-Soviet
coup security policies that were analyzed more thoroughly in
the previous chapter.
346Ronald D. Asmus, "Germany in Transition: National
Self -Confidence and International Reticence, " statement before
the U.S. Congress, House Sub-Committee on Europe and the
Middle East, January 29, 1992. For more detailed survey
information, see Ralf Zoll, "Public Opinion on Security and
Armed Forces: The German Case," from the International
Meeting on the Future of Security in Europe: A Comparative
Analysis of European Public Opinion
,
presented at NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, December 16-17, 1991.
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a position supporting the continuation of NATO. 347 Though
Chancellor Kohl has repeatedly reconfirmed Germany's
commitment to full participation in the Western military
structure, the question of German neutrality exists, and
significant anti-military sentiments throughout the population
could prevent Germany from taking part in the revamping of
NATO in the near future.
Ultimately, the question of NATO's survivability will
probably be answered in the United States. The public's
attention is increasingly turning toward domestic issues. 348
When major actions are undertaken overseas, they are often
performed with the attitude that the U.S. is again providing
a free service to the international community. As Brenner
concludes from the Gulf War, "...the [United States] was
united in the conviction that Americans were undertaking a
sacrifice for the sake of partners who were unwilling to
contribute to the common cause on a scale commensurate with
their stake." 349 Such an attitude is sure to lessen public
support for NATO, and it inflames those in Congress who use
the burden-sharing issue as a stick against the West
347Josef Jof fe, "The Postmodern Alliance, " Sueddeutsche
Zeituncr , February 10, 1992, 4 (FBIS-WE, February 11, 1992,
13) .
348This interpretation has been reported by various public
opinion surveys, including R.W. Apple, Jr., "Majority in Poll
Fault Focus by Bush on Global Policy but Back New Order, " New




Europeans. Congress, however, does not need much additional
ammunition, as domestic pressure has affected foreign aid,
defense, and international trade. The exchanges at the 1992
Wehrkunde conference in Munich highlight how politically
sensitive economic protectionism is, as well as the stakes
involved in the security arena. The potential failure of the
Uruguay Round of GATT could have profound implications not
only on economic relations with Europe but also on foreign and
security relations.
2. Conclusion
A French spokesman was essentially correct when he
stated, "We all support the presence of U.S. forces in Europe;
it is not we Europeans who are pushing the U.S. out of
Europe." 3 ' Cultural, economic, and historic ties have all
contributed to the endurance of NATO; the institutional
framework and bureaucratic momentum that exist provide a
daunting test to any challenger. As Hugh De Santis recently
noted:
Sentiment reinforces NATOphilia. Over the years,
policymakers, pundits, and political analysts have grown
attached to an institution they have been quick to defend
against detractors during periods when its cohesion has
been challenged from within and without the Alliance. 351
350Alan Cowell, "Bush Challenges Partners in NATO over Role
of U.S.," New York Times , November 8, 1991, 1. Interestingly,
the spokesman carefully used the term "Europe" rather than
"France .
"
351Hugh De Santis, "The Graying of NATO, " The Washington
Quarterly , Autumn 1991, 52.
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This may soon change. Though powerful forces preserve the
established alliance, equally powerful forces - more than the
loss of the Soviet threat - could lead to its demise.
It is important to recognize that many complex and
unpredictable factors are influencing the development of the
new European security architecture. In addition, there are
other important factors that have only lightly been touched
upon that will have influence over NATO's future, such as the
actions of other European countries and the role of
international economics. The Europe of today could not have
been predicted even three years ago; the concept of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council would have stretched even the
most flexible imagination. Such a short period of time is too
brief to allow the creation of thoroughly thought-out
policies
.
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was
established, the U.S. Congress had no intention of providing
a permanent, large-scale U.S. military force to Europe (nor
did the Truman Administration) . That presence is now likely
to be sharply diminished, perhaps back to the level and type
initially envisaged by the Congress. The United States is
likely to have a great deal influence over the future course
of the Alliance; hopefully, the piecemeal pullout being
mandated by the U.S. Congress will proceed along with a
careful revision of U.S. national security strategy.
Otherwise, the United States may once again have failed to
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learn from history and have found itself sorry for having
disarmed in a world that fails to live up to a peaceful
billing.
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VII. ANALYSIS AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS
A. THEORIES OF ALLIANCE FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE
One of the first questions asked in this thesis was
whether it was worthwhile to consider how the alliance
relationships would develop in Europe. Without the Soviet
threat, some might argue, there may no longer be a rationale
for any alliances in Europe. The traditional threat that
promoted West European cohesion and American participation in
European security affairs no longer exists. Many political
theorists have argued that alliances cannot endure without a
direct threat. As noted in Chapter One, Stephen Walt posits
that balancing the threat is the prime motivator for the
formation of alliances.
As Chapter Two demonstrated, however, many threats remain
in the post-Cold War world, of varied types and degrees of
severity. While not possessing the potential for worldwide
catastrophe of a superpower nuclear war, these threats are
conceivably more serious because of the greater likelihood of
their escalation into shooting wars. While West European
allies do not necessarily view threats from as global a
perspective as the United States, in many ways concepts
regarding forseeable risks and threats are similar on both
sides of the Atlantic. The risks and threats described in the
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second chapter ensure the need for continued cooperation
between the U.S. and Europe, in order to provide for a stable,
collaborative, well-defended Europe as the transitional
European political landscape is redesigned, and as countries
on Europe's periphery become progressively better armed.
At the same time, other reasons for the success of NATO
add to the hopes of those who wish to strengthen other West
European alliances. NATO has institutionalized the
participation of the U.S. in European affairs, within and
beyond the security arena. It has also provided a stable
security framework for the collaboration of the West European
nations, as the European Coal and Steel Community, the
forerunner of the EC, closely followed the Alliance's
founding. NATO has become much more than a collective defense
body. It has served as the central forum for political
discussion as the European security environment has changed
since the 1940s, especially very recently. American
participation has given the West Europeans confidence as well
as economic flexibility to rebuild into the economic power the
EC has become. At the same time, the West Europeans have come
to recognize the need to assume more responsibility for their
own defense. Because no one European state can handle all
potential contingencies alone, many have proposed
strengthening the WEU to speak for the EC on security matters.
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For the United States, the atmosphere of cooperation and
mutual participation that has been developed is important for
future scenarios. Unable to act unilaterally as it could when
it was more relatively dominant in many fields, the U.S. will
need the assistance of its allies in the future more than
before. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has recognized the need for ad hoc coalitions in
upcoming military contingencies, even while formal alliances
will remain fundamental to American military strategy. 352 On
both sides of the Atlantic, the common values and history of
close relationships and cooperation will not only help NATO
last, but will also promote the process of European security
integration
.
B. THE INTERACTIONS OF THE EVOLVING ORGANIZATIONS
1 . The Need for Europe to Provide for Its Own Defense
The burden-sharing issue has been significant since
the founding of the North Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. Senate
especially, but others in the U.S. government as well, have at
times shown considerable irritation about what they feel is a
"free ride" by the Europeans, allowing them to concentrate on
economic growth while the U.S. burdens itself with huge
defense budgets. In recent Congressional testimony, a Defense
Department expert on European security affairs highlighted
352General Colin Powell, The National Military Strategy
,
Washington, DC, 1992, 8.
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some of the current restructuring, stating, "our new forces
will enable the allies to increase their NATO roles and
responsibilities for European security." 353 The Europeans
have long tried to emphasize their contributions to their own
defense to convince the United States of their seriousness.
With a substantial U.S. withdrawal already in progress, the
Europeans - even as all the West European nations are also
reducing their defense budgets and forces - must now assume a
great deal more of the burden. The Europeans have
acknowledged this need, and have taken steps to satisfy it,
reflected in the development of new security organizations.
2 . The European Community, The Western European Union,
and the French-German Proposal for a European Corps
As the vehicle of European integration, the EC plays
a pivotal role in the overall process, including that
involving new military structures. The WEU, which includes
nine of the twelve EC members, occupies a critical position
between the EC and NATO and its established collective defense
capabilities. While the WEU has often reaffirmed its enduring
link with NATO, it is possible that -if some of the hindrances
toward closer cooperation are overcome - the WEU will grow
much closer to the EC. Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis
has spoken of either a merger or a clear institutional link
"George Bader, "U.S. Military Presence in Europe,"
statement before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, April
1, 1992, 2.
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existing between the EC and WEU by 1998. 354 As the U.S. role
in Europe becomes less pre-eminent, the WEU will have to fill
some of the vacuum, even though its independent military
capabilities are in the early stages of development. This
will be an important factor governing U.S. alliance
relationships, and it illustrates the continuing need for
NATO.
The Franco-German proposal for a European corps, on
the other hand, seems to have no distinct mission. Created by
politicians without significant military input, the corps idea
serves French needs by institutionalizing autonomy from U.S.
influence. The Germans, in contrast, wish to subordinate the
corps to NATO. In addition, the German Basic Law crisis over
the out-of-area question, which is discussed in Chapter Five,
seem further to complicate the realization of an iniative
already losing both steam and direction, as out-of-area
missions seem fundamental to the corp's existence. As the WEU
develops, the "Eurocorps" may fade out as an independent
option, other than providing for continued Franco-German
bilateral cooperation. The important point, then, will be the
coexistence of NATO and the WEU.
'-"Andreas Unterberger, interview with Gianni De Michelis,
Die Presse , March 23, 1992, 3 (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1992, 8).
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3 . Rise of the NACC and the NATO/CSCE Links
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was born
from the changes in Eastern Europe. Arising from uncharted
territory, the NACC is widely seen on both sides of the
Atlantic as able to contribute to the continued progress of
the Eastern Europeans (including the former Soviet republics)
toward economic, political, and military reform, resulting (it
is hoped) in stability in the region. According to James
Baker,
NATO, through the NACC, can concretely provide expertise
and operational experience in defense and security affairs
that will help our liaison partners make the transition to
durable democratic systems. Working together with our new
partners, we can implement a successful NACC program that
will contribute to security and stability throughout the
Euro-Atlantic community. 355
The United States saw the Council as providing a new and
necessary role for NATO, while the French have tried to limit
the scope of the organization's activities because they have
seen NACC as a way to perpetuate American influence. NACC has
been an important forum for addressing the concerns of the
East European countries, while at the same time linking them
(loosely) to the American-led NATO security structure.
NATO, transforming itself into an organ that can act
effectively in the post-Cold War world, seems to have found
new rationales that can complement its institutional strength.
355James Baker, intervention at the NACC ministerial
meeting, Brussels, March 10, 1992, in US Department of State
Dispatch
, March 16, 1992, 202.
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In addition it provides an avenue for the U.S. to maintain a
role in European security affairs and ease some of its fears
about potential European instability. As for the CSCE, it
seems likely that the NACC may overlap with some of its roles,
including perhaps that of a security forum. It seems
unavoidable that an organization that has some enforcement
capabilities and well-established bureaucratic structures will
relegate one paralyzed by the need for consensus and lacking
effective institutional structures to a more limited role.
Still, the U.S. will continue to support the goals and process
of CSCE, such as crisis-prevention and management, even while
it strives to solidify the role NACC is building. Ultimately,
NATO and the NACC may be able to work with the EC and WEU (the
European pillar) in constructing a regime based on collective
security within Europe and collective defense against risks
and threats from outside Europe, which leaves Europe most of
the responsibility but keeps the U.S. tied into Europe to
provide the support the Europeans may need in a crisis.
C. EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
Obviously, the problem of intra-European squabbling
remains, slowing the process of integration while
personalities and domestic constituencies are satisfied. One
important feature of changes in Europe is common to the U.S.
(and Canada) : the need to cut defense spending. This section
briefly summarizes the attitudes of the key European actors
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toward designing a new European security architecture and the
role of the United States.
1 . Germany
As noted in Chapter Five, German foreign and security
policies are still in transition, as internal political
disputes threaten not only to hinder German initiatives in
European and international affairs, but also to undermine
Germany's reliability in the eyes of its allies - including
the U.S. Foreign Minister Genscher's goal, and that of a
large segment of the German population, is that the CSCE
assume the dominant role in European security. NATO and the
NACC, as well as European-only institutions such as the EC and
WEU, would ultimately become components of the CSCE. 356 The
NATO and U.S. roles have nevertheless been reemphasized, as
both are seen as essential for stability in Europe. Efforts
to tie other structures to NATO may also be attempts to draw
France back toward the military structure.
Even though Germany's leadership role is based mainly
on its economic power, the out-of-area question and the
legislated (and treaty-mandated) drawdown of the Bundeswe.hr
threaten to weaken Germany's leadership role in Europe and
356Genscher has called for CSCE collaboration with the WEU
or NATO for "peace-preserving measures . " Additionally, he has
called for CSCE blue and green helmet forces. See "Text of
Speech by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the
Opening of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki," Berlin
ADN, March 24, 1992, 1453 GMT (FBIS-WE, March 25, 1992, 2).
188
restrict its ability to carry out significant military
operations. German military officers have already expressed
concern over the deteriorating state of Germany's military
capabilities, while the out-of-area dispute has paralyzed many
of Germany's leading policy-makers within domestic politics.
As both trends are unlikely to change in the near future,
German decision-makers will have to consider their impact on
Germany's role in Europe.
2 . France
France, which has long asserted its independence in
political and military decision-making, finds itself on the
verge of isolating itself from European decisions and
institutions. Having attempted to establish security
structures in their own image, first the WEU and most recently
the Franco-German proposal for a European corps, the French
have encountered opposition from those who find French
leadership undesirable and fear the withdrawal of the United
States from Europe. With the Socialist government suffering
from paralysis owing to adverse election results and opinion
poll findings, Mitterrand can no longer claim a clear mandate
for his own policies.
France is, nevertheless, a powerful player in the
European integration process, and its opinions and attitudes
toward the new West European security architecture carry
weight. First, France still fears the possibility of a
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resurgent Germany. As a result, the French have exerted great
effort toward tying Germany into Western security structures,
with some degree of success. Second, the French feel that the
United States will sharply, perhaps even completely, curtail
its military presence in Europe, necessitating the West
Europeans developing their own autonomous military-
capabilities. While NATO remains essential in a supporting
role, European security will depend on the interactions of the
EC (European Political Union [EPU] ) , CSCE, and NATO. 357
While France and the U.S. share the same ultimate goals, i.e.
peace and stability in Europe, they have disagreed on the
vehicles to be used for achieving them. In this regard, the
French have opposed any expansion of NACC activities for fear
that NACC might become an instrument of American dominance in
European security affairs and undermine NATO's ability to
perform its core functions. The French believe it is time for
the Europeans to assume responsibility for their own defense.
3 . The United Kingdom
The British find themselves in a transitional position
as well. Long satisfied with the "special relationship" with
the United States, they have been among the most steadfast
supporters of the "Atlanticist " position. As Labour expert
Bruce George recently told Parliament,
357Roland Dumas, address to the Institute of Higher
Defense Studies, Paris, February 4, 1992, 4-6 (Text furnished
by the French Embassy in Washington)
.
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[It is] vital not to push the Americans out of Europe by
over-accentuating the Europeanness of defense. We must
keep North America involved in European security because
we are kith and kin and belong to the same political
traditions as Canada and the United States. 358
Still, the British have adopted more "Europeanist " leanings.
Public opinion, as described in Chapter Three, has shown
greater support for the concept of a European identity,
including in military forces. Prime Minister Major, more
independent after winning a general election in his own right,
will be able to stand for more Europeanist positions than did
his predecessor.
The British recognize the accession of Germany to the
role of leading partner of the United States in Europe. They
do not, however, feel that this diminishes the special
relationship or compromises the need for NATO and the American
role in Europe. The British support the several security
organizations developing in Europe and do not seem concerned
about the overlap in their roles and missions. The British-
Italian proposal of October 1991 showed British interest in
more European defense ideas, while not duplicating NATO
missions. This initiative is important in showing Britain's
interest in protecting established and proven structures while
participating fully in the move toward European integration.
3B8Bruce George, House of Common Parliamentary Debates
(Hansard) on Maastricht, December 19, 1991, 509.
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D. THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFFAIRS
Though for different reasons, all of the American allies
in Europe have called for a continuing American presence and
role in European security affairs. Ranging from the German
view - that American forces are necessary to ensure stability
- to that of the French - that the United States is essential
in providing last-resort insurance for contingencies beyond
the EC/WEU's capabilities - there is a consensus that the U.S.
needs to remain engaged in Europe. In the United States,
however, a debate rages about the type of engagement and about
whether any engagement is still needed as the European (and
world) security environments have changed.
1 . World Involvement
The American role is changing, as the distribution of
world power shifts. While the U.S. is and will for some time
at least remain the world's most powerful nation, the nature
of its power and its ability to use that power have changed.
According to Joseph Nye,
...the critical question for the future United States is
not whether it will start the next century as a superpower
with the largest supply of resources, but to what extent
it will be able to control the political environment and
to get other nations to do what it wants. 359
The United States has long championed the assumption
by the West Europeans of more responsibility for their own
359Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of
American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 175.
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defense. The U.S. nonetheless wishes to keep engaged in the
security affairs of Europe, with a certain degree of
influence. Isolationism has been emphatically rejected by the
Administration. As Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger has observed,
I would like to make the case today that what we did to
win the Cold War is in fact very much relevant to the
challenges we are now facing at home and abroad, and that
we must ignore the siren song of those who urge us to
'come home' and set aside the burden of world leadership
which was thrust upon us 50 years ago this December. 360
At the same time, the U.S. has recognized that it has
a continuing commitment to the defense of Western Europe, and
the ways of operationalizing that commitment after the demise
of the Soviet Union have been the focal point of the ongoing
American debate. As President Bush has stated,
We agreed that NATO remains the bedrock of European peace
and there is no substitute for our Atlantic link, anchored
by a strong American military presence in Europe - which
the Chancellor and I both agreed must be maintained. 361
The Administration has had a difficult time in convincing
Congress of the need for 150,000 troops. 362 The number now
360Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Engagement vs. Withdrawal:
US Foreign Policy After the Cold War, " remarks at a Business
Week symposium at Washington, DC, October 3, 1991, in US
Department of State Dispatch , October 7, 1991, 738.
361George Bush, news conference with Helmut Kohl at
Washington, DC, March 22, 1992, in US Department of State
Dispatch , March 23, 1992, 217.
362For a review of recent Congressional debate on the
subject see Pat Towel 1, "Army's Cutback Procedures Win
Unexpected Support," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report ,
March 7, 1992, 553.
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seems likely to drop; but the importance of the commitment
remains, as the Administration has demonstrated in various
recent strategic planning documents.
The specific number of American forces may not be as
important as some say. While 150,000 appears to be a
significant figure for the Germans, as well as being the
Administration's target, it is more important that the number
be based on an assessment of the capabilities required to
carry out missions for which American forces could
realistically be assigned. Is 150,000 necessary to ensure
European stability? The U.S. seems less eager to make that
point than it once was, as the argument has been joined by
those trying to determine what the connection between such a
presence and the prevention of conflict between Hungary and
Romania would be, for example. More likely, the Pentagon will
push for those forces needed for prepositioning in Europe to
be used in the Middle East or elsewhere, though this is
obviously politically sensitive in European capitals. George
Bader has recently testified to a number of missions for
American forces in Europe:
[U.S. forces in Europe] will demonstrate U.S. commitment,
deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote U.S.
influence and access to overseas facilities and, when






2. U.S. Public Opinion
The views of the American public will be particularly-
important not only in the 1992 campaign season but also in the
future, as recent scandals have increased the public's
displeasure with the federal government that has grown over
the years. As a result, it is necessary to examine recent
public opinion trends that will affect the future of the
American security role in Europe. First, by a 5:1 margin,
Americans believe that the country needs to concentrate more
on domestic issues than foreign policy, even while a slight
majority favored continuing world involvement by the U.S. 364
At the same time, there has been a loss of confidence in the
global leadership role of the United States, as only 30%
believed that it would be the leader of the free world and
only 63% thought the country would even still be a superpower
in the year 2000
.
36S
364Gallup Poll taken January 6-9, 1992, in Richard J.
Cattani, "America in the World," Christian Science Monitor
,
March 4, 1992, 18.
365
"Opinion Outlook," National Journal , December 14, 1991,
3046. 39% of Americans believed leadership would be exercised
by the triad of the U.S., Japan, and Europe. Much of the loss
of confidence in American leadership, as compared with results
from 1986 surveys, stems from economic weakness, as the trade
and budget deficits have increased while Japan and Germany
have gained economic strength. See John Rielly (President of
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations), "Public Opinion:
The Pulse of the '90s," Foreign Policy , Spring 1991, 80.
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Second, even while Americans overwhelmingly supported
a continued military alliance with Europe 366
,
the number of
those favoring a reduced commitment to Europe grew by
substantial amounts, doubling (from 11 to 22%) in a survey of
the mass public, and up four times (from 13 to 57%) in the
opinions of "leaders" of public opinion compared with a poll
taken in 1987. 367 Third, and perhaps ominously, 30% of the
public and 41% of leaders felt that the most serious threat in
the future would come from economic competition with Europe,
and a significant minority of both samples believed that the
EC exercised unfair trading practices. 368 The results of
such surveys could have a substantial impact on the shaping of
the political agenda, as they show a large tilt in public
attitudes in the wake of the Cold War.
3 . Congress and the American Role in European Security
Congressional activism in security policy, significant
not only because of the demands of public opinion but also
because of a perceived lack of executive branch initiative,
has already made the long-term maintenance of the
Administration's goals for force levels in Europe uncertain.
366The public supported this position by a margin of 5:1
in an October 5-7, 1991 CBS/New York Times poll. Cattani, 18.
367Rielly, 86-7. The leadership sample in the survey
consisted of 377 individuals who work with international and
security issues from Congress, the Administration, business,
communications, education, and foreign policy institutes.
368Ibid., 86, 95.
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It already seems probable that troop levels will fall below
150,000, so the question becomes what a reasonably stable end
point might be. Some have called for 75,000-100,000, but the
final number could be much less, especially if momentum based
on budget-cutting and burden-sharing accelerates. Some
believe that if force levels drop much below 75,000, force
cutting momentum could take them to zero. This would change
the entire American posture in Europe, with a large loss of
influence
.
Though budget-cutting and burden-sharing issues are
sufficiently strong considerations to cause force levels to
drop substantially, the increased salience of trade issues is
a new factor in the equation. Disputes over protectionism and
the future of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) threaten to upset the economic,
political, and military relations between the U.S. and its
European allies. Though efforts are being made to rescue the
Round, the potential for failure is great. Though it is by no
means certain, the definite possibility exists that a failed
GATT could aggravate protectionist impulses and damage
transatlantic relations. The trade-security linkage discussed
in Chapter Six could become very real in such a scenario,
generating its own momentum.
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4. The Future U.S. Role in European Security Affairs
Though it might have appeared for some time that
European efforts to develop a specific security identity were
attempts to drive the U.S. out of European security affairs,
the Europeans have made concerted efforts to convince the U.S.
that their intentions are otherwise. Each ally, including
France, has spoken clearly of the need for a continued
American presence in Europe to fulfill important roles. The
Europeans in the EC and WEU are attempting to address the
burden-sharing issue by designing their own defense identity,
which would be associated with NATO in one of several
potential frameworks. At the same time, this identity is
consistent with the process of forging European Political
Union. As a result, while the United States has not been
excluded from the European table by the Europeans (the U.S. is
a full member of the CSCE and will communicate with the WEU
and the EC; and NATO and the NACC will continue to function),
the United States may no longer possess the dominant role in
European security affairs that it held since the period from
1949-1950 to 1989-1991.
Does this mean the U.S. will be marginalized? The
answer depends on the decisions taken by the U.S. government.
Most Europeans do not wish to marginalize the United States.
Indeed, the greater risk may be one of U.S. withdrawal.
Though the Administration has often repeated the need for the
United States to remain actively involved in European security
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affairs, its arguments have not, so far, succeeded in
convincing a skeptical Congress that feels that the President
has not developed a clear, long-term strategy for the U.S. in
Europe (or the world) . As a result, Congress has taken the
initiative and acted (based on tight budgets, the end of the
Soviet threat, and the need to devote attention to other
regions) to legislate large troop cuts and a diminished U.S.
role in Europe.
While much of this decision-making is entirely
appropriate, given changes in the security environment, the
danger is that short-sightedness will reduce the American role
too far and too fast. Though the Administration has been
accused of an inability to respond to drastic world changes
with new thinking, responding sharply to the consequences of
the business cycle is hardly long-term strategic vision. In
addition, to require that the Pentagon produce specific threat
scenarios to justify a U.S. military presence in Europe is
unreasonable. The world has shown itself to be a dangerous
place for hundreds and thousands of years. To draw inward and
assume there is no longer any reason for forces in Europe is
short-sighted and potentially costly. 369
369There are a number of prominent Americans who have
argued in favor of some variety of such a neoisolationist
attitude. Pat Buchanan's "America First" campaign is a
particularly newsworthy example. Hobart Rowen quotes
Buchanan: "George Bush... is a globalist, and we are
nationalists. He believes in some pax universalis . We
believe in the old Republic. He would put America's wealth
and power at the service of some vague new world order. We
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The United States needs a policy that works with the
main European and transatlantic institutions to address not
only security issues but also their domestic implications. In
order to avoid "marginalization" from European security
affairs, the U.S. must take an active, reasonable, and
bipartisan role in the transitions taking place in Europe.
Otherwise, marginalization may occur not too far in the
future
.
will put America first." "America First: A Misguided Idea,"
Washington Post , December 22, 1991, HI.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis has been to determine whether
the development of a West European defense identity could
result in the marginalization of the United States in European
security affairs. The Cold War has ended and changing power
distributions are altering the face of world security
politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern
Bloc has instigated reappraisals of the defense policies of
nations around the world, and NATO's strategy has been
fundamentally recast. At the same time, these events have
raised questions about the goals of American security policy
and whether it remains appropriate for the U.S. to play a
major role in European security affairs.
Since NATO was created to meet the threat of the Soviet
Union (containing Germany was a deliberate side effect), the
demise of the Soviet threat has induced questions about
whether NATO retains a reason for being. Indeed, this concern
raises other questions about whether any military alliance is
justified in Europe. Walt's balance of the threat theory
seems to justify military alliances in Europe, and his thesis
is strengthened by numerous additional factors regarding
institutional cooperation, culture, and the momentum of
European political union. Consideration of the foreseeable
risks alone provides a daunting picture of instability which
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could be more likely to erupt into conflict without the
stabilizing role of the superpower rivalry of the Cold War.
In view of risks, ranging from ethnic conflicts in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction around Europe's periphery, West
Europeans have reason to desire continued military
cooperation, with or without American participation.
West European defense autonomy should not be expected in
the very near future. While in principle many West Europeans
long for such status, many obstacles remain to be overcome in
the process, especially issues of national sovereignty and
domestic politics that hinder agreement. Though the
Maastricht Summit led to an accord on security policy, the
agreed treaty formulas were vague and left the adherents free
to attach whatever interpretations that they pleased. Still,
it is significant that the British and others have moved far
toward more "Europeanist " positions, and that the
"Europeanists " - especially France - have attempted to soothe
the concerns of the " Atlanticists " that the U.S. may be forced
out of its position of influence and that small countries may
be faced with a new hegemony based on France or a Franco-
German partnership leading the European political union. The
development of the WEU is critical toward both a West European
security identity and the continued role of NATO.
The issue of West European nuclear cooperation is a
critical subset of the search for West European defense
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autonomy. Several historical examples exist of attempts to
promote closer nuclear cooperation, but each has failed, with
minor exceptions. The British and the French have made
efforts toward limited cooperation, but wide gulfs remain. In
this instance, national sovereignty is at the heart of the
issue, because of the symbolic value of nuclear weapons. If
close nuclear cooperation came to pass, it would take place
after all significant hurdles toward political and military
union had already been cleared in Western Europe.
No discussion of West European security policy can be
complete without specific attention to Germany's role. The
newly-reunified economic powerhouse occupies a pivotal spot in
the processes of economic, political, and military
integration. Both the Bonn-Paris and Bonn-Washington axes
will continue to play a large role. Significantly, however,
the domestic political and economic climate is such that
Germany has had difficulty devoting sufficient attention to
these issues, as mounting unification costs magnify German
problems in reaching a defense consensus . The weight of
Germany is so great, however, that should Germany ever decide
to lean strongly toward the Atlanticist or Europeanist view,
the other could be gravely weakened. At present, however,
perceived German ambivalence has engendered questions by its
allies about its motives and reliability.
All of the above considerations are affecting NATO's
attempts to influence and fit into the changing European
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security landscape. The Alliance has formulated a new
military and security strategy to adapt to the changes. The
development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
has not only been a strong political response to the needs of
Eastern Europe, but it has also set up a formidable barrier to
those who would wish to limit severely NATO's future role. As
nearly all influential European officials (East and West) have
called for the maintenance of NATO and an American role in
European security affairs, it falls upon the U.S. government
to decide what it wishes America's mission to be. While the
Bush Administration has strenuously supported NATO and a
substantial American military presence in Europe, many members
of Congress have taken opposing positions. As tight budgets,
isolationism, and protectionism may have greater influence on
future American political agendas, there is more than a minor
chance that the American role will be reduced to a token one,
especially if the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiations remain stalemated.
While at one time it might have seemed that West European
efforts to develop a defense and security identity were
equivalent to attempts to drive the U.S. out of European
security affairs, it seems that more than anything else the
key driver toward such marginalization might be the actions of
the U.S. Congress. American public and elite opinion has
shifted away from previously high levels of support for NATO,
and this could encourage Congress to adopt anti-European
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attitudes which might jeopardize American influence in Europe.
As a result, the United States could run the risk of entering
the 21st Century with a haphazard strategy that forgets that
conflicts and wars are typical features of international
politics. It is to be hoped that a more thorough analysis of
European history and security policy will lead to more
effective and timely strategic planning.
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